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PROTECTING BRAND IMAGE OR GAMING
THE SYSTEM?CONSUMER GAGCONTRACTS
IN AN AGE OF CROWDSOURCED RATINGS
AND REVIEWS
LUCILLE M. PONTE*
Traditionally, businesses developed and controlled brand image
through company-sponsored advertising and marketing campaigns. With the rise of social media, brand communications have
become more interactive, especially on crowdsourced review sites.
This increased interactivity helps companies to gain valuable insight into the consumer experience and to improve their brand
image and customer engagement. Businesses soon learned that
positive consumer ratings and reviews often translated into enhanced brand reputation and increased revenues. Some merchants and professionals seek to burnish their brand image by
paying for positive reviews while others try to silence disgruntled
customers through adhesive nondisparagement clauses. These
gag clauses may rely upon dubious intellectual property claims,
monetary penalty clauses, and other financial threats in order to
prevent unhappy consumers from posting negative reviews.
Certain businesses justify these provisions as legitimate actions
needed to protect their brand image and goodwill in a social
media environment fraught with fake negative reviews from
unscrupulous competitors and libelous consumers. This Article
examines the rise of consumer nondisparagement clauses and
considers the legality of such agreements under contract, free
speech, and intellectual property principles. Issues of freedom of
contract and concerns about deceptive advertising, fair use, and
copyright misuse are also addressed. This Article concludes with
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a review of self-regulatory proposals that balance freedom of
contract and legitimate branding concerns with customer speech
interests and issues of good faith and fair dealing.
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INTRODUCTION

Businessesinvestagreatdealoftim e, effort, and expenseinto
developing their brand and building custom er relationships.1
Traditionally, businesses shaped their brand im age through
com pany-sponsored advertising and m arketing cam paigns.2 With
theriseofsocialm edia, brand com m unicationshavebecom em uch
m ore com plicated, with greater consum er interactivity3 through
online and brick and m ortar websites, socialm edia platform s,4
aswellasindependentcrowdsourced review sites, such asYelp,5
1 Bi
llions of dollars are spent annually to prom ote positive consum er
recognition ofbrands. PaulW. Garrity, Advertising Regulation in the Web 2.0
World, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.m etrocorpcounsel
.com /articles/13197/advertising-regulation-web-20-world [http://perm a.cc/
SF5Q
-6QBH]. It is estim ated that U.S. consum ers engage in approxim ately 100
m illion discussions aboutbrands every hour, and aboutthree billion brand
conversationseach day. JONAH BERGER, CONTAGIOUS:WHY THINGS CATCH ON
7, 64(2013). Overall, word ofm outh between ordinaryconsum ersisten tim es
m oresuccessfulthan traditionaladvertising. Id. at8.
2 Garri
ty, supra note 1. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 795
96, 80304 (2010). ProfessorKatyalstatesthatbranding strategiesm ake up
a significantportion ofgeneralcorporate strategy;financialanalysts claim
thatbrand equitym akesup atrem endousam ountofcom panyvalue. Attim es,
a com pany
s brand equity has been m ore im portant than the book value
ascribed to a particular product.Id. at804. See generally JENNIFER GILLAN,
TELEVISION BRANDCASTING:THE RETURN OF THE CONTENT-PROMOTION HYBRID
24562 (2015) (discussing the historicalrole of television as brand recom m endation m achineand content-prom otion hybridson digitalplatform sasvehiclesforgeneratinganew waveofonlinebrand recom m endations).
3 Kai
tlin A. Dohse, Note, Fabricating Feedback: Blurring The Line
Between Brand Management and Bogus Reviews, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL
Y
363, 365 (2013);KendallL. Short, Note, Buy My Vote: Online Reviews for
Sale, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 441, 44243 (2013). About 87 percent of
Am ericans use new m edia technologies, with about86 percentpreferring to
interactwith brandsonline. 2010 Cone Consumer New Media Study 2, CONE
COMMC
NS, INC., http:
//
www.conecom m .com /stuff/
contentm gr/
files/0/61d7fb20ef6
d001b5b77a4308eeb986b/files/
consum er_new_m edia_fact_sheet_final.pdf [http:
//
perm a.cc/79NU-9NXJ][hereinafterNew MediaStudy].
4 Andrew Bl
uebond, When the Customer Is Wrong: Defamation, Interactive
Websites, and Immunity, 33 REV. LITIG. 679, 68283 (2014).
5 Cal
ifornia-based Yelp statesthatithasabout83 m illion m onthly unique
visitors, with over83 m illion custom erreviewsoflocalbusinesses. About Yelp,
YELP, http://www.yelp.com /about[http://perm a.cc/PD7M-2ENR].
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TripAdvisor,6 and Angie
s List.7 The one-way push ofbrand
m arketing cam paigns has given way to a diverse, lively consum erdialoguein a variety ofonlinesitesoutsidethecontrolof
brand owners,8 with increased consum er reliance on online
sources ofproduct and service inform ation especially custom er
reviews both dom estically9 and internationally.10 Thisreliance
Massachusetts-based TripAdvisor hosts m ore than 200 m illion reviews
and opinions ofm ore than 5.2 m illion hospitality businesses and touristattractions in 45 countries. About TripAdvisor, TRIPADVISOR, http://www.trip
advisor.com /PressCenter-c6-About_Us.htm l[http://perm a.cc/A8QY-QURB]. Its
site indicatesthatitreceivesabout375 m illion unique m onthly visitors, excludingvisitorstoitsChinesetravelreview site, daodao.com . Id.
7 Subscri
ption-based Angie
s Listhas m ore than three m illion subscribers
with custom erratingson over720 differentlocalservices. About Us, ANGIE
S
LIST, http://www.angieslist.com /aboutus.htm [http://perm a.cc/EW9J-Q9AM].
Mem berspen aboutsixtythousand reviewsperm onth on thesite. Id.
8 Despi
te form albranding efforts, consum ers are m ore often turning to
crowdsourced consum erreviewsand ratingssitesto inform theirpurchasing
decisions, and notbrand advertising. Consumers Turn to Online Ratings and
Reviews, as Sites Respond to Concerns, PRWEB (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.pr
web.com /
releases/2008-02-28/ratings/prweb729043.htm
[http://
perm a.cc/PF4C
-8D3F]. In 2011, approxim ately64percentofconsum erssearchedforconsum er
reviews before m aking a purchasing decision, up from 55 percentin 2010.
Game Changer: Cone Survey Finds 4-out-of-5 Consumers Reverse Purchase
Decisions Based on Negative Online Reviews, CONE COMMC
NS, INC. (
Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.conecom m .com /stuff/contentm gr/files/0/286c351989671ae74
994fec139863bb2/files/2011_cone_online_influence_trend_tracker_release_and
_fact_sheet.pdf[http://perm a.cc/VA8H-4GMM][hereinafterCone2011 Survey].
About20 to50 percentofallpurchasing decisionsaroseoutofword-of-m outh
referrals. BERGER, supra note 1, at7. Yetoverallword ofm outh occursm ost
often in theofflineworld, with onlineword ofm outh accounting foronly about
7 percent. Id. at11. Online word-of-m outh m arketing m ay seem ubiquitous,
butBergerassertsthat
[w]e tend to overestim ate[]online word ofm outh because
it
s easier to see. Socialm edia sites provide a handy record of
alltheclips, com m ents, and othercontentweshareonline. So
when we look atit, itseem s like a lot. Butwe don
tthink as
m uch about allthe offline conversations we had over that
sam etim eperiod because wecan
teasily seethem .
Id. at11.
9 About89 percentofconsum ersf
ind onlinereviewstobetrustworthychannelsforassessingproductsand services, an increasefrom 67 percentin 2010.
Cone2011 Survey, supra note8;see Dohse, supra note3, at364;Short, supra
note 3, at444. A recentstudy found thatconsum ersflock to online research
6
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m ay bem isplaced, asaboutone-third ofreviewsarethoughtto
befake,11 including custom erassessm entsofnonexistentoryetto-open businesses.12 Consum ersm ayeasilybeabletospotduplicativeorirrelevantpostingsasopinion spam , butitisbecom ing
over in-store interactions with sales associates because itis faster than inperson efforts, bolstersconsum erconfidencein buyingdecisions, and offersm ore
credible inform ation to consum ers. Justin Malbon, Taking Fake Online Consumers Seriously, 36 J. CONSUM. POL
Y 139, 140, 14344 (
2013);Short, supra
note 3, at44546;PressRelease, PowerReviews, Consum ersPreferto Conduct
Research Online vs. Speak to Store Associates:Few and Lack ofNegative
ReviewsDegradeConsum erTrust(May 3, 2010), http://www.e-tailing.com /con
tent/?p=1193 [http://perm a.cc/U6UM-UJSM]. Further, consum ers m ay not
trustcom paniesthathavescantnum bersofonlinereviewsorhavefew orno
negativereviewstoconsider. Malbon, supra, at149;PowerReviews, supra.
10 Press Rel
ease, The Nielsen Co., PersonalRecom m endations and Consum er Opinions Posted Online are the Most Trusted Form s ofAdvertising
Globally (July 7, 2009), http://www.nielsen.com /content/dam /corporate/us/en
/newswire/uploads/2009/07/pr_global-study_07709.pdf [http://perm a.cc/7GHC
-UVDW]. A 2009 survey of25,000 onlineconsum ersfrom fifty countriesindicatesthat70 percentofonlineshopperstrustconsum erreviewsin m akingtheir
buying decisions. Id. Thehighestlevelsoftrustin onlinereviewswerefound
in Vietnam (81 percent), Italy (80 percent), China and France (77 percent).
Id. Online consum ers were the m ost skepticalabout custom er reviews in
Argentina and Finland. Id. U.S. trustlevels were also relatively high at72
percent, ranked twelfth outofthe fifty surveyed countries. Id. See Malbon,
supra note 9, at14243 (reviewing Nielsen study and discussing Australian
focusgroup research on consum ertrustofonlinereviews). Consum erreviews
are particularly helpfulwhen a consum erisbuying online from a rem ote location, asthey can help balance the inform ation asym m etry between online
consum ersand sellers. Malbon, supra note9, at13940, 149.
11 Dohse, supra not
e 3, at385;David Streitfeld, The Best Book Reviews
Money Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, atB1. One study estim ated that
1015 percentofYelp reviews were bogus. L. David Russell, Christopher C.
Chiou & Zain A. Shirazi, Fake It Until You Make it? Battling Fake Online
Reviews, LAW360 (June 9, 2014, 12:17 PM), http://www.law360.com /articles
/545366/fake-it-until-you-m ake-it-battling-fake-online-reviews [http://perm a.cc
/9XT5-P72J].
12 See generally GrantMart
in, Fake Nautical Restaurant on TripAdvisor
Gets Glowing Reviews, FORBES (July 29, 2013, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes
.com /sites/grantm artin/2013/07/29/fake-restaurant-on-tripadvisor-gets-glowing
-reviews/?utm _cam paign=techtwittersf&utm _source=twitter&)%3B
[http://
perm a.cc/M9ZX-CCBR];RaphaelBrion, Graham Elliots Unopened Resto Gets a
Negative Yelp Review, EATER (Sept. 1, 2010, 4:55 AM), http://eater.com /archives
/
2010/09/
01/graham -elliots-graham wich-gets-negative-yelp-review.php [http://
perm a.cc/RVB2-U7HZ].
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challenging to decipherm ore sophisticated form s offake online
reviews.13 Yetthe desire to share inform ation online aboutour
experiencesand viewpointscontinuestogrow.14
Thisincreasedinteractivityhashelped som ebusinessestogain
valuable insightinto the consum erexperience, to im prove their
brand im age, tostrengthen custom erengagem entand long-term
relationships,15 andtolearn aboutproductqualityissues.16 Others
have viewed socialm edia and crowdsourced reviewsasanother
perilous obstacle to their brand im age and business or professionalsuccess.17 Research studies show thatpositive consum er
Nitin Jindal& Bing Liu, Opinion Spam and Analysis, WSDM PROC.
(Feb. 2008), http:/
/184pc128.csie.ntnu.edu.tw/
presentation/09-04-06/Opinion%20
Spam %20and%20Analysis.pdf[http://perm a.cc/SP2K-MQ87];Malbon, supra
note 9, at 149;Myle Ott, Yejin Choi, Claire Cardie & Jeffrey T. Hancock,
Finding Deceptive Opinion Spam by Any Stretch of the Imagination, 49 ASS
N
FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 309, 30910 (
2011). Professors Jindaland
Liu studied m illionsofreviewson Am azon.com and concluded thatdeterm ining realfrom bogusreviewsby sim ply reading the reviewsisvery hard, ifnot
im possible, becausea spam m ercan carefully crafta spam review toprom ote
a targetproductorto dam age the reputation ofanotherproductthatisjust
likeany otherinnocentreview.Jindal& Liu, supra.
14 See BERGER, supra not
e 1, at3334. Neurologicalresearch indicatesthat
self-sharingactivatesthe sam e pleasure sensorsin ourbrain associated with
food and m oney, so itm ay be difficultto dialback this desire in our social
m edia age. Id. About87 percentofAm ericans use new m edia technologies,
with about86 percentpreferring to interactwith brandsonline. New Media
Study, supra note3, at12.
15 Dohse, supra not
e 3, at 387; Ann Marie Marciarille, Hows My
Doctoring? Patient Feedbacks Role In Assessing Physician Quality, 14
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 390, 40102 (2012). Research shows that
unhappy custom ersm ay am end orrem ove a negative postifa com pany acts
quickly toresolvea problem . Short, supra note3, at451. About40 percentof
consum erswould think aboutpatronizing businessesthatrespond prom ptly
tonegativereviews. Short, supra note3, at451.
16 Dohse, supra not
e3, at364;Marciarille, supra note15, at390.
17 Paresh Dave, Small businesses struggle to manage online image, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.latim es.com /business/la-fi-tech-savvy-online
-reviews-20130810-story.htm l[http://perm a.cc/7SJQ-6WD7];DaniGirl, Why
Yelp sucksYelp survival guide, BOSSHAWAII (Jan. 6, 2013), http://www
.bosshi.com /why-yelp-sucks/[http://perm a.cc/S27B-SECD];Brad Tuttle, Guess
Whos Getting Some Pretty Awful Reviews: User Review Sites, TIME (Sept. 21,
2013), http:
//
business.tim e.com /
2013/09/21/guess-whos-getting-som e-pretty-awful
-reviews-user-review-sites/[http:
//
perm a.cc/
RY9A-P8X3]. See also Stefan Rutzel,
Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal Problems
13
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ratingsand reviewsoften translateintoenhanced brand reputation and increased revenues,18 while bad ratings and reviews
could devastate one
s reputation and financialfuture.19 Theseresearch findings, coupledwith anecdotalbusinessexperiences, have
led to a rush for positive consum er com m entaries.20 In lightof
thesepressures, som ebusinesseshavetriedtoburnish theirbrand
im age by paying for positive reviews,21 or for negative reviews
Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 36
(1995)(rem arking that[r]eputation and im age arefragilecom m odities).
18 BERGER, supra not
e 1, at18;Cone 2011 Survey, supra note 8, at1, 3.
Thissurveyfound that87 percentofconsum ersindicated thatpositiveonline
inform ation helped to confirm a decision to buy a product or service. See
Dohse, supra note3, at370;Short, supra note3, at453;Russelletal., supra
note11.
19 About80 percentofcust
om ersstated thatnegative online inform ation
changed the consum er
sm ind aboutbuying thatproductorservice. Cone 2011
Survey, supra note8, at1, 3. Branding expertshavesuggested thateven one
negative review can resultin a 25 percentdecline in revenues. Dave, supra
note 17. Otherresearchers have also found thatonline reviews can m ake or
break both new and established com panies.Short, supra note3, at443.
20 Trust
You, a hospitality reputation m anagem entcom pany, indicated that
a business
s ratings largely rem ain static after the initialtwelve reviews, so
earlypositivereviewsarecritical. Dave, supra note17.
21 Kat
yal, supra note 2, at83334;Short, supra note3, at443, 447;Robert
Sprague& MaryEllen Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling
a Web of Deceit, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 42024 (2010);Insurance Coverage Implications of Internet, Technology and Social Media, 7, 11, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING
ISSUES ANALYSIS, Sept. 29, 2011, available at 2011 Em erging Issues5928. The
scram ble for positive reviews only worsens a cycle known as the feedback
loop.
The feedback loop is the phenom enon in which people are
m ore likely to selectbusinesses or products thathave m any
positivereviewsand avoid thosethathaveneutralornegative
reviews, oreven those thatonly have a few positive reviews.
The com panies or products thathave m ore positive reviews
garnerm orerealcustom ers, whothen postrealreviews, thereby
drawing in even m ore custom ers. Therefore, itbenefits com paniesto pay forinitialreviews eithervery good reviewsfor
them selvesorverybadreviewsfortheircom petitors. Thosecom panies thatactethically, however, and refrain from participating in thispractice, suffer. Theyeitherbecom ethetargetof
a m alicious cam paign ofnegative reviews, which can drive
away custom ersfrom even established businesses, orthey lack
enough exposuretoreceivelegitim atepositivereviewsfrom a
feedback loop.
Short, supra note3, at444(footnotesom itted).
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aim ed attrashing their com petitors,22 in violation ofstate and
federallaws.23
Others have tried to silence disgruntled custom ers via legal
actionsundera variety oflegaltheories24 orby instituting adhesivespeech suppression contractsorgagcontracts.25 Thesekinds
ofagreem ents are typically notpurely contracts ofsilence that
prohibitallspeech,26 aspositive reviewsand com m entsare not
only desirable but good for a business
s custom er relationships
and bottom line. Rather, anondisparagem entclausepreventsconsum ersfrom m aking orposting anynegativerem arks, criticism s,
orridiculeabouta business, itsgoods, and/oritsservices.27 These
clauses usually do not prevent allspeech only negative views
thatm ightharm orreflectpoorly on a brand
sim age even ifthe
statem entsarelegallyprotected trueoropinion speech aboutthe
consum er
sexperience.28
Short, supra note3, at443, 447.
See infra notes 36178 and accom panying text;see generally Lucille M.
Ponte, Mad Men Posing as Ordinary Consumers: The Essential Role of SelfRegulation and Industry Ethics in Decreasing Deceptive Online Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 46871 (2013)
(discussing issuesofstealth m arketing and astroturfingin socialm edia).
24 See infra not
es16269, 18594, 20209 and accom panying text. See generally Eric Goldm an, Doctor Lawsuits over Online Reviews by Patients (or
their family members), SANTA CLARA L. DIGITAL COMMONS (May21, 2014), http:/
/
digitalcom m ons.law.scu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1736&context=historical
[http://perm a.cc/S3ED-YY8J];MattKellogg & Sim on Frankel, Trends in Defamation Cases Involving Online Reviews, LAW360 (Nov. 27, 2013, 5:55 PM), http://
www.law360.com /articles/490334/trends-in-defam ation-cases-involving-online
-reviews[http://perm a.cc/6BCE-57TW].
25 Dohse, supra not
e3, at385.
26 Can Nondisparagement Clauses Silence Negative Online Reviews?, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 26, 2014), http://www.blankrom e.com /index.cfm
?contentID=37&item ID=3352 [http://perm a.cc/
3KLG-9LWE][hereinafter LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER].
27 Id. See infra not
es8291 and accom panying text.
28 See Dohse, supra not
e3, at386;Lyrissa BarnettLidsky, Silencing John
Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 90304, 91920,
94546 (2000)(proposing broaderapplication ofopinion privilege to protectonlinespeech byordinarypeople). Itisim portanttonotethatthisArticlefocuses
on nondisparagem entclausesthatsilenceprotected form sofonlinespeech, but
notillegalones, such asfalseordefam atoryspeech. Term sofserviceand other
contractclausesthatforbid falseordefam atory speech arenotgag contracts,
asthey only prohibitspeech thatisalready illegal. In addition, such clauses
22
23
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Nondisparagem entterm soften restupon dubiousintellectual
propertyclaim s, broadconfidentialityclauses, excessivem onetary
penalties, and other financialthreats in order to prevent unhappy consum ersfrom posting negativereviews.29 Certain businessesjustifythesegagcontractsaslegitim ateactionsneeded to
protecttheirbrand and goodwillin a socialm edia environm ent
fraughtwith fake negative reviewsfrom unscrupulouscom petitors, libelouspostings, threatsoflibelouspostingsby consum ers
seekingtoextractunfairadvantages, and deeplyflawed filtering
and ratingsystem son crowdsourced review sites.30
Despite the sheernum berofconsum erreviews, research indicatesthatthese ratingsdo littleto inform consum erscontem plating purchases aboutapplicable contractterm s, or to better
balance these adhesive term s between consum ers and m erchants.31 Although consum ers and public interest groups m ay
help to prom ote protected truthfuloropinion speech while avoiding faked or
untruespeech thatharm sboth businessesandconsum ers. See infra notes324
28 and 37478 (discussing endorsem entguideson honestopinionsneeded to
retain clausesforbiddingfalseordefam atoryspeech).
29 See infra not
es8291 and accom panying text.
30 See infra PartII and accom panyi
ngtext.
31 Ni
shanth V. Chari, Note, Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms
through Online Information Flows: An Empirical Study, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1618, 162122, 164550 (2010). Law and econom ics legaltheorists contend
that contract term s are part and parcelofthe consum er
s bargain with the
m erchant, along with price and productquality. Id. at162526. Yetthe consum er
sfailure to read orto understand theterm sofstandard form contracts
createsa m arketfailure. Id. at162628. In the author
s analysis ofsoftware
productratings on Am azon.com and Epinions.com , she found scantsupport
thattheseonlinereviewswould im pactthepro-sellerterm sand conditionsin
adhesive end user licensing agreem ents (EULAs). Id. at 164550. Her em piricalanalysis challenged argum ents from law and econom ics experts that
the m arketplace alone willeffectively discipline sellers whose adhesive contractterm saretooharsh and one-sided.
Onlineproductrating websitesdolittletoguideconsum ersregarding the contractterm sthataccom pany the productsthey
purchase. Thus, to the extent that online inform ation flows
m ay discipline sellers, online productratings are unlikely to
servethisrolein shapingEULA term s. Absentothersourcesof
m arketpressuretodisciplinesellers, onlineproductratingsdo
not alone support the argum ent that it is unnecessary for
courtsand legislaturestointervenetoprotectconsum ers.
Id. at164647;161922;see infra notes 285315 and accom panying text. She
concluded thatlegislaturesand courtsneed toprotectconsum ersfrom one-sided
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decrynondisparagem entclauses, itisnotclearwhethersuch provisionsin private party contractsare actually illegal.32 Because
contractlaw isacreatureofstatestatutesandcaselaw, each state
willneed tograpplewith itsview ofthelegality ofthesenondisparagem ent clauses in private agreem ents.33 Well-established
notions offreedom ofcontract, the partiesduty to read before
signing contracts, and respectfortheintegrity ofwritten agreem ents34 are com ing into conflictwith concerns aboutconsum er
online agreem ents, as productreviews did little to im prove m ore balanced
term sbetween buyersand sellers. Id.
32 Carol Bast
, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements
Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 639 (1999);Alan E. Garfield,
Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 26364 (1998). ProfessorsBastand Garfield posited concernsabout
contracts ofsilence when considering the censorship ofa CBS episode with
Jeffrey Wigand, a whistleblower on the tobacco industry, who had signed a
confidentiality agreem entwith his em ployer, Brown & William son Tobacco
Com pany. Prof. Garfield stated that
[s]ince partiesare generally freeundercontractlaw to strike
whateverbargain they please there isfreedom ofcontract
the centralconundrum contracts ofsilence pose is whether
theirsuppression ofspeech m akesa difference. Istheresom ething inherently troubling abouta prom ise to suppress one
s
speech thatwarrantsregulation, orshould onebeabletocom m ittokeepingsilentasreadilyasonecom m itstosellingcotton
orplaying football?Are prom isesofsilence differentbecause
they im plicatetheFirstAm endm entorviolatea publicpolicy
favoring freedom ofspeech, or are these constitutionaland
policy concerns irrelevantwhen a private party agrees to silencehim self?
Recenteventssuggestthattheanswerstothesequestions
are notsolely a m atter ofacadem ic concern. Contracts ofsilence are being used effectively to keep relevantand possibly
im portantinform ation outofthepublicdom ain.
Garfield, supra, at264(footnotesom itted).
33 See infra Part
sII and III and accom panyingtext.
34 See Om r
iBen-Shahar, The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract
Law, 27 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 23 (2009);Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 364, 375
(1970). Prof. Ben-Shaharstatesthat
[c]ontractlaw isobsessively engaged with thisproblem ofenhanced opportunity to read, in the nam e ofprinciples ofautonom y and individualpower, but ironically
the solutions
currently offered do nothing to prom ote com petition and robustassent. Opportunity toread fineprintissterileam m unition againstthepowerand sophistication ofcontractdrafters.

70

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059

protection, unconscionability, and publicpolicy issues,35 such as
the protection oftruthfuland opinion speech and the chilling
effect ofsuch clauses in the online and offline m arketplace of
consum erideas.36
Ben-Shahar, supra, at27. Effortsatm oredisclosureshaveseldom aided average individualsin understanding the added inform ation. DanielE. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE
L.J. 574, 57879 (2012). In m ostinstances, m ore sim plified disclosuresare m ore
effective in aiding party decision-m aking. Id. at 57879, 58081. See generally Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap
Dispute Resolution Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality of These
Online Consumer Products, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 119, 15967 (2011)
(proposing a variety ofm ethodsforsim plified disclosuresin online contracts
ofadhesion).
35 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 211, cm t. c(1981). Com m ents
on this section on standardized agreem ents recognize the challenges ofbalancing the interests ofboth contractdrafters and consum ers. The com m ent
considers both regulatory and judiciallim its on overreaching by drafters of
form contracts:
c. Review of unfair terms. Standardized agreem entsare com m only prepared by one party. The custom erassentsto a few
term s, typically inserted in blanks on the printed form , and
gives blanket assent to the type oftransaction em bodied in
the standard form . He is com m only not represented in the
drafting, and the draftsm an m ay be tem pted to overdraw ....
The obvious danger ofoverreaching has resulted in governm ent regulation ofinsurance policies, bills of lading, retail
installm entsales, sm allloans, and other particular types of
contracts .... Apartfrom such regulation, standard term sim posed by one party are enforced. Butstandard term sm ay be
superseded by... theoverridingobligation ofgood faith (§205)
and tothepowerofthecourttorefusetoenforcean unconscionable contract or term (§ 208). Moreover, various contracts
and term sareagainstpublicpolicyand unenforceable.
Id.
36 Iti
sim portantto recognize thatwhile substantialtruth isan absolute
defense to defam ation, opinion is notviewed as an absolute privilege. The
Suprem eCourtstated thatpastprecedentdid not
create a wholesale defam ation exem ption for anything that
m ight be labeled opinion. ... Not only would such an interpretation becontrary tothetenorand contextofthepassage,
butitwould also ignore the factthatexpressions ofopinion
m ayoften im plyan assertion ofobjectivefact.
Ifa speakersays, In m y opinion John Jones isa liar,he
im pliesa knowledgeoffactswhich lead totheconclusion that
Jonestold an untruth. Even ifthespeakerstatesthefactsupon
which he baseshisopinion, ifthose factsare eitherincorrect
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In PartI, thisArticleprovidesan overview oftheriseofnondisparagem entclausesin privatecontracts. Thissection exam ines
effortstoim portnondisparagem entprovisionsfrom othertypesof
agreem entsintoconsum ercontractsin therealm ofcrowdsourced
consum er review sites.37 Part II addresses som e ofthe m ultifaceted underlying factors thatm ay be contributing to the reliance on these clauses by som e businesses and professionals.38
PartIII addressesthe legality ofthese consum ergag clausesin
lightofbasicprinciplesofcontractform ation, unconscionability,
and public policy, and differentiates them from other form s of
legally protected nondisparagem entclauses.39 Proposed federal
optionsfora uniform response to dealwith the issue ofnondisparagem entclausesare considered in PartIV.40 In PartV, this
Article willconclude with proposalsforboth regulatory options
and self-regulatorybestpracticesthatseek tobalancetheprotection ofcustom er speech interests with the legitim ate branding
concernsofbusinessesand professionals.41
I. CONTRACTS OF SILENCE AND THE RISE OF
NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES
In asocietythatsohighlyprizesfreeexpression, itm ayseem
paradoxicalthatourlegalsystem tolerates a wide range ofcontractsofsilencebetween privateparties.42 Courtshavelongupheld
orincom plete, orifhis assessm entofthem is erroneous, the
statem ent m ay stillim ply a false assertion of fact. Sim ply
couching such statem entsin term sofopinion doesnotdispel
theseim plications;and the statem ent, In m y opinion Jonesis
a liar, can cause as m uch dam age to reputation as the
statem ent, Jones is a liar. As Judge Friendly aptly stated:
[It]would be destructive ofthe law oflibelifa writer could
escapeliabilityforaccusationsof[defam atoryconduct]sim ply
by using, explicitly orim plicitly, thewords
I think.

Milkovich v. Lorain JournalCo., 497 U.S. 1, 1819 (1990). See Lidsky, supra
note 28, at91930 (discussing opinion privilege and concerns thatMilkovich
created furtherconfusion aboutthisprivilege).
37 See infra PartI and accom panyi
ngtext.
38 See infra PartII and accom panyi
ngtext.
39 See infra PartIII and accom panyi
ngtext.
40 See infra PartIV and accom panyi
ngtext.
41 See infra PartV and accom panyi
ngtext.
42 Terry Morehead Dworki
n & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence,
36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 152 (1998);Garfield, supra note32, at26566.
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the validity ofspeech suppression agreem ents in em ploym ent,
settlem ent, franchise, and personalrelationship situations.43 In
part, thisjudicialacceptancereflectsa relianceon thetraditional
principlesoffreedom ofcontract, thedutytoreadacontractbefore
signing it,44 and deference to the integrity of written agreem ents.45 These contracts ofsilence m ay also be viewed as perm issiblein ordertovindicatesom eotherlegallyrecognized right
orduty, such asthe protection oftrade secretsand otherintellectualproperty,46 the confidentiality ofem ployer-em ployee and
other fiduciary relationships,47 the preservation of individual
privacy,48 orthenondisclosureofnationalsecurityconcerns.49 In
addition, in the settlem entcontext, the contractofsilence m ay
serve as an incentive to settle and to reduce the strain on lim ited judicialresources.50
Clearly, contractsofsilencem aybeinvalidated in certain circum stancestoavoid illegalorundesirablepublicends, such asa
Garfield, supra note 32, at 26874. See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra
note26.
44 See supra not
e34 and accom panying text. Itiswell-recognized thatm ost
consum ers do notread adhesive contracts and those that do m ay lack the
ability to understand them , creating a m arketfailure in preventing unfair
sellerterm s. Chari, supra note 31, at162223. Butsuch form agreem entsare
a dailystaplein consum erdealingstoprom oteefficiencyand toreducetransactionalcosts. Chari, supra note31, at1624. ProfessorLeffargued thatadhesivecontractsarenotcontractsatall, butproductsthatshould be properly
regulated toavoid falling below m inim um standardsofquality. ArthurAllen
Leff, Unconscionability and the CrowdConsumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 352, n.18 (1970); Arthur Allen Leff,
Contract as Thing, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 157 (1970);but see William J.
Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently
Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 45457 (2004)
(assertingthatcontractsofadhesion in theonlineworld areprim a facievalid
oncea userclicksI Agree). See infra note295 and accom panyingtext.
45 See supra not
e34and accom panyingtext.
46 Bast
, supra note 32, at63641;Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 42, at
15355;Garfield, supra note 32, at26872, 30001;Anthony G. Read, DeWitt
Clauses: Can We Protect Purchasers Without Hurting Microsoft?, 25 REV.
LITIG. 387, 39697 (2006).
47 See Bast
, supra note 32, at63336;Dworkin & Callahan, supra note42,
at15152, 161;Garfield, supra note32, at265, 270, 30102, 305, 308, 33638.
48 See Garf
ield, supra note32, at27274, 33942.
49 See Dworki
n & Callahan, supra note42, at162 & n.67;Garfield, supra
note32, at274.
50 See Garf
ield, supra note32, at266, 33234.
43
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contractofsilence to conceala crim e51 orothertortiousorlegal
wrongdoing,52 such as deceptive trade practices.53 In People v.
Network Associates,54 a software com pany included restrictive
clauses thatprohibited users from publishing benchm ark tests
or any productreviews withoutthe firm 
s perm ission.55 Thedisputed term swerelocated on thesoftwarediskettesand thecom pany
s website.56 An online m agazine requested perm ission to
publish a review aspartofa com parison with othersim ilarproducts.57 Network Associatesdenied itsapproval, and them agazine
published theirreview anyway, which contained unsatisfactory
ratings.58 Network Associatessenta lettertothem agazinecom m unicatingitsconcernsand referencingtherestrictivelanguage
in itslicensing agreem ent, which prom pted the state
s attorney
59
generaltoinvestigatethem atter.
See Bast, supra note32, at649;Garfield, supra note 32, at30609.
See Bast, supra note 32, at64546, 64849;Dworkin & Callahan, supra
note42, at17679;Garfield, supra note32, at32526.
53 See Cent
erforDem ocracy& TechnologyCom plaint& RequestforInvestigation, Injunction and OtherReliefbeforetheFederalTradeCom m ission, In the
Matter of Medical Justice Corp. 1, 9 (Nov. 9, 2011)[hereinafterCDT Com plaint].
54 758 N.Y.S.2d 466 (
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
55 Id. at467. Thedi
sputed provision stated:
Installingthissoftwareconstitutesacceptanceoftheterm sand
conditionsofthelicenseagreem entin thebox. Pleaseread the
licenseagreem entbeforeinstallation. Otherrulesand regulationsofinstallingthesoftwareare:
a. The product cannot be rented, loaned, or leased you are
thesoleownerofthisproduct.
b. Thecustom ershallnotdisclosetheresultofanybenchm ark
test to any third party without Network Associates prior
written approval.
c. Thecustom erwillnotpublish reviewsofthisproductwithoutpriorconsentfrom Network Associates, Inc.
Id. See Genelle I. Belm as & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech
Rights: The Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POL
Y 37, 39
45 (2007)(warning ofgrowing useofgagwrap clausesin softwareindustry to
chillconsum er and journalistspeech on productcom parisons);Read, supra
note 46, at40002 (discussing the use ofDeWittclausesto preventpublication ofbench-m arkingtestresultsfordatabasesoftware).
56 Network Associates, 758 N.Y.S.2d at467.
57 Id. at467.
58 Id.
59 Id.
51
52
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Thecourtdeterm ined thattherulesand regulationslanguage
im properly suggested that posting reviews without perm ission
violated state orfederallaws which wasnotaccurate and that
consum ersm ay be deceived intoabandoning theirrighttopublish
reviewsand resultsofbenchm ark tests.60 TheNew York Superior
Courtultim atelyheld thataconfidentialityclausethatprevented
anycustom ercom m entaryon theantivirusand firewallsoftware
program wasa deceptive trade practice.61 However, the decision
did notinvalidateallconfidentialityclausespreventingconsum er
speech only deceptiveones.62
Thedesirabilityofcontractsofsilenceisstillhotlycontested,
especiallywhen theseagreem entsposeriskstoothernon-contracting parties, such as the generalpublic.63 For exam ple, public
safetym aybeendangeredwhen therisksofadefectiveproductare
concealed in tortsettlem entagreem entsorwhen whistleblowers
areprevented from speaking outagainstem ployerwrongdoing.64
Courtsand legalscholarshavelongwrestled with differentlegal
tests and proposed approaches to setting the properbalance in
evaluatingthevalidityand desirabilityofcontractsofsilence.65
Unlike m any contractsofsilence, nondisparagem entclauses
m ay allow fora certain am ountortypeofspeech. Usually, positivespeech isperm issible, whilenegativeexpressions, critiques,
or rem arks harm fulto another party
s im age and interests are
66
forbidden. Theseprovisionsarecom m onlyfound in caseswhere
m utualtrustand confidentiality are key featuresofan existing
orprior legalrelationship, and continued com m unications m ay
Id. at469.
Id. at470.
62 Id. at470. The courti
ndicated thatthe com pany would be required to
provide thirty days advance notice to the Attorney Generalofany future
language seeking to restrictconsum ersrightstopublish theirassessm ents. Id.
at47071.
63 See Garf
ield, supra note32, at33334.
64 See Bast
, supra note 32, at64446, 649, 65253;Garfield, supra note32,
at334, 344, 361.
65 See generally Garf
ield, supra note 32, at266, 31518 (calling forstronger
judicialregulation through balancing testofcontractsofsilence with refusal
to uphold contracts ofsilence when public interestin disclosure outweighs
anylegitim ateprivateinterestsin contractenforcem ent).
66 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at45.
60
61
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be necessary in the relationship. For exam ple, in a separation
agreem ent, ex-spouses m ay agree notto disparage one another
to protectthe interests oftheirchildren and to prom ote fam ily
harm ony. Sim ilarly, in thecontextoftheem ployer-em ployeerelationship, a nondisparagem entclause m ay be seen asan effort
to supportthe duty ofconfidentiality and loyalty already owed
by the em ployee to the em ployer.67 A nondisparagem entclause
in an em ployee severance agreem entm ay also extend existing
fiduciarydutiesaftertheterm ination ofthepriorrelationship.68
These contractualcurbs on speech m ay also be considered
partofthebargained-forexchangebetween theparties, with the
m uzzled partybeingfinanciallycom pensated in som ewayforits
silence. An ex-spouse m ay agree notto criticize a co-parentas
partofa broaderexchange aim ed atfinalizing a distribution of
assets and other property rights between the divorcing couple.
Further, an em ployeewhoiscurrentlybeingpaid byan em ployer
orseeking com pensation from a form erem ployerundera severanceagreem entm ayagreenottocriticizethatem ployer.69 However, such nondisparagem ent clauses m ay be lim ited by other
existinglawsorregulations, such astherecentcrackdown bythe
NationalLaborRelationsBoard (NLRB)on overly broad nondisparagem entclausesin em ployersocialm ediapolicies.70 TheNLRB
See Bast, supra note 32, at66162;Dworkin & Callahan, supra note42,
at153.
68 See Garf
ield, supra note32, at265;see infra notes 290302 and accom panyingtext.
69 See Al
ison Frankel, Congress, whistleblower lawyers urge SEC to police
de facto gag clauses, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com /alison
-frankel/2014/10/29/congress-whistleblower-lawyers-urge-sec-to-police-de-facto
-gag-clauses/[http://perm a.cc/A7QJ-TZLK];Yin Wilczek, SEC Officials Warn
Against Contracts to Discourage Employee Whistle-Blowing, BNA BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 14, 2013). TheSecuritiesand ExchangeCom m ission (SEC)recently indicated concerns aboutseverance agreem ents thatm ay include gag clauses
thatm ay preventform er em ployees from reporting financialm isconductto
SEC whistleblowingprogram sand m ayviolatetheFalseClaim sAct. In addition, theSEC m ay fileactionsagainstattorneystocensureorbarthem from
practicing before itfordrafting egregiousconfidentiality clausesin severance
agreem ents. See Wilczek, supra.
70 Reportoft
he Acting GeneralCounselConcerning SocialMedia Cases,
N.L.R.B. Mem orandum OM 12-59 (May 30, 2012);Reportofthe Acting GeneralCounselConcerning SocialMedia Cases, N.L.R.B. Mem orandum OM 12-31
67
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hasinvalidatedanum berofexpansivenondisparagem entclauses
thatinfringe upon an em ployee
s rightto concerted action with
co-workerstoaddressworkplaceterm sand conditions.71
Nondisparagem ent clauses have also been litigated in contextswherethesilenced partyisnotreceivinganycom pensation
fortheirsuppressed speech, andm ayeven bepayingthebusiness
fora productorservicewhilecensoring theirown speech. In the
software realm , there have been frequentbattlesoverthe right
ofsoftware com panies to silence criticism s oftheir products in
databasevendorcontractsand beta testingagreem entsnegotiated
between com m ercialparties.72 In the database context, speech
suppression provisions have been justified as protecting a com pany
s brand and productreputation from the user
s inadequate
73
orpoortestingenvironm ents. Further, in thebeta testingsituation, software com panies have argued that confidentiality is
needed to elicitproprietary feedback and avoid unfair product
criticism saboutproductbugsand otherdefectsthatm ay becorrected during thethird party testing phase.74 Thisapproach has
alsospread tonon-negotiated consum ercontractsofadhesion or
end userlicensingagreem ents(EULAs).75 Many EULAsbroadly
(Jan. 24, 2012);ReportoftheActingGeneralCounselConcerningSocialMedia
Cases, N.L.R.B. Mem orandum OM 11-74(Aug. 18, 2011).
71 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note 55, at38, 4041;Read, supra note46,
at39597.
72 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note 55, at38, 4041;Read, supra note46,
at39597.
73 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at38;Read, supra note46, at39697.
74 See Read, supra not
e46, at39697.
75 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note 55, at4445;Read, supra note 46, at
389, 40002;Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A Users Guide to EULAs,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-term s-users-guide
-eulas[http://perm a.cc/XSE6-FB9W][hereinafterEFF GUIDE]. ProfessorsBelm as
and Larson raised early alarm s aboutnondisparagem entclauses in EULAs
forconsum er-oriented software:
Disparage can be read in both its com m on m eaning of
speak[ing]ofin a slighting ordisrespectfulway;belittle[ing],
which could include truthfulstatem ents, orin itslegalsense
ofm aking false and injurious statem ent[s]that discredit or
detractfrom the reputation ofanother
s property, product, or
business.Im posing restrictionson disparagem ent, in theform er
sense, ofthe FrontPage productm ay seem alarm ing enough;
the clause goesfurther, extending the ban on disparagem ent
ofMicrosoftand itsbusinesspartners. Itishard toim aginea
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prohibitanycriticism sofsoftwareproductseven aftertheyhave
been m arketed and distributed tothegeneralpublic, underm ining
assertionsaboutsafeguarding proprietary interestsand avoiding
unfaircriticism soverpre-releaseproducts.76
Outside ofthe software context, confidentiality clauseswere
nottypically found in the consum er realm . In part, businesses
did notwantto lose outon valuable word-of-m outh m arketing
between custom ers.77 In addition, som ebusinessownerswantto
know aboutcustom erissuesin ordertoresolvethem andim prove
custom er experiences and relationships longer-term .78 Other
businessesand professionalsm ay haveoriginally soughttobring
defam ation actionsagainstonlinereviewerstosilencecriticism s,
butthisapproach isboth expensiveand difficulttoprove.79 With
thesurgein consum erreview and ratingwebsites, confidentiality
and nondisparagem entclauses have becom e an inexpensive alternative to litigation. Although these clauses m ay im pactboth
offlineand onlinedialogue, theirprim arytargetistosquelch criticism on a growing num ber ofcrowdsourced rating and review
sites.80 Theaveragecustom erm ayhavelittleornoawarenessthat
they havelim ited theirspeech rightsorwaived opportunitiesto
justification forMicrosofttoexactsuch aprom isefrom itscustom ers, and yetithasbeen doingsoforatleastthreeyears.
Considering the power, pervasive influence, and financial
resourcesofthesesoftwarecom panies, and thedangerthatthey
m ay be able to suppresstruthfulspeech abouttheirproducts
and even aboutsubjectstotally unrelated totheirproducts, it
isessentialthatgagwrap clausesbeevaluated critically. In at
leastsom ecases, theyshould beheld unenforceable.
Belm as& Larson, supra note55, at45 (footnotesom itted).
76 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at75;Read, supra note46, at389,
40002;EFF GUIDE, supra note75.
77 See Russel
letal., supra note11.
78 Id.
79 TheRest
atem entdefinesdefam ation as:
a false and defam atory statem entconcerning another;(b)an
unprivileged publication to a third party;(c)faultam ounting
atleasttonegligenceon thepartofthepublisher[with respect
to the actofpublication];and (d)either actionability ofthe
statem entirrespectiveofspecialharm ortheexistenceofspecialharm caused bythepublication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §558.
80 See infra PartII and accom panyi
ngtext.
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reporton negativeexperiences. Recentlegalactionsand newsarticlesaboutbusiness-consum erskirm isheshavehighlighted som e
ofthekeyfeaturesofthesetypesofnondisparagem entclauses.81
Som eoftheseconsum ercontractsincludeadhesiveconfidentiality provisionsthatwarn consum ersup frontthatthey m ust
seek prior approval potentially in writing before discussing
their consum er experiences.82 In these situations, the business
servesasthegatekeeperofitsbrandim age, grantingspeech rights
to consum erswho willsing theirpraisesand rejecting requests
from those who m ay post negative critiques. Ifthe consum er
posts anyway withoutconsent, then the custom erm ay be sued
forbreach ofcontract. However, itisunlikelythata businesswill
sue a consum er m aking positive rem arks for violating a confidentiality provision,83 leaving only those consum ers who m ake
derogatory rem arks to face potentiallitigation. Yet, in general,
businesses desire the positive buzz ofconsum erword ofm outh
both onlineand offline, sobroad confidentiality clausesm ay not
suittheir m arketing needs. Itis also adm inistratively difficult
and costly fora businesstoreview every requesttocom m enton
aconsum erexperience.
In lightoftheseconcerns, nondisparagem entclauseshavebecom ea quick, cost-effectivewaytohandlethisgatekeepingfunction by broadly allowing positive speech and only suppressing
negativecom m entary. Nondisparagem entprovisionsare popping
up in a wide range ofadhesive consum ercontracts, from online
shopping venues to hotels and rentals84 to wedding photographersand m edicalprofessionals.85 In som e instances, an initial
See infra notes92171 and accom panying text;see generally Marciarille,
supra note 15, at390, 395, 40102 (discussing term s ofearlier MedicalJusticeCorporation contractform sutilized by som em edicalprofessionals);CDT
Com plaint, supra note 53, at 58 (reviewing various form s ofnondisparagem entclausesin them edicalcontext).
82 See CDT Com pl
aint, supra note53, at67.
83 See infra PartII and accom panyi
ngtext.
84 Chri
stopher Elliott, New confidentiality clauses can influence vacation
rental reviews (Apr. 14, 2012), http://elliott.org/blog/new-confidentiality-clauses
-can-influence-vacation-rental-reviews/[http://perm a.cc/GNS9-HBCW].
85 Eri
c Goldm an, Fining Customers For Negative Online Reviews Isnt
New... Or Smart, FORBES TECH (Aug. 8, 2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.forbes
.com /sites/ericgoldm an/2014/08/07/fining-custom ers-for-negative-online-reviews
-isnt-new-or-sm art/[http://perm a.cc/C5MG-DZEL].
81
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consum ercontractm ay notinclude a nondisparagem entclause,
butan unhappycustom erm aylaterberequired toagreetosuch
a clause to obtain a refund on products and services.86 These
clausesareusuallybroadlyworded topreventonlynegativecom m entary, whilelaudatoryspeech isallowed.87
Often, nondisparagem entprovisionsarefram ed in a m anner
thatkeepsthe prim ary focuson the businessinvestm entin the
brand
s developm ent and establishm ent of its goodwill in the
m arketplace, whileobscuringtheefforttolim itconsum erspeech.88
Negative critiquesare fram ed ascausing tangible lossesin revenues and dam aging brand reputation.89 Many consum ers m ay
notrecognizethateven theirhonestly held opinionsorfactually
true statem ents abouttheirexperiences are being relinquished
undertheseprovisions. Theseclausesm ayalsoindicatethatthey
bind notonly the consum er, butalso m em bersofthe consum er
s
fam ilywhoarenotsignatoriestotheagreem ent.90
In som e ofthese agreem ents, consum ers are further threatened with liquidated dam agesclausesthatsetoutdailypenalties
for posting a criticalreview untilthe posting is rem oved.91 For
exam ple, in Palmer v. KlearGear.com,92 plaintiffJohn Palm erordered sm all-dollarChristm asgiftsfrom KlearGear.com .93 When
See FTC v. Ivy Capital, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42369 (D. Nev.
Mar. 26, 2013)(ruling thatconditioning refund ofbusinesscoaching program
on subsequentnondisparagem entclauseisa deceptivepracticewhen notdisclosed atoutsettoconsum er).
87 El
liott, supra note84;see also Goldm an, supra note85.
88 Gol
dm an, supra note85;CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at67.
89 CDT Com pl
aint, supra note53, at67.
90 CDT Com pl
aint, supra note53, at67, 11.
91 See supra not
es 8485 and accom panying text;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note 26;Songm ee L. Connolly, Dont Disregard Calif.s Non-Disparagement Clause Ban, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.law360.com
/articles/585252/don-t-disregard-calif-s-non-disparagem ent-clause-ban [http://
perm a.cc/LK8F-7QXC];Tim Cushing, Online Retailer Says If You Give It A
Negative Review It Can Fine You $3,500, TECHDIRT (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:58 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com /articles/
20131113/
06112425228/
online-retailer-slaps-un
happy-custom ers-with-3500-fee-violating-non-disparagem ent-clause.shtm l[http:/
/
perm a.cc/SNM3-HZ9R].
92 OrderEnt
ering DefaultJudgm ent, Palm erv. KlearGear.com , No. 1:13cv-00175)(D. Utah July1, 2014).
93 Connol
ly, supra note91;Cushing, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26.
86
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theitem sneverarrived, hetried to contacttheonlinem erchant,
but was unsuccessful.94 His spouse, Jennifer Kulas, posted a
negative review ofKlearGear.com on RipoffReport.com .95 About
three years later, Palm er received a billof$3,500 from KlearGear.com claim ing violation ofits nondisparagem ent clause.96
When Palm er refused to pay, KlearGear.com reported their refusalasan unpaid debttocreditreporting agencies.97 Thecouple
disputed the claim ed delinquency, butwere unsuccessfulin rem ovingitfrom theircreditreport.98 Theunresolved debtharm ed
the couple
s ability to obtain credit for a car loan and furnace
repair.99 PublicCitizen, on behalfoftheplaintiffs, filed an action
seeking a declaratoryjudgm entthattheclausewasinvalid100 as
unconscionableand in violation ofFirstAm endm entrights.101 In
adefaultjudgm ent, theUtah DistrictCourtultim atelyinvalidated
the clause,102 declaring thatPalm erand Kulasowed no debtto
94 Cushi
ng,

supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
Cushing, supra note91.
96 Id. Thereport
ed contractclausestated thefollowing:
Non-Disparagement Clause
In an efforttoensurefairand honestpublicfeedback, and
topreventthepublishingoflibelouscontentin anyform , your
acceptance ofthissalescontractprohibitsyou from taking any
action thatnegatively im pactsKlearGear.com , itsreputation,
products, services, m anagem entorem ployees.
Should you violate this clause, as determ ined by KlearGear.com in itssolediscretion, you willbeprovideda seventytwo(72)houropportunitytoretractthecontentin question. If
thecontentrem ains, in wholeorin part, you willim m ediately
be billed $3,500.00 USD for legalfees and courtcosts until
such com pletecostsaredeterm ined in litigation. Should these
charges rem ain unpaid for30 calendardays from the billing
date, yourunpaid invoicewillbeforwarded toourthird party
collection firm and willbereported toconsum ercreditreportingagenciesuntilpaid.
95

Id.

97 Connol
ly, supra note91;Cushing, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26.
98 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra not
e26.
99 Connol
ly, supra note91;Cushing supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note26.
100 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra not
e26.
101 Connol
ly, supra note91.
102 OrderEnt
ering DefaultJudgm ent, Palm erv. KlearGear.com , No. 1:13cv-00175)(D. Utah July1, 2014). See Connolly, supra note91;Cushing, supra
note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
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KlearGear.com 103 and awarding them over$300,000 in com pensatoryandpunitivedam ages, alongwith costsandattorneyfees.104
In otherinstances, thelanguagem aysuggesttoaconsum erthat
theclauseisrequired underlaw orisnecessarytoprotectan im portantlegalright, asin Network Associates.105 Theaverageindividualm ay decide notto critique a businessoutofa desire to
com ply with lawsoutsideoftheprivateordering ofthecontract,
includingtradem ark, copyright, andprivacylaws.106
In addition, som ebusinesseshavetried toassertdubiousintellectualproperty claim s to avoid criticism of their business
activities.107 Copyrightassignm entclausesm aybefeaturesofcertain nondisparagem entprovisions.108 Underthesetypesofclauses,
consum ers agree to assign their copyrights to their rem arks to
the business.109 Ifthe consum er posts som ething thatthe business does notlike or agree with, the business m ay contactthe
consum ertorem ovea postingorelsefacelitigation forbreach of
contractand the specificcopyrightassignm entclause.110 A consum erm ay deletetheirposting to avoid litigation withoutrecognizing theirfairuse rights undercopyright.111 In addition, custom erswhorefusetoelim inatetheirreviewsrisk litigation orm ay
see theirpostingsexpunged in response to a DigitalMillennium
CopyrightAct(DMCA)takedown notice.112 Thistakedown notice
m ayviolateboth ethicaldutiesand legalobligationsbydisclosing
103 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra not
e26. Thecourtdeterm ined thatKlearGear.com wasliableto Palm erand Kulasforviolationsofthe FairCreditReporting Act, aswellasfordefam ation, intentionalinterference with prospectivecontractualrelations, and intentionalinfliction ofem otionaldistress. Id.
104 Connol
ly, supra note91;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
105 Network Associates, 758 N.Y.S.2d at468470.
106 See supra not
es5259 and accom panying text.
107 Marci
arille, supra note 15, at39598;CDT Com plaint, supra note 53,
at78.
108 Marci
arille, supra note 15, at39598;CDT Com plaint, supra note 53,
at78.
109 Marci
arille, supra note15, at395.
110 Id.; see, e.g., Connol
ly, supra note91.
111 Marci
arille, supra note15, at395.
112 Sean D. Lee, 
I Hate My Doctor: Reputation, Defamation, and PhysicianReview Websites, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 574, 59395 (2013);Marciarille, supra note
15, at395;CDT Com plaint, supra note 53, at 1113, 17. Aboutone-third of
DMCA takedown noticesarelegallysuspect. Marciarille, supra note15, at395.
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the existence ofa confidentialassociation, such as the doctorpatientrelationship.113
Attim es, agagclausem ayalsolook totradem ark law toshield
a businessfrom criticism .114 A businessm ayassertownership of
a tradem ark in the nam e ofits business, products, or services.
Asthe tradem ark holder, the clause m ay indicate thatthe consum erisnotperm itted tousea business
s nam e or m arks withoutpriorapproval. Itwould beim possibletoreporteffectivelyon
aconsum erinteraction with am erchantorotherprofessionalifthe
nam eofthebusiness, product, orservicecannotbem entioned. A
consum erm ay bereluctanttoposta negativereview outofconcern aboutpossible tradem ark infringem entordilution actions.
However, these clausesdo notindicate thata consum erretains
a rightoffairuse fora business
stradem arks.115
Sim ilarly, in health caresituations, som em edicalprofessionals
have utilized so-called m utualprivacyagreem ents to deter patientcriticism s.116 Medicalprofessionalsalready haveboth legal
duties and professional ethics that require them to m aintain
patientconfidentiality.117 Thesecontractshave initiated further
debateaboutthecontoursofprivacyforboth patientsanddoctors
in this intim ate relationship.118 Under these privacy contracts,
See Marciarille, supra note 15, at39192. By sending outa takedown
notice or suing a patientfor violating these clauses, a m edicalprofessional
m ay bein violation ofHIPAA by taking an action perceived asretaliatory or
intim idatingagainstapatient. See 45 C.F.R. §164.530(g)(2013).
114 Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55.
115 See 15 U.S.C. §1115(
b)(4)(2014). See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. WalkingMountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 799800 (9th Cir. 2003)(use ofBarbie tradem ark
asnom inative fairuse aspointofreference forartisticparody and critique);
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)(parody
of Barbie tradem ark in song as fair use);Sunm ark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray
Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1056, 105859, 1061 (7th Cir. 1995)(use of
ordinary wordsin tradem ark perm issibleasdescriptiveterm s);AugustStorck
K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 61820 (7th Cir. 1995)(use oftradem ark
forproductcom parison asnom inativefairuse).
116 Marci
arille, supra note 15, at36263;CDT Com plaint, supra note 53,
at38 (discussing term sofearlierMedicalJusticeCorporation contractform s
utilized bysom em edicalprofessionals).
117 Marci
arille, supra note 15, at39192;Lee, supra note 112, at57980;
CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at1113, 17.
118 Marci
arille, supra note15, at39293.
113
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thedoctorordentistprom isestoprovideadditionalprivacyprotectionstopatientrecords, such asnotsellingorsharingpatientinform ation with third partym arketers, in exchangeforthepatient
notposting criticalrem arksanywhere on the Web.119 Thistype
ofdisclosureisa violation oftheprivacyand security rulesofthe
Health InsurancePortabilityand AccountabilityAct(HIPAA),120
so only the m edicalprofessional, notthe patient, isgaining any
added privacy protections.121 These speech suppression efforts
m ay also contravene aspects ofthe Affordable Care Act(ACA)
and data collection by health care insurers in which surveys of
patientexperiencesplay an im portantrolein determ ining m edicalservices, quality, and costreim bursem ents.122
Id. at36263;CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at38.
TheOfficeofCivilRights(OCR)oftheU.S. Departm entofHealth and
Hum an Services previously determ ined thatthese types ofm utualprivacy
agreem entsviolateHIPAA. TheOCR reportstated that
[a]physician practicerequested thatpatientssign an agreem ent
entitled Consentand MutualAgreem entto Maintain Privacy.
Theagreem entprohibited thepatientfrom directlyorindirectly
publishingorairingcom m entaryaboutthephysician, hisexpertise, and/ortreatm entin exchangeforthephysician
scom pliance
with the Privacy Rule. A patient
srightsunderthe Privacy Rule
are notcontingenton the patient
s agreem entwith a covered
entity. A covered entity
s obligation to com ply with allrequirem ents ofthe Privacy Rule cannotbe conditioned on the patient
ssilence. OCR required the covered entity to cease using
the patient agreem ent that conditioned the entity
s com pliance with the Privacy Rule. Additionally, OCR required the
coveredentitytoreviseitsNoticeofPrivacyPractices.
T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ANNUAL
U.S. DEP
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND SECURITY RULE COMPLIANCE FOR CALENDAR YEARS 2009 AND 2010 15 (
2010), http://www.hhs.gov
/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcem ent/com pliancerept.pdf[http://
perm a.cc/YE9E-PSZH].
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(h)(2015)(individualsm ay notbe required to waive
theirrightsasa condition oftreatm ent, paym ent, health plan enrollm entor
benefits eligibility). See also Marciarille, supra note 15, at 39394, 40203;
Lee, supra note112, at57980;CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at13.
121 Marci
arille, supra note15, at363, 391.
122 Id. at36465, 37983. Despi
te currentefforts to im prove the collection
andaccesstopatientexperiencedata, som em edicalprofessionalsutilizeacom bination ofspeech suppression efforts to thwartnegative patientonline reviews. Id. at36465. Prof. Marciarille statesthat
[t]he m echanism softhreatened control copyrightlaw, defam ation law, and HIPAA areinteresting. Butthetim ing iseven
119
120
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Theclassaction ofLee v. Makhnevich123 bringstogetherdifferentthreadsofthesequestionablenondisparagem entclausesin a
billingdisputebetween apatientand a dentist.124 Thelead plaintiff, Lee, soughtem ergency dentalcarefrom Dr. Makhnevich.125
Herofficerequired Leetosign a m utualprivacy agreem entthat
prom ised the above-noted additionalprivacy protections in exchange for her continued protection ofhis patientinform ation
from third party m arketing firm s.126 The agreem ent also contained a copyrightassignm entclause and a liquidated dam ages
provision tohelp enforcethegag clause.127 Leepaid about$4,800
m ore so. Justasan industry arisesto police online physician
reviews, thefederalgovernm entpushesitsown largestgovernm ent funded insurance program s to begin to collect patient
satisfaction and patientexperiencedata and tom akeitavailable online thussetting up a collision between the irresistible
force pushing for increased transparency on patientsatisfaction data and the im m ovable objectofphysicians closing the
exam ination room dooreverm oretightlyagainstasociety-wide
trend toward onlineinform ation sharing.
Id. at36465 (footnotes om itted). See also CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at
18 (discussing Departm entofHealth and Hum an Serviceseffortstoprom ote
patientengagem entand patient-centered care).
123 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013). See Com plaint, Lee
v. Makhnevich, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013)(No. 11civ-8665), http://www.citizen.org/docum ents/Lee-v-Makhnevich-com plaint.pdf
[http://perm a.cc/D4ZU-58H6][hereinafterLeeCom plaint].
124 See Gergana Kol
eva, Dentist to the Stars Sued for Suppressing Bad Reviews Online, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:
10 PM)http:/
/www.forbes.com /sites/
gerga
nakoleva/
2011/
12/08/
dentist-to-the-stars-sued-for-suppressing-bad-reviews-on
line/;DinaElBoghdady, Some doctors try to squelch online reviews, WASH. POST
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com /business/econom y/som e-doc
tors-try-to-squelch-online-reviews/2011/11/29/gIQA2KQhYQ_story.htm l[http://
perm a.cc/DG4R-J87V];EricGoldm an, You Shouldnt Need a Copyright Lawyer
to Pick a Dentist, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com /sites
/
ericgoldm an/2013/
04/
17/
you-shouldnt-need-a-copyright-lawyer-to-pick-a-dentist/
.
125 LeeCom pl
aint, supra note123, at2.
126 Id. at2, 56. The com pl
aintcontended thatthe prom ises ofadditional
privacy falsely stated protectionsfrom loopholesin the privacy provisionsof
HIPAA. Lee Com plaint, supra note 123, at5. MedicalJustice had provided
these form s, which the firm indicated have now been retired. ElBoghdady,
supra note124;Koleva, supra note124. However, thesecontractsm aystillbe
in effectforpatientspriortothechangein theseform s. See CDT Com plaint,
supra note53, at35.
127 LeeCom pl
aint, supra note123, at2, 8. The clause in dispute stated, in
part:
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directly to the dentistforhisdentalcare and had to seek reim bursem entfrom hisdentalinsurance program .128 Monthslater,
Leecontendedthathewasunabletoreceivereim bursem entunder
his dentalinsurance because Makhnevich
s office had failed to
provide the insurer with the needed paperwork.129 Lee posted
criticism sofMakhnevich on DoctorBase, Yelp, and othercrowdsourced rating sites.130 Makhnevich sent Lee a warning letter
aboutbreaching theterm softheirm utualprivacy agreem ent131
and began assessing him $100 per day under the liquidated
dam ages clause forinfringing hercopyright.132 In addition, the
com plaintalleged thatshe senttakedown noticesto these sites
dem anding the rem oval of Lee
s posts and disclosing personal
inform ation in violation ofHIPAA.133
The consum errightsorganization PublicCitizen took on the
classaction becauseofitsconcernsabouttheim pactofsuch gag
In consideration fortreatm ent[,] [p]atientagreesto refrain
from directly or indirectly publishing
com m entary upon
Dentist and his practice, expertise and/or treatm ent [sic]If
Patient does prepare com m entary for publication about
Dentist, the Patientexclusively assigns allIntellectualProperty rights, including copyrights, to Dentistfor any written,
pictorial, and/or electronic com m entary . This agreem ent
shallbe operative and effective atthe tim e ofcreation (prior
to publication)ofthe com m entary . In addition, Patientwill
notdenigrate, defam e, disparage, orcastaspersionsupon the
Dentist;and
willuse allreasonable efforts to preventany
m em beroftheirim m ediatefam ilyoracquaintancefrom engagingin anysuch activity.
Lee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at*34 (quoting LeeCom plaintEx. A ¶ 3).
128 Lee, 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS at*4. The com plaintasserts thatthe servicesshould only havecostthepatient$200. LeeCom plaint, supra note123,
at2. See Koleva, supra note124;ElBoghdady, supra note124.
129 Lee, 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS at*4. See ElBoghdady, supra note124.
130 Lee, 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS at *56. See Lee Com plaint, supra note
123, at78;Koleva, supra note124.
131 Kol
eva, supra note124. See LeeCom plaint, supra note123, at78.
132 Lee, 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS at*5. See Lee Com plaint, supra note 123,
at8;Koleva, supra note124.
133 Lee, 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS at*6. See LeeCom plaint, supra note123, at
8. Thecom plaintindicated thattakedown noticessenttoYelp and DoctorBase
disclosed the plaintiff
s personalinform ation, including date ofbirth, height,
weight, address, and photo, in violation ofHIPAA. LeeCom plaint, supra note
123, at8.
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clauses on patientsfree speech and privacy rights, along with
thepotentialm isuseofintellectualproperty law.134 Makhnevich
sought to dism iss Lee
s case, but the court refused, allowing
Lee
s claim s ofcontract invalidity based on a lack ofconsideration and hisassertion offairuse forthe copyrightassignm ent
tom oveforward.135 Eventually, Makhnevich seem stohaveclosed
herdentalpractice, and shebecam eunavailableforthecontinuation oftheclassaction againsther.136
Itis im portantto note thatthese recentconsum er victories
com e largely through defaulting businesses, ratherthan a fullthroated defenseoftheseclauses, soitisunclearifothercourts
willcontinue to follow this nascentpath. Further, contractlaw
is a state-by-state endeavor and other states m ay notem brace
thisconsum er-friendlyapproach.137
A business
s use ofthese adhesive gag provisionspresentsa
num ber ofserious issues for both consum ers and com petitors.
First, these clauses squelch allform s ofnegative com m entary,
including truthfuland opinion speech. Courtshave consistently
recognized thattheseform sofspeech, both positiveand negative,
arelegallyprotected.138 In addition, substantialtruth139 andopinion speech140 aredefensestoclaim sofdefam ation. Theseclauses
prohibitcritiques, regardlessofveracity.141
Second, theseprovisionschillfurtherconsum erspeech, resulting in concernsaboutconsum erdeception. Along with attacking
Koleva, supra note 124. The com plaint also indicated that Lee
s critiquesofhisdentalcareexperiencefellunderfairuse. LeeCom plaint, supra
note123, at3.
135 Lee, 2013 U.S. Di
st. LEXIS at*2, *8, *1617.
136 Kol
eva, supra note124.
137 See supra not
es6487 and accom panying text.
138 See, e.g., Jef
ferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody
s Inv
r Servs., 175
F.3d 848, 85256 (10th Cir. 1999)(discussing FirstAm endm entprotectionsof
opinion speech and upholding dism issalofdefam ation claim based on opinionsin Moody
sarticle on schoolbondsevaluation);Kellogg & Frankel, supra
note24, at1.
139 See, e.g., N.Y. Ti
m es Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra
notes28, 36, 7287 and accom panying text.
140 See supra not
es28, 38, 7287 and accom panying text.
141 Davi
d Farren, What is a Non-Disparagement Clause and Why You
May Not Want to Sign One, JABURG WILK, http://www.jaburgwilk.com /news
-publications/what-is-a-non-disparagem ent-clause-and-why-you-m ay-not-want
-to-sign-one[http://perm a.cc/F45T-S3BD].
134
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protected categories ofspeech, other consum ersspeech willbe
discouraged over concerns aboutaggressive business tactics in
enforcing these gag contractsagainstnegative reviewsand ratings and fear oflitigation based in defam ation for expressing
one
s views.142 Overall, consum er speech willbe lessened and
availableinform ation reduced aboutproductand servicequality,
which harm s inform ed decision m aking by other custom ers.143
Consum erswillalsobedeceived becausetheseclauseswillskew
ratings and reviews toward positive feedback with little or no
criticism availableforconsum erconsideration.144
Third, notonlydoconsum erssufferharm , butothercom petitors are also unfairly disadvantaged on crowdsourced review
sites.145 Many businessesinviteconsum erdialogue, positiveand
negative, asawaytolearn aboutthecustom erexperienceand to
determ ine areas for needed im provem ent.146 Merchants and
professionals who utilize nondisparagem ent clauses falsely inflatetheirrankingsand reviewsoverbusinessesseeking candid
142 Shauna L. Spi
nosa, Note, Yelp! Libel or Free Speech: The Future of
Internet Defamation Litigation in Massachusetts in the Wake of Noonan v.
Staples, 44SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 748, 754(2011). Spinosawarned that
[t]hethreatoflitigation tobloggersand onlinereviewerschills
free speech by exposing internetusersto liability forposting
any criticalopinions orexperiences on the internet, whether
true ornot. Increased accessibility to custom erreviewsorinform ation on an individual or their services via internet
search enginesm akescriticalblogsorm essagesa perm anent
reputation blight, thereby affecting em ploym entpossibilities
or custom er-based business. Defam ed individuals and businessesoften threaten litigation againstcriticalposters, which
som etim esresultsin hostsitestakingdown negativeposts, or
bloggersnotpostinganynegativeopinionsatall.
Id. at748 (footnotesom itted). See DMCA Notices, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://
www.chillingeffects.org/topics/29 [http://perm a.cc/44PF-YB78](providing DMCA
notices to inform public about aggressive copyright holders); Trademark,
CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/topics/6 [http://perm a.cc/EN
8S-Y6RU](providing onlineaccesstoaggressiveceaseand desistlettersfrom
tradem ark holders).
143 Bel
m as & Larson, supra note 55, at38;Spinosa, supra note 142, at
75455.
144 CDT Com pl
aint, supra note53, at1516.
145 See Short
, supra note3, at444, 447.
146 Dohse, supra not
e3, at387.
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consum erfeedback.147 Thisapproach providesan unfairadvantageforbusinessestryingtosquelch consum erspeech.
II. KEY MOTIVATORS FOR UTILIZATION OF
NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES
On the surface, businesses instituting nondisparagem ent
clausesseem toview anynegativecritiquesasseriousthreatsto
brand im ageand value, ratherthan constructivefeedback on the
custom er experience. Although im portant speech ram ifications
are atstake, this contentious debate m ay be m ore com plicated
than itinitially appearson itsface. The underlying reasonsfor
the developm entand use ofthese kinds ofclauses go beyond a
desiretosuppressnegativespeech and raisea num berofconcerns
about crowdsourced review sites. As disputes over nondisparagem entclauses continue to arise, there is a need to address a
m ore com plete picture ofthe driving forcesbehind such clauses
in ordertoeffectivelydealwith theseissues.
Many sm allbusinessesand professionalsfeelthey are being
victim ized by participantsin and ownersofcrowdsourced rating
sites.148 With thedem andsofrunning one
sown enterprise, m any
businessownersm ayfocustheireffortsand dollarson m arketing
through m ore traditionaloutlets, such as postcards, neighborhood shopping guides, coupon books, and localnewspapers. The
switch from theone-way m arketing oftraditionalchannelstothe
m ulti-sided consum erdialogueofsocialm ediahasbeen adifficult
challengeforsm allbusinesses.149 Unlikelargecorporations, m om and-pop businessesm ay lack the tim e, ability, and resourcesto
grapplewith thegrowingpresenceofonlinesocialm edia.150 This
lack ofcontroloverbrand presentation on crowdsourcing review
sites m ay overwhelm sm allbusinesses thatoften cannotafford
See CDT Com plaint, supra note 53, at19 (nondisparagem entclauses
perm itdoctors to falsely curate their online reputations, which is harm ful
topatientsand com petitors).
148 See Andrea Chang, Tempers flare at Yelps town hall for small business
owners in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.latim es.com /2013
/
aug/21/business/la-fi-tn-yelp-town-hall-reviews-20130820 [http:/
/perm a.cc/A73P
-HT8D];Dave, supra note17.
149 Dave, supra not
e17.
150 Id.
147
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the assistance ofprofessionalm arketing agencies orreputation
m anagem entfirm s.151
Thisconfusion oversocialm edia interactionsisfurtherexacerbated by concernsabouttheram pantflow offraudulentreviews
from libelous consum ers and unscrupulous com petitors. Crowdsourced review siteshavebecom eunregulated warehousesofreputationalinform ation.152 Research indicatesthataboutone-third
ofonlineconsum erreviewsarefakeevaluations, andpay-per-post
services generate m ountains ofbogus reviews.153 Som e crowdsourced review sitesm ay m akeeffortstofilteroutfakereviews,
som etim esbyrem ovinglegitim atepraises, orm issinginaccurate
orlibelousjeers.154 Spottyenforcem enteffortsbystateattorneys
generalunderconsum erprotection lawsand the FederalTrade
Com m ission underitsEndorsem entGuidelinesprovidelittleassistancetosm allbusinessesbeingunfairly attacked. Recently, a
Virginia carpetcleaning com pany, Hadeed CarpetCleaning, becam esuspiciousofa rash ofanonym ousnegativereviewson Yelp
and tried to m atch them up with currentcustom erinform ation
and service dates.155 Unable to m ake the service connections,
Hadeed successfully sued tolearn the identitiesofthe allegedly
unhappy custom ersin supportofitsdefam ation claim s, despite
Yelp
sprom ise ofanonym ity.156
Although disclosure through subpoenaesm ay aid businesses
bringingdefam ation claim s, thisapproach raisesconstitutionalconcernsabouttheprotection ofanonym ousspeakers.157 In addition,
Id.;Dohse, supra note3, at37273;Short, supra note3, at452.
Marciarille, supra note15, at376.
153 See supra not
e1 and accom panyingtext.
154 See infra not
es10733 and accom panying text.
155 Yel
p, Inc. v. Hadeed CarpetCleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 557 (Va. Ct.
App. 2014).
156 See, e.g., Doev. Indi
viduals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 25356 (D. Conn. 2008)
(denying m otion toquash subpoena tounm ask anonym ousposters, asplaintiffs
m adetheprim a faciecaseoflibeland FirstAm endm entrightstoanonym ity
notabsolute).
157 Li
dsky, supra note 28, at88990;Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits
and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity And Accountability In Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 49596 (2001). Professor
Spencerrecom m ended am ending theElectronicCom m unicationsPrivacy Act
(ECPA)to provide a thirty-day notice period to anonym ousspeakers to providethem an opportunitytochallengea subpoena in courtin ordertoprotect
151
152
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som edefam ation plaintiffsm aynotwantdam ages, butthey m ay
seek ahum iliatingonlineapologyaim edatvindicatingtheirlegal
action and chasteningotherswhom ightdarecriticizea business
or professional.158 Stripping away anonym ity m ay chillcandid
onlinespeech and m ayinfluenceconsum erwillingnesstopostreviewsforfearofa businessorcom m unity backlash.159 Itisim portanttonotethattheburden ofproofforgranting a subpoena
isrelativelylow in theCom m onwealth ofVirginia, which doesnot
havean anti-SLAPP statute.160 However, in otherstates, such as
California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, itm ay bequitedifficultto succeed in unm asking an anonym ous reviewer without
clearevidencetosupportaprim afaciecaseofdefam ation.161
Legalexpertssuggestthatdefam ation lawsuitsarethewayto
handlefalseordefam atorycustom erreviews.162 Butm anysm all
businesses already lack the ability to access and pay for legal
services. Furtherm ore, defam ation can bea difficulttorttopursuesuccessfully, and dam agesm aybehard toproveortocollect
from averageindividualstorem edytheharm suffered.163 In som e
theirrighttospeak anonym ously. Spencer, supra, at50912. He warned that
a failuretoprotectanonym ousspeakersonlinem aydrivem anyInternetusers
toseek outanonym izing services, which would only furtherham perlegitim ate
defam ation claim s. Spencer, supra, at519.
158 Li
dsky, supra note28, at876, 88183;Spencer, supra note157, at498.
159 Li
dsky, supra note28, at88990;Spencer, supra note157, at49899.
160 Russel
letal., supra note11.
161 Id. Som e revi
ew sites, like Angie
sList, donotallow anonym ousreviews.
Marciarille, supra note15, at376.
162 See Dohse, supra not
e 3, at38182;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note
26, at10, 11. Som ebusinesseshaveutilized ceaseand desistlettersand takedown noticesasalternativestom oreexpensivelitigation. LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
supra note 26, at 10, 11. See, e.g., Fireworks Restoration Co. v. Hosto, 371
S.W.3d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)(finding thatform erco-founder
sposting ofthree
fakederogatoryonlinereviewswasdefam ation resultingin $1 in actualdam agesand $150,000 in punitivedam ages).
163 Kel
logg & Frankel, supra note 24, at2;Lee, supra note 112, at583;
Lidsky, supra note 28, at 87276;DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 118 (
2007);Joanna
Schorr, Note, Malicious Content On The Internet: Narrowing Immunity under
the Communications Decency Act, 87 ST. JOHN
S L. REV. 733, 73738, 75152
(2013). See Goldm an, supra note 24;but see Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th
1354, 137075 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (perm itting dentist
s action to proceed
againstpatientwho posted Yelp review after prim a facie showing oflibel).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §588 (1977)(elem entsofdefam ation).
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instances, businesseshavesuffered a publicrelationsdebaclefor
bringing a defam ation claim againsta custom erwhen theircourt
com plaintswentviralonline.164
For exam ple, in Dietz Dev., LLC v. Perez,165 a Virginia contractor brought a defam ation claim against a custom er, Jane
Perez, whoposted negativerem arksabouthisservices.166 In her
criticism , she indicated thatDietz had billed herforwork that
wasnevercom pleted, thathehadtrespassedon herproperty, and
shesuggested thathehad stolen jewelryfrom herhom e.167 In responding tohercritique, Dietzm adea num berofclaim sagainst
Perez, including contending thatshehad stolen from him bynot
paying forhisgoodsand serviceson thatproject.168 Dietzfiled a
defam ation action againstPerez claim ing $300,000 in business
losses and seeking $750,000 in dam ages.169 Ultim ately, a jury
found that both the plaintiff and the defendant had defam ed
each other in their fiery online posts, and no dam ages were
awarded to either party.170 Both parties expended considerable
effort and resources in taking the m atter to court.171 But the
cost, tim e, and uncertainties ofa defam ation lawsuit m ake it
problem atictorelyupon a tortaction toeffectively addressfalse
ordefam atorypostings.
164 Russel
letal.,

supra note11.
No. 2012-16249 (FairfaxCo., Va. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 7, 2012).
166 Just
in Jouvenal, Fairfax jury declares a draw in closely watched case
over Yelp reviews, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/in-closely-watched-yelp-case-jury-finds-dual-victory/2014/01/31/2d174580
-8ae5-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.htm l[http:/
/perm a.cc/W4PV-RGXK][hereinafterJouvenal1];Justin Jouvenal, In Yelp suit, free speech on Web vs. reputations, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com /local/crim e
/2012/12/04/1cdfa582-3978-11e2-a263-f0ebffed2f15_story.htm l [http://perm a.cc
/X8AF-3PVV][hereinafterJouvenal2];AditiMukherji, Yelp Defamation Lawsuit Ends in a Draw, FINDLAW (Feb. 3, 2014 11:54AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com
/free_enterprise/2014/02/yelp-defam ation-lawsuit-ends-in-a-draw.htm l[http://
perm a.cc/5CW2-W4G3].
167 Jouvenal1, supra not
e166;Jouvenal2, supra note166;Mukherji, supra
note166.
168 Jouvenal1, supra not
e166;Jouvenal2, supra note166;Mukherji, supra
note166.
169 Jouvenal
, supra note166.
170 Id.
171 See supra not
e166 and accom panyingtext.
165

92

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059

Even ifthey are notvictim s offake ordefam atory postings,
business owners are likely aware thatreviews and ratings can
havea substantialim pacton theircurrentand futurerevenues.
A 2011 Harvard BusinessSchoolstudy found thatindependent
restaurants reaped a 5 to 9 percentincrease in their revenues
when theirYelpratingsroseaboutonestarhigher.172 Conversely,
thepostingofa singlenegativereview onlinecould causebusiness
revenuesto plum m etabout25 percentorm ore.173 Because consum erstend to give greaterweightto negative com m entary and
retain itbetterin theirm em ories, businessesareconcerned that
even afew fakeorrealnegativereviewswilldoom theirfuture.174
Itisoften difficult, expensive, orim possibletohavea falsereview rem oved from a website.175 In addition, som e custom ers
m ayusethethreatofnegativereviewstogain unfairconcessions
from a m erchant.176 Forexam ple, a vacation renterm ay trash a
rentaland then dem and back a dam age depositwith threatsof
negativeonlinereviews.177 In som einstances, a businessorprofessionalm ayuseanondisparagem entclauseasan inform alsorting m ethod to help determ ine who isa trustworthy patron.178 If
you sign the agreem ent, then you are som eone they can engage
172 Dave, supra not
e17. Sim ilarly, aBerkeley studyshowed thatahalf-star
im provem ent led to decreased reservation availability of19 percent during
peak diningperiods. Id. Additionally, San Franciscorestaurantswere50 percentm ore likely to be booked up with reservationsaftera half-starincrease
on Yelp. Russelletal., supra note11. Seattlerestaurantssaw a10 percentjum p
in theirrevenueswith aone-starincreaseon Yelp. Russelletal., supra note11.
173 Russel
letal., supra note11. TrustYou, ahospitalityreputation m anagem entcom pany, indicated thata business
sratings largely rem ain staticafter
theinitialtwelvereviews, soearlyreviewsarecritical. Id.
174 Mal
bon, supra note9, at144;Marciarille, supra note15, at38283, 393
94;Short, supra note 3, at 45051. For psychological reasons, angry online
rantsaboutproductsand servicesarem orelikely totap intounderlying hostilitiesand goviralm oreoften than othershared em otions, such assorrow or
disappointm ent. BERGER, supra note1, at120.
175 Kat
hleen Richards, Yelp and the Business of Extortion 2.0, E. BAY
EXPRESS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.eastbayexpress.com /oakland/yelp-and
-the-business-of-extortion-20/Content?oid=1176635&showFullText=true[http://
perm a.cc/97JY-VLL3];Tuttle, supra note17.
176 El
liott, supra note84.
177 Id.
178 Marci
arille, supra note15, at37576.
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with ifdisagreem entsarise, and willwork with thatbusinessto
iron outdifficultiesratherthan airingdisputesonline.179
This fear ofnegative reviews m ay have created a panicked
survivalresponseam ong som ebusinessesthatm ay turn tonondisparagem ent clauses to defend them selves againstboth real
and fakereviewsonline. Yetconcernsaboutnegativeratingsm ay
be overblown, as m ostwebsite postings are positive reviews.180
However, unlike traditional word of m outh, online rants and
raveshave an im m ediacy and perm anency notfound in the offline world.181 With the rise ofm obile devices, an ordinary consum er possesses an instant m egaphone that reaches a m uch
wideraudience than word ofm outh.182 Even ifonly a few users
see an initialpost, itm ay be republished repeatedly and could
goviral, becom ingaccessibletom illionsofusersin a briefperiod
oftim e.183 A businessm ayfindthatithasbeen criticized beforeit
hasthe opportunity to learn aboutortry to resolve a consum er
com plaint. In addition, online postingshave a perm anency that
Id.
Lee, supra note112, at574.
181 Id.;Li
dsky, supra note 28, at86263;Marciarille, supra note15 at371,
377, 394. As to the inform ality and im m ediacy of online com m unications,
ProfessorLidskynotesthat
[b]ecause com m unication can occur alm ost instantaneously,
participants in online discussionsplace a prem ium on speed.
Indeed, in m any fora, speed takes precedence over allother
values, includingnotjustaccuracybuteven gram m ar, spelling,
and punctuation. Hyperbole and exaggeration are com m on,
and ventingisatleastascom m on ascarefuland considered
argum entation. Thefactthatm any Internetspeakersem ploy
online pseudonym stendsto heighten thissense thatanything
goes, and som e com m entators have likened cyberspace to a
frontiersocietyfreefrom theconventionsand constraintsthat
lim itdiscoursein therealworld. Whilethisview isundoubtedly
overstated, certainlytheim m ediacyand inform alityofInternet
com m unicationsm aybecentraltoitswidespread appeal.
Lidsky, supra note28, at86263.
182 Dave, supra not
e17;Lee, supra note112 at574;Lidsky, supra note28,
86263;Marciarille, supra note15, at371. Therelativeeaseand inexpensive
accessofonlinecom m unicationsprovidesan opportunity torebalanceunequal
powerdynam icsin therealworld. Lidsky, supra note28, at89497.
183 BERGER, supra not
e 1, at 11920, 20607;Lidsky, supra note 28, at
86364.
179
180

94

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059

tends to view businesses as fixed and unchanging entities.184
Effortstoim proveoperationsortorespond tocustom erconcerns
m ay be buried in website postingsand notreadily accessible to
consum ershoping to learn currentinform ation abouta business
s
additionalorim proved practices.
Som e businesses have challenged website rating and review
system sasseriouslyflawed, eitherin term sofhow ratingsaredeterm ined orin how reviewsarefiltered and presented. Forexam ple, in Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC,185 Seaton wastheownerofthe
Grand ResortHoteland Convention Centerin Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, which ended up on TripAdvisor
s 2011 Dirtiest Hotels
list.186 Seaton broughtan action fordefam ation, tortiousinterferencewith businessrelationships, and false-lightinvasion ofprivacy againstTripAdvisor.187 Thetravelwebsitem oved todism iss
Seaton
s com plaintas protected speech under the FirstAm end188
m ent. Seaton asserted thatthe travelwebsite
slistofthe dirtiesthotelswasinaccurately determ ined based on unsubstantiated
rum orsand grossly distorted ratingsand m isleading statem ents
to be used by consum ers.189 He added thatTripAdvisor could
quantitatively determ inethedirtiesthotelsthrough a statistical
analysisofnegativehotelreviews.190 He furthercontended that
this ranking on TripAdvisor
s website and its republication by a
hostofm edia outlets caused irreparable harm to his business
anditsgoodwill.191
In reviewingthecase, theSixth Circuitdecided thattheterm
dirtiestwas notan assertion offact, buthyperbolicfigurative
speech derived from the subjective evaluations ofcustom ers.192
184 Lee,

supra note112, at574;Marciarille, supra note 15, at38283, 394.
Prof. Marciarille notes that for m edicalprofessionals, [w]hat m ay be m ost
challenging aboutthe never-forgotten negative reviewsishow inhum an and
im personalthey are. A postingin internetperpetuityim pliesthatthephysician
is static incapable ofgrowth or developm ent.Marciarille, supra note 15, at
394. Som eobservershavesuggested thatonlinereviewsshould havesom etype
ofexpiration date. Marciarille, supra note15, at394.
185 728 F.3d 592, 594(
6th Cir. 2013).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at59496.
189 Id. at59495.
190 Id. at595.
191 Id. at594.
192 Id. at59698.
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The courtstated thatTripAdvisor
sm ethodology in ranking hotels
wasinherently subjective because itwasbased upon individual
assessm entsthatcould notbeconsidered provablestatem entsof
fact.193 With theexplosion oftop ten listsonline, theSixth Circuit
concluded thatsuch listingsarenotfactualinform ation butprotected opinion speech, and thusarenotactionableunderlibelor
othertortclaim s.194
Proprietary filtering program s on review sites have also
stirred controversy with business owners.195 Som e businesses
havecom plained thatthesefiltering program spush negativereviewstothetop, whilepositiveonesaresuppressed orm oved to
seldom -viewed secondaryweb pages.196 Foritspart, Yelp did state
thatitsfilteringsystem doesnottreatallpostingsidentically, but
denied anyefforttom anipulatereviewsintentionally.197 Underits
filteringprogram , thepostingsofso-called elitereviewers(som e
ofwhom arestaffm em bers, whileothersareunpaid volunteers)198
are highlighted orm oved to the top ofthatsite.199 Am ong other
undisclosed factors, such reviewersachieve elitestatusby contributing substantialcontentto Yelp and garnering positive rem arksfrom othersitevisitors.200 However, Yelp and othersites
m ay notdisclose the details oftheir algorithm s outofconcern
Id. at598600.
at600.
195 SandyBanks, Turning a critical eye on Yelp, L.A. TIMES (
Apr. 20, 2013),
http://articles.latim es.com /2013/apr/20/local/la-m e-banks-yelp-20130420 [http://
perm a.cc/65WW-H2B2];Richards, supra note175;see also Ho, supra note34,
at587 (in review ofrestaurantgrading, arguing forsim plification notonly in
how inform ation isdisclosed, butalsoin how such gradingdata isaggregated
and analyzed).
196 Banks, supra not
e195;Richards, supra note175.
197 Banks, supra not
e 195;Richards, supra note 175. See infra notes 226
32 and accom panyingtext.
198 Banks, supra not
e195;Richards, supra note 175. Recently, som e elite
volunteersbroughta classaction againstYelp claim ing violationsoftheFair
Labor Standards Act(FLSA), alleging thatthey should be classified as em ployeeswhoshould havereceived pay and benefitsinstead ofnon-cash awards
and socialevents. See Class Action Com plaint, Panzer v. Yelp, Inc., CV 1307805 (C.D. Calif. filed Oct. 10, 2013), http:
//skift.com /
wp-content/uploads/2013
/10/180014238-Panzer-v-Yelp.pdf[http://perm a.cc/LEP8-EEFZ].
199 Banks, supra not
e195;Richards, supra note175.
200 Banks, supra not
e195;Richards, supra note175.
193

194 Id.

96

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059

thatsom e businesses willuse thatinform ation to try to gam e
ratingsystem stofalselyinflatetheirrankings.201
In Demetriades v. Yelp,202 a restaurateur challenged Yelp
s
advertising claim s about its filtering program , rather than its
proprietary algorithm , in an unfaircom petition and falseadvertising action.203 Thebusinessaccused Yelp ofim properly m anipulating reviews, failing to rem ove inaccurate or false reviews,
and m aking wrongfulclaim s aboutthe reliability and accuracy
ofits reviews and filtering program .204 The trialcourtgranted
Yelp
s m otion to strike down the lawsuitunder the state
s antiSLAPP statute and found thatany ofthe claim ed Yelp m isrepresentationswereunactionablepufferyand opinion.205
However, a three-judgeappellatepanelreversed on theissue
oftheanti-SLAPP m otion.206 The appeals courtrecognized Yelp
s
battlewith fakereviewsand effortstoestablish aproprietaryfiltering system aim ed atdeterring fake reviews,207 and discussed
thefactthatYelp doesnotdiscloseitsalgorithm in ordertopreventusersand businessesfrom trying to avoid itsfiltering process.208 Thedecision ultim atelystated thatYelp isa publicforum
with its custom er reviews being m atters ofpublic concern, but
notitsown advertisingassertionsaboutitsfilteringsystem .209
In contrasttoitsconsum erpostings, Yelp
s statem entsabout
thereliability and trustworthinessaboutitsfiltering program 210
201 Banks, supra not
e 195;Richards, supra note 175. See Jindal& Liu,
supra note 13 (com puterscience researchersproposed autom ated m odelsfor
detecting high probability ofopinion spam in evaluating custom er reviews);
Ottetal., supra note 13, at30910, 31617 (proposing a m ixed m odelofpsychologicaland com putationallinguisticstodetectwell-crafted opinion spam ).
See infra notes51821 and accom panying text.
202 228 Cal
. App. 4th 294 (2014). See Eric Goldm an, Yelp Defeats Legal
Challenge to Its User Review Filter, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://
www.forbes.com /sites/
ericgoldm an/2013/02/
06/yelp-defeats-legal-challenge-to-its
-user-review-filter/[http://perm a.cc/NT2X-DJJS].
203 Demetriades, 228 Cal
. App. 4th at298.
204 Id. at298, 30002.
205 Id. at298, 304.
206 Id. at299, 313.
207 Id. at299300.
208 Id. at300.
209 Id. at310.
210 Id. at30001.
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were notsales puffery, butstatem ents ofquantifiable factthat
werem adein thecourseofitsbusinessservicesand intended to
induce consum ers to use and businesses to advertise on its
site.211 Yelp
s representations about its filtering regim e were
viewed ascom m ercialspeech exem ptfrom protection underthe
state
santi-SLAPP statute.212 Theappellatecourtalsoeschewed
Yelp
s contention offederalCDA (Com m unications Decency Act)
im m unitybecauseitsown words, notthoseofthird partyreviewers, were being questioned.213 Subsequently, Yelp appealed the
action totheCalifornia Suprem eCourt, which hasnotyetruled
on thedispute.214
Othershavebroughtlegalactionsclaim ingthatwebsitestaff
are penning negative reviews and then following up with sales
calls offering to am eliorate the reviews ifthe business owner
advertiseswith thesite.215 Som ebusinessesbelievethatnegative
posts written by Yelp em ployees are being used to create sales
leadsforthatsite
sadvertising staff.216 In Levitt v. Yelp,217 aclass
action wasbroughtbased on allegationsofunfairbusinesspractices and civilextortion.218 The plaintiffs contended that Yelp
extorted orattem pted to extortadvertising dollars through the
Id. at31112. See Malbon, supra note9, at146 (discussing UK Advertising Standards Authority ruling that TripAdvisor
s trusted advice from
realtravelerswasm isleading duetopersistenceoffake, unverified reviews).
212 Demetriades, 228 Cal
. App. 4th at312.
213 Id. at313. Wi
th regard to Yelp
sassertion ofSection 230 im m unity, the
courtdecided thatYelp
sargum entism isplaced. Nowheredoesplaintiffseek
toenjoin orhold Yelp liableforthestatem entsofthird parties(i.e., reviewers)
on its Web site. Rather, plaintiffseeks to hold Yelp liable forits own statem entsregarding theaccuracy ofitsfilter.Id.
214 Def
. and Resp
t
s Pet. for Review, Dem etriades v. Yelp Inc. (No.
S220885)(Cal. filed Aug. 28, 2014). See MelissaJ. Sachs, Yelp asks California
high court to slap down restaurateurs suit over review filter, WESTLAW J.
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://blog.thom sonreuters.com /index.php/yelp-asks-califor
nia-high-court-to-slap-down-restaurateurs-suit-over-review-filter/ [http://perm a
.cc/9FKF-BBTU].
215 Ri
chards, supra note175.
216 Id.
217 Levi
ttv. Yelp, 765 F.3d1123 (9th Cir. 2014). See Richards, supra note175;
Stephen L. Carter, Give This Column Five Stars on Yelp, Please, BLOOMBERG
TECH (Sept. 4, 2014, 12:56 PM), http://www.bloom bergview.com /articles/2014
-09-04/
give-this-colum n-five-stars-on-yelp-please[http:/
/perm a.cc/B3NM-UZCG].
218 Levitt, 765 F.3d at1126;see Cart
er, supra note217.
211
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m anipulation ofuser reviews and by creating negative reviews
oftheir businesses.219 The trialcourtalso determ ined thatthe
parties had failed to provide sufficient facts to support their
claim sand thatSection 230 im m unity prevented legalaction for
extortion against Yelp for not rem oving certain negative reviews.220 The districtcourtdism issed the lawsuitand the businessownersappealed.221
The appellate courtdeterm ined thatYelp
s solicitation ofadvertisingwasnotwrongfulconductrequired forthenarrow legal
requirem ents for civilextortion.222 Further, Yelp
s actions did
notam ountto eitherthe anticom petitive orantitrustviolations
needed to support claim s of unfair business practices.223 The
courtadded thattheplaintiffshad alsofailed toshow thatYelp
staffershad created thenegativepostsabouttheirbusinesses.224
However, thecourtleftopen the option thatotherlegalactions,
ifproperlypled, m ightbesustainableagainstYelp.225
Sim ilarly, in Reit v. Yelp!,226 a dentistchallenged negativereviewson Yelp, asserting thatYelp notonly keptup the negative
review, butrem oved allthe positive postings.227 Based on language in Yelp
s guide to business owners, the dentistcontended
thatYelp
s filtering program deceived consum ers because itwas
subjectto hum an bias through Yelp
s m anipulation ofconsum er
228
reviews. He also argued thatthisprocedure ofrem oving positive reviews and highlighting negative ones is part of Yelp
s
business m odel, used as leverage to coerce businesses and professionals into paying for advertising on Yelp.com .229 However,
the courtdeterm ined thatthe statem ents in the business guide
did not m aterially m islead consum ers because the guide was
Levitt, 765 F.3d at112729;see Carter, supra note217.
Levitt, 765 F.3d at1126, 113536.
221 Id. at1126, 1129.
222 Id. at 113033. The court added t
hat the businesses had not proven
thatYelp authored any ofthe negative reviewsatissue. Id. at113536. See
Carter, supra note217.
223 Levitt, 765 F.3d at113637.
224 Id. at113436.
225 Id. at1137.
226 907 N.Y.S.2d 411 (
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
227 Id. at412.
228 Id. at412, 414.
229 Id. at41213.
219
220
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geared toward m erchants, notconsum ers.230 Even ifthe plaintiffscould provetheirclaim thatYelp had m anipulated consum er
reviews to generate advertising revenues, this claim ed conduct
was nota deceptive practice because itwas business-oriented,
not consum er-oriented.231 Therefore, the court concluded that
Yelp
s filtering regim e for reviews was notlikely to deceive reasonableconsum ers.232
Certain licensed professionals also chafe against custom er
ratings as inappropriate challengesto theirprofessionalautonom y, especiallydoctorsand dentists.233 Them edicalprofession is
centered prim arilyon peerevaluationsandreferralsasthebasis
forprofessionalreputation, notpatientevaluations.234 Research
studies indicate thatm edicalprofessionals often think thatpatientslack theexpertisetofairlyand accuratelyassessthequality ofm edicalservices.235 In general, survey analyses indicate
Id. at415.
Id.
232 Id.
233 Lee, supra not
e 112, at57780;Marciarille, supra note 15, at38485.
Prof. Marciarille
sresearch found that
[t]here isa sense thatreporting on directobservation ofphysician and physician staffquality by patients is inherently
dem eaning. Itisalso an inescapableundercurrenthere, even
spilling over into the popular press. Inviting directobserver
or consum er com m enton provider behavior im plies thatthe
observationsofordinary untrained people are valuable to patients, providers, and payorsalike.
Som e ofthisrelatesto a vision ofprofessionalautonom y,
where the very m eaning ofprofessionalconjuresup an im age
ofindividualjudgm entexercised with littleprocess-based feedback. The culture ofm edicine hasbeen described asone that
isdeeply rooted, both by custom and by training, in high standards ofautonom ous individualperform ance and a com m itm enttoprogressthrough research.Alternatively, som e ofthis
relatestoa vision ofhealth carethatfocuseson theinherently
collaborative nature ofthe provision ofhealth care services.
Underthisvision, placing qualityobservation solely atthefeet
ofthephysician seem stonegatethem utualtask ofcreatinga
successfulorunsuccessfulphysician-patientrelationship.
Id.
234 Marci
arille, supra note15, at36263, 37071.
235 Lee, supra not
e 112, at 58081;Marciarille, supra note 15, at 36263.
Marciarille believesthatitisodd thatdoctorsshould be so dism issive ofpatientreviewsoftheirservices:
230
231
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thatdoctorsand dentistsdonotwanttobejudged bytheoverall
patient experience, such as waiting tim es in reception areas,
respectfulpatientinteractions with the doctorand staff, physician attentivenesstopatients, and m edicalinform ation and education provided tothepatient.236 Manydoctorsand dentistsprefer
an em phasison technicalm edicaloutcom esratherthan softerpatientexperiencesasa reflection oftheirprofessionaltrainingand
autonom y.237 Nevertheless, such layperson reviewscan alsoprovideawindow intowaystoim provethepatientexperience.238
However, thisresistance to patientreview iscom ing into directconflictwith im portantchanges in the m edicalfield. More
and m ore patients are seeking to arm them selves proactively
with m edicalinform ation beforeconsulting a doctor.239 About80
percent of Am ericans search for m edical inform ation about
health conditionson theInternet,240 aswellaspatientreviewsof
m edicalprofessionals.241 Therisein patientconsum erism isthus
pushing back againstthetradition ofa passive, com pliantrolein
Itis ironicthatphysicians cham pions ofthe validity ofindividualized approachestopracticeand the validity ofanecdotal
evidence are thefiercestopponentsofpatient-generated anecdotalevidence on physician perform ance. Thisisparticularly
surprising in light of the fact that m ost graduates of U.S.
m edicalschoolsare firsttrained in clinicalskillsthrough the
use ofanecdotalpatientfeedback gained from practicing on
each other and through the use of standardized patients.
Patientfeedback from physician or physician-in-training patientsand from professionalpatientsis, apparently, lesssuspectthan feedback from realpatients.
Marciarille, supra note15, at389.
236 Lee, supra not
e112, at581;Marciarille, supra note15, at36869, 38182.
237 Lee, supra not
e 112, at58081;Marciarille, supra note 15, at363, 368
69, 385.
238 Lee, supra not
e112, at582.
239 Marci
arille, supra note15, at36567.
240 Id. at366.
241 Pat
ientscan now accesscrowdsourcedreview sites, such asRateMDs.com ,
Angie
sList, and Yelp, to gain insightinto patientopinionsabouta particular
physician ordentist. Lee, supra note112, at574, 57677;Marciarille, supra note
15, at362, 36667, 37273. Dentists, in particular, have been in the firing line
ofconsum erratingsbecausem anypatientsdonothavedentalinsuranceand
havetopayout-of-pocketfortheirdentalservices. Marciarille, supra note15,
at37273. Dentists also have been involved in a num ber ofdefam ation and
nondisparagem entclauselawsuitsregardingpatientonlinereviews.
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the physician-patientrelationship.242 In addition, theprovisions
ofthe ACA243 and efforts by provider insurers244 prom ote data
collection on thepatientexperiencetoevaluatephysician quality
and perform ance m etrics, such as m edicaloutcom es, office efficiencies, and patientevaluations oftheir interactions.245 Som e
m edicalprofessionalsalsofearthatnegativepatientreviewswill
affectoverallpay and reim bursem entrates246 ortheircontinued
participation in certain health insurance program s.247 Oddly
enough, m ostpatientreviews ofdoctors on crowdsourced sites
areoverwhelm inglypositive.248
III. AVOIDING ENFORCEMENT UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
Clearly, the reasons behind the use of nondisparagem ent
clausesm ayvarydependingupon thenatureand concernsofthe
individualbusiness. Even though onem ightdisapproveofthese
clausesasinherently unfairorpractically m isguided, itrem ains
Marciarille, supra note15, at36566.
Id. at363, 381.
244 Id. at37779.
245 Id. at363. Unl
ike othertypesofservices, m edicalcare isa private activity with enorm ouspublicconsequences. Id. at369;CDT Com plaint, supra
note53, at15. UndertheACA, theCentersforMedicareand MedicaidServices
(CMS)sponsorsthePhysician Com parewebsite, which collectspatientreviews
on thepatientexperienceforfuturepublicaccess. Marciarille, supra note15,
at363. Concerned aboutthequality and veracity ofpatientassessm ents, the
Am erican MedicalAssociation advocatesthatCMS perm itdoctorstoreview any
assessm ents before any posting is published. Marciarille, supra note 15, at
36364, 388. Hospitalsare also worried thatthey willbe evaluated like hotels,
with expectationsofhotel-likeam enities.Marciarille, supra note15, at382.
246 Marci
arille, supra note15, at38082.
247 Insurers have l
ong sought to collect data on the patient experience,
som etim es referred to as the patientvoice,to determ ine the quality ofcare
and whether to retain physicians under their health plans. Id. at 37879.
Insurersutilizesurveystohelpdeterm inewhethertodisenrollm edicalpractices
from their insurance program s, leading to litigation aboutthe m ethodology
and accuracyoftheseinternalanalyses. Id. at37879. Onewould expectthat
insurersm ightconsidertextand datam iningon crowdsourced review sitesto
help quantifypatientvoicem etricson m edicalprofessionals. Id.
248 Lee, supra not
e 112, at 57778; Marciarille, supra note 15, at 394;
ElBoghdady, supra note124. A 2009 review ofthirty-threecrowdsourcedrating
sitesofabout300 doctorsand specialistsin theBoston area determ ined that
positivereviewsm adeup 88 percentoftheposted com m entaries. ElBoghdady,
supra note124.
242
243
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unclear as to whether these clauses are invalid under existing
contractlaw. One could posita num berofargum ents to defeat
nondisparagem entclauses, including onesgrounded in issuesof
consideration, unconscionability, public policy, excessive penalties, and privity.
A. Lack of Consideration
Consideration isabedrock elem entofanyvalid contract.249 It
requiresa bargained-forexchangeofsom ething oflegally recognized valuebetween contracting parties.250 Am ong otherthings,
consideration m ayconsistofan exchangeofprom isesora prom ise
in return foranother
s forbearance. In m any contracts ofsilence
ornondisparagem entclauses, oneparty receivescom pensation251
through settlem entfunds orseverance pay in exchange fornot
speaking orforsuppressing negative critiques. The typicalconsum ercontractinvolvesan exchangeofprom isesbetween them erchantand the custom er, such as the provision ofproducts and
services in return for paym ent.252 The utilization ofnondisparagem entclausesaddsthe requirem entthatconsum ersnotpost
anynegativecom m entsorridicule. Focusingon thebargained-for
exchange, courtstypicallywillnotanalyzetheadequacyorvalue
ofthe consideration.253 The factthatconsum ers are waiving or
lim iting their speech rights withoutcom pensation does notinvalidate the contract.254 Consum ersspeech rights are bundled
with theirexchange ofotherprom isesin purchasing goodsand/
orservices.
However, in certain circum stances, consum ersm aybeableto
claim alack ofconsideration when a partyhasapre-existinglegal
duty asto the bargained-forbenefit.255 Forexam ple, in Lee, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §71 (1981);see JOHN E. MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §56 (4th ed. 2001).
250 MURRAY, supra not
e249.
251 Garf
ield, supra note32, at278.
252 MURRAY, supra not
e249.
253 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §79 (1981).
254 But see Bel
m as& Larson, supra note 55, at7576 (arguing thatthere is
a lack ofm utuality ofobligation as software com pany doesnotgive up anything in exchangeforconsum er
sprom iseofsilence).
255 See CDT Com pl
aint, supra note53, at1113.
249
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dentist
s m utualprivacy contractrequired herpatienttorefrain
from posting negative reviewsin exchangeforsafeguarding the
patient
s inform ation from third party m arketing firm s.256 However, thiskind ofdisclosureofpatientinform ation isalreadyforbidden underHIPAA withoutpatientconsent257 and transgresses
theconflictofinterestprovisionsofm edicalethicscodes.258 Therefore, the patientcould challenge the validity ofthe privacy provisions as lacking consideration because m edicalprofessionals
alreadyhaveapre-existinglegaldutytoprotectpatientprivacy.
In Lee, thedentist
sprom isescould alsobeviewed asillusory259
and notin linewith therequirem entofconsideration. Thedentist
s
privacy com m itm entism eaninglessin lightofherexistinglegal
and ethicalobligations. Thedentistwould beofferingem ptyprom isesofprivacywhilethepatientissubstantivelyboundtosuppress
hisspeech rightsand tohand overhiscopyrighttohisdentist. In
response to the dentist
sm otion to dism iss, the trialcourtrefused
to dism iss Lee
s claim s seeking to invalidate the nondisparagem entprovisionsofhercontractaslackingin consideration.260
Furtherm ore, doctors and dentists typically enter into provideragreem entswith insurersforwhich the covered patientis
See supra note128, at12;LeeCom plaint, supra note123, at2.
See CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at1113.
258 See AM. MED. ASS
N, AMA ETHICS CODE OPINION 8.03 CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST:GUIDELINES, http://www.am a-assn.org/am a/pub/physician-resources
/
m edical-ethics/
code-m edical-ethics/opinion803.page? [http://perm a.cc/CRF7-V4
N6](stating that [u]nder no circum stances m ay physicians place their own
financialinterestsabovethewelfareoftheirpatients.... Ifa conflictdevelops
between the physician
s financialinterest and the physician
s responsibilities
to the patient, the conflictm ustbe resolved to the patient
sbenefit.);see CDT
Com plaint, supra note53, at17.
259 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §77 (1981):
A prom ise or apparentprom ise is notconsideration ifby its
term stheprom isororpurported prom isorreservesa choiceof
alternative perform ances unless (a) each of the alternative
perform ances would have been consideration ifitalone had
been bargained for;or(b)oneofthealternativeperform ances
would have been consideration and there isorappearsto the
partiestobea substantialpossibilitythatbeforetheprom isor
exercises his choice events m ay elim inate the alternatives
which would nothavebeen consideration.
See MURRAY, supra note249, §57.
260 See Leev. Makhnevi
ch, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2013), at*1, *4.
256
257
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a third party beneficiary.261 Under these agreem ents, m edical
professionals are required to provide particularservices atcertain feeschedulesto prem ium -paying participants.262 Onecould
view the refusalto provide the requested m edicalservices as a
breach ofcontract. Therefore, theseprofessionalsalready havea
pre-existing legalduty to com ply with their insurer contracts
andtoprovidetheagreed-upon m edicalservices, regardlessofthe
patient
s agreem ent to a nondisparagem entclause. In this context, a plaintiffcustom erwilllikely arguethatthereisa lack of
consideration, dependingupon thecircum stances.
B. Unconscionability
Groundedin goodfaith andfairdealing,263 courtsdeterm ineunconscionabilityasam atteroflaw,264 reviewingissuesofprocedural
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §302 (1981).
D. Ward Kallstrom , Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors:
Free Schedules and the Sherman Act, 27 DUKE L.J. 646 (1978).
263 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 208 cm t. a (1981). See generally CHARLES L. K NAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS
IN CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 599601 (
7th ed. Wolters Kluwer
2010)(discussing evolution ofunconscionability undercivillaw and com m on
law legalsystem s);Susan Landrum , Much Ado About Nothing? What the
Numbers Tell Us about How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine
to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 78187 (2014)(providing
historical and statutory overview of unconscionability doctrine);Larry A.
Dim atteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1068, 107175 (2006)
(reviewing developm ent ofunconscionability and its bifurcation into proceduraland substantiveform s).
264 U.C.C. § 2-302 cm t
. 1 (2000);R ESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS
§208 cm ts. b, f(1981). Som e legalscholarshave questioned the appropriate
role ofthe judiciary in applying unconscionability to invalidate provisionsof
adhesive consum er contracts. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 263, at 61012
(discussing scholarly concernsaboutjudicialapplication ofunconscionability
and im portance ofconsum erprotection lawsto police unfaircontracts);Leff,
supra note 44, at35658 (questioning reliance on judicialdeterm inations of
unconscionablecontractsthatarebetterleftup tolegislativebodiestoaddress);
Speidel, supra note34, at36365 (calling forgreaterem phasison consum erprotection lawstoprom otem orefairconsum ercontractsratherthan wastingjudicialresourceson unconscionability). But see Landrum , supra note263, at78185
(2014)(where the author
sem piricalresearch suggeststhatunconscionability
261
262
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and substantive unconscionability.265 The equitable principle of
unconscionability266 considersflawsin thecontractform ation process(proceduralflaws)and exam inesthesubstanceofclausesto
isapplied sparinglyoverallbym ostcourtswith onlysm allnum berofstatesinvalidating arbitration clausesunderunconscionability);John E. Murray, Jr.,
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 4043, 80 (1969)
(calling forcourtsto recognize the value ofjudicialinterpretationsofunconscionabilitytodeterm ineitsparam etersundertheU.C.C.).
265 See JOHN M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 332, 338
(West6th ed. 2009);Dim atteo & Rich, supra note 263, at 107275;Garfield,
supra note32, at28586;Leff, supra note44, at48688;Debra Pogrun Stark,
Jessica M. Choplin & Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the
Laws and Practices That Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 IND. L.
REV. 797, 79899 (2013). See generally ArthurAllen Leff, Unconscionability
and The CodeThe Emperors New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 48788,
55889 (1967)(criticizing the U.C.C. forfailing to clearly define unconscionabilityand tocreateexpressprocedural-substantivebifurcation analysis).
266 K NAPP ET AL., supra not
e263, at58485;PERILLO ET AL., supra note265,
at33233;Leff, supra note 44, at52829. An unconscionable contractissuch
asnom an in hissensesand notunderdelusion would m akeon theonehand,
and as no honest and fair m an would accept on the other. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 208 cm t. b (1981)(citing Hum e v. United States,
132 U.S. 406 (1889)(quoting EarlofChesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125,
155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750))). Both the Restatem ent (Second)of
Contractsand theU.C.C. recognizetheconceptofunconscionability. TherelevantRestatem entprovision statesthat
[i]fa contractorterm thereofisunconscionableatthetim ethe
contractism adea courtm ayrefusetoenforcethecontract, or
m ay enforcetherem ainderofthecontractwithouttheunconscionable term , orm ay so lim itthe application ofany unconscionableterm astoavoid anyunconscionableresult.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §208. TheUniform Com m ercialCode
indicatesthefollowingregardingunconscionability:
(1)Ifthe courtas a m atter oflaw finds the contractor any
clauseofthecontracttohavebeen unconscionableatthetim e
itwasm adethecourtm ayrefusetoenforcethecontract, orit
m ay enforcetherem ainderofthecontractwithouttheunconscionable clause, oritm ay so lim itthe application ofany unconscionableclauseastoavoid anyunconscionableresult.
(2)When itis claim ed or appears to the courtthatthe contractorany clausethereofm ay beunconscionabletheparties
shallbeafforded areasonableopportunitytopresentevidence
astoitscom m ercialsetting, purposeand effecttoaid thecourt
in m akingthedeterm ination.
U.C.C. §2-302 (2000).
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seeiftheyaretooharsh orone-sided(substantiveflaws).267 Courts
utilize a variety ofapproachesto unconscionability,268 butm ost
requireapartyseekingtorescindan agreem enttobeartheburden
ofshowingboth form sofunconscionability.269 Ifa courtm akesa
finding ofunconscionability, itm ay rejectenforcem entofan entirecontract, seversolelytheharsh clauses, orrestricthow these
offendingprovisionswillapply.270
Proceduralunconscionability focuses on unfair surprise and
theabsenceofm eaningfulchoicein contractform ation.271 Courts
m ayconsidera num berofissues, includingthelack ofparty education orsophistication, unequalbargaining powerbetween the
parties, unfairsurprisesin term sburied in fineprintorobscured
byfontorextensivelegaljargon, orthelack ofan opportunityto
review and negotiatecontractterm s.272 A courtwillneed toassess
U.C.C. § 2-302 cm t. 1 (Am . Law Inst. & Unif. Law Com m 
n 2000);RE(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §208 cm t. b (1981);K NAPP ET AL., supra
note 263, at 60507;PERILLO ET AL., supra note 265, at332, 338;Garfield,
supra note 32, at28586;Leff, supra note 44, at530;Stark, supra note 265,
at824.
268 K NAPP ET AL., supra not
e263, at60507;PERILLO ET AL., supra note265,
at332, 338;Dim atteo& Rich, supra note 263, at107275;Landrum , supra note
263, at 76769. State court analyses ofunconscionability claim s are further
com plicated byexistingstateand federalconsum erprotection laws.
269 K NAPP ET AL., supra not
e263, at605;Dim atteo& Rich, supra note263,
at1074;Landrum , supra note 263, at767. See William s v. Walker-Thom as
Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)(sem inalcase requiring showing of
both proceduraland substantive unconscionability in consum er installm ent
contractofadhesion forgoodstransaction). But see David Gilo& ArielPorat,
Viewing Unconscionability through a Market Lens (John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 489, 2009), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index
.htm l[http://perm a.cc/KA9F-FYXE](reviewingvariousform sofoppressivecontractterm s, butarguing thatcourtsshould notexam ine partiesornature of
transactionsforcontractfairnessbutshould instead considerwhetherm arket
com petition overcontractterm sexists).
270 U.C.C. § 2-302(
1);RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 208. See
Landrum , supra note263, at764.
271 U.C.C. § 2-302(
1)cm t. 1;R ESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 208
cm t. d.
272 See Ben-Shahar, supra not
e34, at8;Landrum , supra note 263, at768
69;Marciarille, supra note15, at365;Stark etal., supra note265, at825. In
them edicalfield, therem aybeaclearlyunequalbalanceofpowerbetween doctorsand patients, which can factorintoproceduralunconscionability. Professor
Marciarillestated that
267
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how thecontractprovisionsarepresented, theavailabilityofproductand service alternatives in the consum er m arketplace, and
traditionalprinciplesoffreedom ofcontract, which m ay m ilitate
againsta finding ofproceduralunconscionability. Becausethese
nondisparagem entclausesarefound in consum ercontractsofadhesion, onem ighteasilyargueproceduralunconscionabilitybased
upon thelack ofm eaningfulchoicebecauseconsum ersoften lack
bargaining power, businesssavvy, and an opportunity tonegotiate contractterm s.273 In addition, few consum ers actually read
[p]atient-physician relationships have been fram ed by m any
m etaphors:parent-child relations;seller-purchasertransactions;
teacher-studentlearning;relations am ong friends;or parties
enteringintocontractualrelations. Itisnotnecessarytoalign
an understandingofphysician-patientrelationshipswith only
oneofthesem odelstounderstandthatthereareaspectsofaservice contract relationship to m odern physician-patient relations. Ithasbeen observed thatcontractprinciplesgovern the
inception ofthe physician-patientrelationship butthat bargainingpowerisalm ostentirelyrem oved from thepatientonce
therelationship isform ed, leaving tortlaw togovern theterm s
ofthe relationship. The lack ofequitable bargaining power
within thephysician-patientrelationship isattributabletoinform ation asym m etryandthecuriousintim acyoftherelationship.
Marciarille, supra note15, at365.
273 Ben-Shahar
, supra note 34, at 12;Read, supra note 46, at 39294;
Stark etal., supra note265, at825. ProfessorBen-Shaharcorrectlystatedthat
[r]ealpeople don
t read standard form contracts. Reading is
boring, incom prehensible, alienating, tim e consum ing, but
m ostofallpointless. We wantthe product, notthe contract.
Besides, lotsofpeopleboughttheproductortheservicealong
with thesam econtractandseem happyenough, sowepresum e
thatthere m ustbe nothing particularly im portantburied in
thecontractterm s. And whatiftheydid read?Surely, thereis
nothing they can do aboutthe bad stuffthey know they will
find. Are they going to cross outthe unfavorable term ? Are
they going to callsom e sem i-autom atic
custom erserviceagent
and negotiate?Otherthan losetheexcitem entaboutthedeal
and m aybe walk away from it(to what? A better contract?),
thereisnotm uch individualscan do. Dedicated readerscan expectonly heartache, which isa very poorreward forengaging
in such tim e-consum ing endeavor. Apartfrom an exoticindividualhereorthere, nobodyreads.
Ben-Shahar, supra note34, at2.

108 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
adhesive contracts, and even ifthey did read thecontract, m ost
donotunderstand fullywhattheseterm sm ean.274
Yet consum er contracts ofadhesion are not autom atically
procedurally unconscionable, and are routinely enforced.275 The
Restatem ent (Second) of Contracts provision on standardized
agreem entsacceptstheinherentvalueofadhesiveconsum ercontracts in a world ofm ass distribution ofgoods and services.276
Enorm oussavingsin tim e, cost, andeffortoccurwhen individually
negotiatedcontractsgivewaytostandardform agreem ents.277 The
Restatem ent provision also recognizes that the drafter ofstandard contractform sknowsthatfew willread orunderstand the
term s ofa standardized contractand m ustrely upon the good
faith ofitsdrafters.278
274 See Ben-Shahar, supra not
e 34, at23;Read, supra note 46, at39294;
Stark etal., supra note 265, at 82829. Professor Stark and her co-authors
also lam ented that courts often failto address the basic reality that m ost
consum ersdonotread contractsofadhesion. Theystated that
[c]ourts need to engage in this fiction because buyers could
otherwise argue that they failed to read or understand any
term ofthe contractthatthey laterregret, thus, eroding the
goalofcertaintyofcontract. Although courtsm ayneed, in the
typicalcase, to engage in this fiction, they should be aware
thatitis, in fact, a fiction;in caseswhere the term sare very
unreasonableand one-sided, courtsshould keep thisfiction in
m ind.
Stark etal., supra note265, at828 (footnoteom itted). See supra notes34, 44
and accom panyingtext.
275 Landrum , supra not
e263, at769.
276 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §211 cm t. a(1981):
a. Utility of standardization. Standardization ofagreem ents
servesm anyofthesam efunctionsasstandardization ofgoods
and services;both areessentialtoa system ofm assproduction
and distribution. Scarce and costly tim e and skillcan be devoted to a classoftransactionsratherthan to detailsofindividualtransactions.
See MURRAY, supra note249, at§97;Read, supra note46, at39294.
277 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 211 cm t. ab. The Restatem ent
provision also recognizes thatthe drafter ofstandard contractform s knows
thatfew willread orunderstand the term sofa standardized contract. Id. at
cm t. b.
278 Id. atcm t
. b. Com m entbstates:
b. Assent to unknown terms. A partywhom akesregularuseof
a standardized form ofagreem entdoesnotordinarily expecthis
custom ersto understand oreven to read the standard term s.
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Butgovernm entregulation and judicialreview m ay prohibit
oroverturn unfaircontractterm sthatfalloutsideofthereasonableexpectationsofthenon-drafting party.279 Undersubstantive
unconscionability, thedisputed contractterm sm aybeevaluated
todecideifthey aretoooppressively harsh orone-sided in favor
ofthecontractdrafter.280 Som eexam plesofsuch term sareexcessive price provisions, exculpatory clauses on dam ages, unusual
warrantydisclaim ers, unreasonableforum orvenuechoices,281 and
thelack ofm utualityin contractrem edies.282 In som einstances,
liquidated dam ages clauses associated with nondisparagem ent
clauses thatare disproportionate penalties m ay be deem ed unenforceable. In Palmer, theplaintiffsargued thatKlearGear.com
obscured these clauses from view on a second page ofthe site
s
term s ofuse and went beyond the reasonable expectations of
consum ers.283 Without explicitly m entioning unconscionability,
Oneofthepurposesofstandardization istoelim inatebargaining over details ofindividualtransactions, and thatpurpose
would notbe served ifa substantialnum berofcustom ersretained counseland reviewed the standard term s. Em ployees
regularlyusingaform often haveonlyalim ited understanding
ofitsterm sand lim ited authoritytovary them . Custom ersdo
notin factordinarily understand or even read the standard
term s. Theytrusttothegood faith ofthepartyusingtheform
and to the tacitrepresentation thatlike term s are being accepted regularly by otherssim ilarly situated. Butthey understand that they are assenting to the term s not read or not
understood, subjecttosuch lim itationsasthelaw m ayim pose.
Id. See MURRAY, supra note249, at§97;see also supra note35 and accom panyingtext.
279 Sect
ion 211 specifically statesthat, astoform contracts, a provision will
notbe enforced when the drafterhasreason to believe thatthe party m anifesting such assentwould notdo soifhe knew thatthe writing contained a particular term , the term is notpartofthe agreem ent.RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §211(
3)& cm t. c.
280 See St
ark etal., supra note265, at82829.
281 PERILLO ET AL., supra not
e 265, at33940. See Dim atteo& Rich, supra
note 263, at 1107 (describing em piricalstudy finding that successfulunconscionability claim s involved unsophisticated consum ers with agreem ents
containing one-sided clauses, often excessive in price or exculpatory clauses
favoringm erchant).
282 See Br
agg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 60708 (E.D. Pa.
2007);Com b v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 117374 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
283 Pal
m erv. KlearGear.com , No. 1:13-cv-00175 (D. Utah filedJuly1, 2014).
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the court determ ined that the nondisparagem ent clause and
associated liquidateddam agesrem edieswereinvalid.284
Only Arizona has directly addressed a consum er nondisparagem entclauseunderunconscionabilityin acontractofadhesion,
in FreeLife Intl v. Am. Educ. Music Publns, Inc.285 In thatcase,
David LucasBurgesestablished a websitewith articlesand postingsthatcriticized FreeLife, itsbest-selling productHim alayan
GojiJuice, and itsm arketing and com pensation strategies.286 On
itsown website, FreeLife wrote an open letterdisputing Burges
s
com m entaries withoutm entioning him by nam e.287 Ataboutthe
sam etim eofhiswebsitelaunch, Burgescom pleted an onlineapplication tobecom ea m arketing executiveforFreeLifetosellits
products.288 In theapplication process, heconsented toan adhesive clickwrap agreem ent289 thatincluded a nondisparagem ent
clause.290 Burgesnevertook on thatrole, butcontinued to criticize FreeLife, and the com pany sued Burgesfordefam ation, intentionalinterference with contractualrelations, and breach of
contract.291 Hecounter-claim ed in defam ation regardingtheopen
response letteron FreeLife
swebsite.292
Burgesasserted thatFreeLife
sclickwrap contractwasinvalid,
and thestandardized clausewasunenforceableifthedrafterhad
reason to know or believe thatthe other party would nothave
agreed to thatterm ifhe had been aware ofit.293 Initially, the
courtstated thatArizona precedentupholdsstandardized agreem ents unless the term s are outside of the partiesreasonable
expectations.294 Thecourtfound thatBurgeshad voluntarily assented to FreeLife
s term swhen he clicked I Accept.295 Furtherm ore, the court determ ined that Burges provided no evidence
284 Id.

No. CV07-2210-PHX-DGC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97680 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1,
2009).
286 Id. at34.
287 Id. at3.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. at36.
291 Id. at35.
292 Id. at3.
293 Id. at56.
294 Id. at5.
295 Id. at5, 7.
285
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that FreeLife knew or had any reason to know that Burges
would have objected to this term .296 Looking to traditionalcontractprinciples, theArizonadistrictcourtdeterm inedthatavalid
contractexisted and thatBurges had assented to the term s of
theclickwrap agreem ent.297
Burges also claim ed the contract was procedurally unconscionablebecauseitwasa contractofadhesion, helacked theopportunitytonegotiateitsterm s, and hedid notpossessthelegal
expertise to understand the agreem ent.298 Recognizing these
factors, thecourtdeterm ined thatclickwrap agreem entsareroutinelyenforced in Arizona and otherjurisdictions.299 In reviewing
the docum ent
spresentation, the courtfound thattheagreem ent
wasclearly displayed before Burgesassented to itsterm s.300 In
addition, thenondisparagem entclausewaswritten in plain language, soitwasnotprocedurallyunconscionable.301
In addition, Burgescontended thattheadhesivenatureofthe
agreem entand the factthathe m ightbe exposed to m illionsof
dollars in dam ages for m aking truthfulstatem ents supported
his assertion ofsubstantive unconscionability.302 However, the
appealscourtdecided thattheterm softheagreem entwerenot
too one-sided or oppressive.303 Analogizing to em ploym entseverance agreem ents, the court indicated that itwas reasonable
forFreeLifetoprotectitsbusinessim agefrom itsown m arketing
representatives.304 Thecourtadded thatBurgeshad voluntarily
agreed to the term s and could notnow claim they were unfair
becauseitm ightm akehim liablefordam ages.305
The court then stated that the clause m ust be interpreted
based upon the plain m eaning of the term disparage.306 The
plain m eaning would suggestthateven true statem ents m ight
Id. at6.
Id. at5.
298 Id. at6.
299 Id. at56.
300 Id. at67.
301 Id. at6.
302 Id. at67.
303 Id.
304 Id. at6.
305 Id. at7.
306 Id. at7, 13.
296
297
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bedisparaging, subjecting Burgestopotentialliability forbreach
ofcontract.307 Theappellatecourtleftitup tofuturejurydeterm inationsasto whetherBurgesdefam ed FreeLife308 orifthecom pany suffered any dam ages from Burges
s assertions.309 Lastly,
the appeals court quickly dispatched any First Am endm ent
claim s, contending a lack ofthe requisite state action to invoke
thatconstitutionalrightin aprivatecontractsuit.310
With varied state approaches to unconscionability, itis uncertain how nondisparagem entclausesin consum ercontractswill
farein thefuture. In som eways, theapplication ofunconscionability to nondisparagem entclausesm ay follow a sim ilarpath to
courtreviewsofarbitration clausesunderthisconcept, with state
determ inationsallacrossthespectrum .311 Ifunconscionabilityis
thelegaldoctrineapplied, then consensusisunlikelytobefound
on thevalidityofsuch clauses.
C. Public Policy Concerns
Undercontractlaw, an agreem entisvoid and unenforceableif
itviolatesawell-establishedorclearpublicpolicy.312 Publicpolicy
Id. at7. Thecourtlooked tothedictionary fortheplain m eaning ofthe
term :
Disparage m eans [t]o bring discreditorreproach upon;to dishonour, discredit; to lower in credit or esteem . Oxford
English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). As the Court previously
said, the ordinary m eaning ofthisterm doesnotrequire that
the disparaging statem ent be false (citation om itted). Sum m ary adjudication as to the interpretation ofdisparagewill
begranted.
Id.
308 Id. at10.
309 Id. at11.
310 Id. at7. Thec
ourtstated that[t]heFirstAm endm entprotectsindividuals
from governm entinfringem enton speech, notprivateinfringem ent. George v.
Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996). There isno
unconstitutionalrestriction ofFirstAm endm entrightsin thiscase.
311 Landrum , supra not
e263, at75557.
312 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §178 (1981):
When A Term IsUnenforceableOn GroundsOfPublicPolicy:
(1)A prom iseorotherterm ofan agreem entisunenforceableon
groundsofpublicpolicy iflegislation providesthatitisunenforceableortheinterestin itsenforcem entisclearlyoutweighed
307
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m ay be derived from such sources as constitutionalprovisions,
statutory law, and/orjudicialprecedent.313 In voidinga contract,
courts willconsider ifthe public policy concerns outweigh the
interests in enforcing the agreem ent.314 In certain instances, a
in thecircum stancesbyapublicpolicyagainsttheenforcem ent
ofsuch term s.
(2)In weighing the interestin the enforcem entofa term , accountistaken of
(a)the partiesjustified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcem ent
weredenied, and
(c)anyspecialpublicinterestin theenforcem entofthe
particularterm .
(3)In weighing a publicpolicy againstenforcem entofa term ,
accountistaken of
(a)the strength ofthatpolicy asm anifested by legislation orjudicialdecisions,
(b)thelikelihood thatarefusaltoenforcetheterm will
furtherthatpolicy,
(c)theseriousnessofanym isconductinvolved and the
extenttowhich itwasdeliberate, and
(d)thedirectnessoftheconnection between thatm isconductand theterm .
A balancingtestisinherentin theRestatem entview ofpublicpolicy, which inevitablyleadstovaryingoutcom eson a state-by-statebasis. Belm as& Larson,
supra note55, at5256.
313 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §178(3)cm t. a(1981). See Bast,
supra note32, at67475, 678;Garfield, supra note32, at29697. ProfessorGarfield notesthat[w]hile freedom ofcontractm ightexist, there isno freedom to
usecontractsto underm ine im portantsocietalvalues.Garfield, supra note32,
at294.
314 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §178(1), (3)(1981). See Belm as
& Larson, supra note 55, at7380;Garfield, supra note 32, at29496. In evaluatingpublicpolicy, ProfessorGarfield indicated that
The Restatem entdoes notlistthe publicpolicies thatcourts
can considerin thisbalance. Rather, a courtcan considerrelevantlegislation, caselaw, and itsown perception ofthepublic
welfare. An oft-quoted passage from a nineteenth-century
English decision bestcapturesthe open-ended nature ofthis
public policy analysis, characterizing public policy as a very
unrulyhorse, and when onceyou getastrideityou neverknow
where itwillcarry you.In fact, the public policy analysis is
notonly open-ended, butitcan also lead to differentconclusionsovertim e.
Garfield, supra note 32, at 29798 (footnotes om itted). See also Dworkin &
Callahan, supra note 42, at17273, 17982 (discussing balancing publicpolicy
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courtm ay decide to severthe offending clause ifthe rem aining
contractprovisionsdonotoffend notionsofpublicpolicy.315
1. First Amendment Issues
From a constitutional perspective, legal experts dispute
whetherthese typesofcontractsand clausesviolate an individual
s First Am endm ent free speech rights.316 These restrictive
clauses not only im pact one
s right offree expression, but also
therightsofotherstohearalternativeviews.317 In addition, both
true speech and opinion speech are protected under the First
Am endm ent.318 Substantialtruth and opinion speech can be asserted in defam ation actions, asa plaintiffcan only prevailifit
can beshown thattherewerefalsestatem entsoffactthatdam aged an individual
sorbusiness
sreputation.319 Substantialtruth
disposesofclaim soffalsity, and opinion speech obviatesa showingofobjectivefactsrequired in defam ation situations.320
Som ecaselaw and legalcom m entatorscontend thatbecause
privatecontractsareinvolved, thereisnostateaction necessary
to invoke FirstAm endm entfree speech claim s.321 Other precedentand legalscholars suggesta m ore expansive approach in
which stateaction isinvoked when courtsarecalled upon toenforceprivatecontractsofsilenceand nondisparagem entclauses,322
especially ifthe governm ent
scoercive powerisused to deny rec323
ognized rights.
concerns between confidentiality of em ploym ent relationship and whistleblowerstatutesaim ed atpreventingwrongdoingand protectingpublicgood).
315 Dworki
n & Callahan, supra note42, at190.
316 Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at57;Garfield, supra note32, at31819.
317 Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at5762, 6466.
318 See supra not
es28, 36 and accom panyingtext.
319 Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at76.
320 See supra not
es28, 36 and accom panyingtext.
321 Garf
ield, supra note 32, at34849;see supra note 315 and accom panyingtext.
322 Bel
m as& Larson, supra note 55, at6769;Garfield, supra note 32, at
319, 34748, 362.
323 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note 55, at68 (asserting court
s unwillingnesstoenforcerestrictivepropertycovenantsbased on raceorcolorasim perm issibleuseofstateaction).
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However, thisbroaderapproach m aybeunderm inedbynotions
offreedom ofcontractin which partiesoften waivewell-established
rightsin ordertogain som ethingofvaluein return.324 Traditional
contractlaw allowspartiestofashion theirbargained-forexchange
underfreedom ofcontract, including waiving one
slegalrightsof
325
speech aspartofthatbargain. Contractcaselaw alsoim poses
thedutytoread upon allcontractingparties, includingthoseentering intoadhesiveconsum ercontracts.326 From existing precedent, consum ersunwilling toenterintosuch nondisparagem ent
clauses m ay reject them and take their business elsewhere.327
Therefore, itm aybeproblem atictoassertstateaction in instances
ofprivatecontracting.328 Thatsaid, freeexpression rightsm aybe
effectivelyprotectedthrough theapplication ofotherpublicpolicy
groundstostrip awaynondisparagem entclauses.
2. State Statutes Invalidating Nondisparagement Clauses
Thereareanum berofotherpublicpolicyissuesthatcould be
successfullyraised tochallengetheseconsum ernondisparagem ent
clausesasviolative ofa num berofstatutory laws. California is
the firststate to outlaw nondisparagem entclausesin consum er
Belm as& Larson, supra note55, at67.
Id.
326 Ben-Shahar, supra not
e34, at7.
327 Id. at12.
328 See Garf
ield, supra note 32, at 34849. Professor Garfield recognized
thatcontractsofsilence can only have powerifcourtsare willing to enforce
them asapossibleform ofstateaction. Id. at349. However, henoted that
[t]he consensualnature ofcontractlaw potentially affectsits
constitutionalsignificancein a num berofways. Onecan argue
thattheenforcem entofa contractofsilenceinvolvesnostate
action, becausea contractisthecreation ofprivatepartiesacting independently ofthe state. Likewise, even ifstate action
ispresent, onecan arguethatany party whoagreestoa contract ofsilence has im plicitly waived his First Am endm ent
rights. Lastly, even ifthere is state action and no waiver of
First Am endm ent rights, one can argue that state enforcem entofa contractofsilenceislegitim atecontent-neutralregulation ofspeech because the state did notselectthe speech
beingregulated.
Id. at34849.
324 See
325
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contracts by statute under its recent so-called Yelp Law.329
Thisstatutem akesitunlawfulto offercontractsforproductsor
services thatrequire a consum erto waive theirrights to m ake
anystatem entaboutthecustom erexperience.330 A businessthat
threatenstoenforceawaiverortriestopenalizeaconsum erposting an online review is subjectto civilfines.331 The fines range
CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.8 (2014). Thestatutestatesasfollows:
1670.8(a)
(1)A contractorproposed contractforthesaleorleaseofconsum ergoodsorservices m ay notinclude a provision waiving
the consum er
s right to m ake any statem ent regarding the
seller or lessororits em ployees oragents, or concerning the
goodsorservices.
(2)Itshallbeunlawfultothreaten ortoseek toenforcea provision m ade unlawfulunder this section, or to otherwise penalizea consum erform aking any statem entprotected under
thissection.
(b)Any waiverofthe provisionsofthissection iscontrarytopublicpolicy, and isvoid and unenforceable.
(c)Anyperson whoviolatesthissection shallbesubject
toacivilpenaltynottoexceedtwothousandfivehundreddollars
($2,500)forthefirstviolation, andfivethousanddollars($5,000)
forthesecond and foreach subsequentviolation, tobeassessed
and collected in a civilaction broughtbytheconsum er, bythe
Attorney General, orby the districtattorney orcity attorney
ofthecounty orcity in which theviolation occurred. When collected, thecivilpenalty shallbepayable, asappropriate, tothe
consum er or to the generalfund ofwhichever governm ental
entitybroughttheaction toassessthecivilpenalty.
(d)In addition, for a willful, intentional, or reckless
violation ofthissection, a consum erorpublicprosecutorm ay
recover a civilpenalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars
($10,000).
(e)The penalty provided by this section isnotan exclusiverem edy, and doesnotaffectany otherrelieforrem edy
provided by law. This section shallnotbe construed to prohibitorlim ita person orbusinessthathostsonlineconsum er
reviewsorcom m entsfrom rem oving a statem entthatisotherwiselawfultorem ove.
Id. See Songm ee L. Connolly, Dont Disregard Calif.s Non-Disparagement
Clause Ban, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:44AM), http://www.law360.com /articles
/585252/don-t-disregard-calif-s-non-disparagem ent-clause-ban [http://perm a.cc
/3Q5C-UGK9].
330 CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.8(
a)(1), (2)(b)(West2014).
331 Id. §1670.8(
2)(c).
329
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from $2,500 forthefirstviolation to$5,000 foreach subsequent
violation, com pounded by a $10,000 fine forwillful, intentional,
orrecklessviolationsofthelaw.332 Thesepenaltiesarenotexclusiverem ediesanddonotpreventotherform sofrelieforrem edy.333
Thestatutealsoexpresslyperm itsprivatecausesofaction, aswell
asenforcem entactionsby thestateattorney general, district, or
cityattorney.334
The law doesallow review sitesto rem ove postingsthatare
otherwiselawfultoredact,335 which m ayincludeunprotected obsceneand defam atory speech336 orconsum erpostingsthatdo not
com ply with the FTC
s Endorsem entGuidelines.337 Under this
statute, nondisparagem entandconfidentialityclausesin consum er
agreem entswould beillegaland could bevoided asagainstpublicpolicyin California.338 Currently, severalotherstatesareconsidering enacting theirown statutesvoiding adhesive consum er
nondisparagem entclauses.339
However, as written, this newly enacted law protects any
consum erstatem entfrom beingwaived by contract.340 Buta consum erdoesnothavealegalrighttopostanythingtheywish about
a business, sothelaw m ay need furtherjudicialinterpretation to
addressthe provision
sconflictswith existingtortactionsin fraud,
m isrepresentation, privacy, defam ation, and unfaircom petition, as
wellas com pliance with the FTC
s Endorsem ent Guidelines.341
In addition, thebroad languagewould alsoinvalidateportionsof
Yelp
s contract with site users. Its term s ofservice incorporate
contentrulesthatdonotallow consum erstopostanystatem ent
they wish regarding products and services.342 Contrary to the
new statute, Yelp
s own agreem ent with users forbids and perm itstherem ovalofcertain offensivebutotherwiselegalform sof
Id. §1670.8(2)(cd).
Id. §1670.8(e).
334 Id. §1670.8(
c).
335 Id. §1670.8(
e).
336 See infra not
es15356 and accom panying text.
337 See infra not
es36778 and accom panyingtext.
338 CAL. CIV. CODE §1670.8(
a), (2)(b).
339 See Connol
ly, supra note91.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Terms of Service ¶ 4 (
B), 5(A), 6(A), YELP (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www
.yelp.com /static?p=tos[http://perm a.cc/39GM-9XPY].
332
333
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speech, such as lewdness, discrim inatory or bigoted language,
and pornography.343
Thelaw willm ostlyaffectCalifornia-basedbusinessesorthose
doing business in California. However, m any ofthe sm allbusinessesand professionalsreviewed on crowdsourcing sitesarelocallyownedandoperated.344 Otherstateswillhavetoweigh in on
theissueofwhetherornotconsum ernondisparagem entclauses
are legal. As discussed earlier, an Arizona courtin FreeLife rejected Burges
spublicpolicy claim thatFreeLife
scontractviolated
Burges
s First Am endm ent right offree speech.345 The decision
indicated that First Am endm ent rights applied to governm ent
actorsand did notapply toprivaterestrictionson speech,346 and
concluded that the nondisparagem ent clause did not violate
Burges
s FirstAm endm entrights.347 In sum , the FreeLife court
upheld a nondisparagem ent clause in a clickwrap agreem ent
undertraditionalnotionsoffreedom ofcontract.348 However, the
courtrefused sum m aryjudgm enton theissueofwhetherBurges
disparaged FreeLife, contending that reasonable jurors m ight
differon assessingthesefactsabouthisspeech on hiswebsite.349
Because contractlaw isstate-specific, itisunclearifCalifornia
s
approach willbefollowed in otherstates, sochallengeswilllikely
follow on astate-by-statebasis.350
3. Anti-SLAPP Laws
State anti-SLAPP laws m ay also play a role in invalidating
defam ation claim s based upon nondisparagem ent clauses.351
Theselawsareintended toallow thedism issaloflitigation filed
with the aim ofhalting participation in a publicforum .352 Som e
Id. ¶ 6(A).
supra notes57.
345 FreeLi
fe Int
l, Inc. v. Am . Educ. Music Publ
ns, Inc., No. CV07-2210PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3241795, at*6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2009).
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id. at*45.
349 Id. at*6.
350 See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra not
e26.
351 Dohse, supra not
e3, at386;Kellogg& Frankel, supra note24, at1.
352 Marci
arille, supra note15, at377;Spencer, supra note 157, at50001;
Spinosa, supra note142, at75859;Russelletal., supra note11.
343

344 See
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anti-SLAPP statutesarelim ited toform sofpoliticalspeech, such
aspetitioning thegovernm entorcom m unicating with publicofficials.353 Otherstateanti-SLAPP statutesconsidera widerange
ofm attersofpublicconcern and arenotlim ited togovernm ental
interactionsorpoliticalspeech.354 Each statestatutem ayaddress
specificelem entsthata defendantm ustm eetin ordertoprevail
on a m otion to dism iss a lawsuiton anti-SLAPP grounds.355 In
addition, som e anti-SLAPP laws perm itdefendants to seek the
recovery of costs and attorney
s fees356 or to sue plaintiffs for
abusing legalprocessunderso-called SLAPP backsections.357
Regarding nondisparagem ent provisions, one could argue
under a broad anti-SLAPP rationale that the sharing of consum erinform ation, online and offline, isa m atterofpublicconcern. Consum ers m ay need inform ation about the quality and
valueofcertain productsand servicesbeforem aking purchasing
decisions. Onlinecrowdsourced review sitesarecom m on vehicles
fordiscussingthisim portantinform ation with awiderangeofpotentialcustom ers.358 Such clausespreventpublicdiscourseon the
issuesthatm atterto consum ers. In Demetriades, the trialcourt
determ ined thatefforts to squelch negative online reviews violated California
s anti-SLAPP laws, and dism issed the case. 359
Thatdecision waslateroverturned underthecom m ercialspeech
exception tothatlaw.360 Morestate-by-statechallengesareneeded
todeterm ineifanti-SLAPP statuteswillprovideadequatebases
forstrikingdown theseadhesiveconsum erprovisions.
Spencer, supra note 157, at50001;Spinosa, supra note 142, at758
59;LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26. Som estatesm ay am end theirantiSLAPP lawsto capture otherm attersofpublicconcern, which could lead to
invalidaton ofcertain consum er nondisparagem entclauses. LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra note26.
354 Kel
logg& Frankel, supra note24, at2;Spencer, supra note157, at501;
Spinosa, supra note142, at75859.
355 See Spi
nosa, supra note 142, at75859. See supra notes 16061, 206
14and accom panyingtext.
356 Spencer, supra not
e157, at501.
357 Spi
nosa, supra note142, at758.
358 Dohse, supra not
e3, at36768.
359 Dem et
riades v. Yelp, Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 13334 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014).
360 See supra not
es16566, 20221 and accom panying text.
353

120 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
4. Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Aside from anti-SLAPP statutes, strong argum ents can be
m ade thatthese adhesive consum er nondisparagem entclauses
aredeceptiveand unfairtradepracticesperpetrated on consum ers
and businesscom petitorsalike.361 Both federaland statelawsaddressissuesofdeceptiveadvertisingandunfaircom petition, which
m ay arise through eitherintentionalspeech ornondisclosure of
m aterialfacts. Atthefederallevel, theFederalTradeCom m ission
(FTC)possessesthelegalauthoritytosafeguard consum ersunder
Section 5 oftheFederalTradeCom m ission Act362 and toaddress
com petitorsconcernsunderthe Lanham Act.363 Theseactsauthorize the FTC to adoptregulationsand institute enforcem entactionsin ordertoprotectconsum ersfrom unfairordeceptivetrade
practices,364 such asdeceptiveadvertising. Deceptiveadvertising
is a form ofillegal, unprotected speech, which includes faked
endorsem ents, and related jurisprudencedatesback totheearly
twentieth century.365 Sim ilarly, since its earliestyears, the FTC
361 TheFTC hasdet
erm ined thatissuesofunfairnessand deception in businessconductareindependentlegalbasesforenforcem entactions, and conduct
m aybechallengedasunfair, deceptive, orboth. FED. RESERVE, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT, SECTION 5:UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 1
(June 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supm anual/cch/ftca.pdf
[http://perm a.cc/NDU5-ZYYL]. See Short, supra note3, at444, 447.
362 16 C.F.R. §255.0(
a)(2013);GuidesConcerningtheUseofEndorsem ent
and Testim onialsin Advertising, 74Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,126 (Oct. 15, 2009)(to
becodified at16 C.F.R. pt. 255). See Jessica Godell, Consumer-Generated Media
and AdvertisingAre They One and the Same? An Analysis of the Amended
FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. 205, 20709 (2010).
363 15 U.S.C. §1051 (
2012). See Godell, supra note362, at20910.
364 Tradi
tionally, the courts deferto the FTC
sadm inistrative expertise on
issuesofunfairand/ordeceptivepractices, and certain stateshavepatterned
their laws based on the FTC Actand FTC rulings. Brian D. Wright, Social
Media and Marketing: Exploring the Legal Pitfalls of User-Generated Content,
36 DAYTON L. REV. 67, 69, 71 (2010).
365 FederalTrade Com m i
ssion Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 71921 (1914)
(codified asam ended at15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc
y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937)(faked custom er testim onials on encyclopedia serviceisdeceptiveadvertising). Traditionally, in reviewing FTC actions, courts
have also upheld opinion speech grounded in an individual
shonestly held beliefs, even ifa party isbeing com pensated foritsspeech oreven ifthespeech
isinaccurate, butnotm otivated byfinancialgain. See Northam Warren Corp.
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hasaided businessessufferingeconom icdam agefrom a com petitor
sunfairordeceptivetradepracticesundertheLanham Act.366
In 2009, theFTC revised itsEndorsem entGuidestoaddress
online advertising m essages and endorsem entsin socialm edia,
including disclosure requirem ents for com pensated online ratings and reviews.367 In part, the Endorsem entGuides support
and safeguard the individualrightto discuss honestly held beliefsoropinionsaboutactualuse orexperience with a product
orservice.368 Theserevised guidesrequiredisclosure ofany m aterial connections between the consum er and any sponsoring
parties, with thegoalofprom otingtransparencyand avoidingdeceiving consum ersaboutwhethera review isa sponsored advertisem entorunsponsored consum eropinion.369 Initially, theFTC
broughtactions againsta publicrelations firm ,370 a sponsoring
v. FTC, 59 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1932)(failure to disclose com pensation to
celebrityendorsersoftoiletriesisnotunfairpracticeifbased on honestlyheld
opinions);Sci. Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 644(3d Cir. 1941)(upholdingdistribution falselycharacterizinghealth risksfrom alum inum utensilsifhonestly
held opinionsby personswith nofinancialinterestin com m erceortrade);see
also Godell, supra note362, at21012;Short, supra note3, at45758.
366 See Lanham Act
, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946)(codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§105172, 109196, 111129, 114141n (2012));see, e.g., E. B. Muller& Co.
v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944)(upholding FTC finding thatcom pany
s
falsedisparagem entofcom petitor
scoffeeascontaining chicory asform ofunfaircom petition);contra Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49, 5152 (6th
Cir. 1928)(setting aside FTC enforcem entactions forespionage and disparagem ent which were viewed as not am ounting to unfair com petition). See
Godell, supra note362, at21011;Short, supra note 3, at45657.
367 16 C.F.R. § 255 (
2013). See FTC Publishes Final Guide Governing
Endorsements, Testimonials, FED. TRADE COMM
N(
Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.ftc
.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm [http://perm a.cc/5GUC-5L4J]. See generally
Godell, supra note362, at207;Jason Goldstein, How New FTC Guidelines on
Endorsement and Testimonials Will Affect Traditional and New Media, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 609, 61213 (2011);Ponte, supra note 34, at472
86;Short, supra note3, at45860.
368 16 C.F.R. §255.1(
a)(2013). See CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at12.
369 16 C.F.R. §255. See generally Mal
bon, supra note 9, at14748 (sum m arizing UK and Australian rulesregarding fake online reviewsasm isleading
and deceptivepractices).
370 In re Reverb Com m c
ns, Inc. (No. C-4310)(F.T.C. Nov. 22, 2010), 2010
FTC LEXIS 89, at*1. See Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges that It
Advertised Clients Gaming Apps Through Misleading Online Endorsements,
FED. TRADE COMM
N (
Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/reverb
.shtm [http://perm a.cc/UC36-33DK].
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com pany,371 and an em ploym entscreening agency372 thatfailed
tocom plywith theserevised guidelines, and warned othersabout
theirinadequaciesin theirpoliciesand supervision efforts.373
Although theEndorsem entGuidesdonotexpresslydealwith
nondisparagem entclauses,374 theexclusion ofhonestfeedback on
consum erexperiencesseem s, ata m inim um , toviolatethespirit
ofthese interpretive rules. Nondisparagem entclausesalso tend
to skew consum erratingstoward positive reviews, presenting a
form ofdeceptiveadvertising.375 Theseclausesintentionallyfilter
outnegativecustom erexperiences, thereby preventing inform ed
consum erdecision m aking.376 Sim ilarly, theseclausesharm com petitorswhodonotusethem andaretransparentin theirdialogue
aboutconsum erconcerns.377 Thesebusinessesm ayreceivem ixed
reviewson crowdsourced review sites, whileotherbusinessesthat
em ploy these clauses m ay unfairly achieve high overallratings
and falselyappeartodonowrongin theeyesofconsum ers.378
5. Fair Use and Copyright Misuse
Asdiscussedabove, nondisparagem entclausesm aybegrounded
in questionableintellectualpropertyclaim s. Copyrightassignm ent
clausestransferownership ofreview postingsfrom theauthoring
custom ertothem erchantorlicensedprofessional.379 Upon receiving a com m unication from a businessoritslegalrepresentative,
m anyconsum ersm ightquicklydeletereviewsorrankingsoutof
371 In re Legacy Learni
ng Sys., Inc., No. C-4323, 2011 FTC LEXIS 112 at
*23 (F.TC. June10, 2011).
372 Uni
ted Statesv. Spokeo, No. 2:12-cv-05001-MMM-SH (C.D. Cal. June7,
2012). See Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly
Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA,
FED. TRADE COMM
N (
June 12, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/06/spokeo
.shtm [http://perm a.cc/WEF9-R4W8].
373 See Pont
e, supra note34, at46869, 48690.
374 Thedef
inition ofendorsem entm ightbeinterpreted toincludenegative
com m entary abouta com petitor
s products or services. However, the guide
s
exam plesallsuggestpositive reviewsin exchange forsom e m aterialbenefit.
16 C.F.R. §255.2 (2013). See Ponte, supra note34, at49394.
375 See Pont
e, supra note34, at49394.
376 See Bel
m as& Larson, supra note55, at38.
377 See Pont
e, supra note34, at49394;Short, supra note3, at444.
378 Short
, supra note3, at444, 447.
379 See Marci
arille, supra note15, at395.
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fearofan expensive, tim e-consum inglegalbattle.380 Ifacustom er
refusestorem ovehisorherpostings, then thebusinessm aysend
aDMCA takedown noticetotherelevantwebsiteowner.381 Som e
socialm ediasiteshaverefusedtohonortheselettersandrisk losing theirim m unityfrom copyrightliabilityunderthesafeharbor
provisions ofthe DMCA.382 Other sites m ay sim ply take down
the consum er postings for fear ofrunning afouloftheir duties
underthesesafeharborprovisions.383
Sim ilarly, clausesreferencing tradem ark rightsm ay prevent
custom ers from nam ing a provider
s business, goods, and ser384
vicesiftheywish toavoid litigation. Aswith DMCA takedown
notices, custom ers and crowdsourced websites m ay elim inate
postings in response to heavy-handed cease and desist letters
and threatened tradem ark infringem ent litigation. Therefore,
consum er speech is effectively prevented or chilled due to concernsaboutcopyrightinfringem entand tradem ark infringem ent
ordilution.385
Consum ersand ratingswebsitesm ay notbeawarethatthey
possessfairuse rights undercopyrightlaw, regardless ofthese
speech suppression clauses.386 Under copyrightlaw, fair use387
See supra notes14244 and accom panying text.
Marciarille, supra note15, at39597.
382 Id. at39596.
383 Id. at395, 397;CDT Com pl
aint, supra note 53, at15;see supra notes
14244and accom panyingtext.
384 Spi
nosa, supra note142, at748.
385 See supra not
e147 and accom panyingtext.
386 Vi
deo Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Hom e Entm 
t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206
(3d Cir. 2003)(suggesting thatfairuse opportunities forcriticism and com m entexistdespiteterm sofrestrictivenondisparagem entclauses);Ty, Inc. v.
Publ
ns Int
lLtd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002)(indicating thatfair use
m ay prohibit tradem ark holder
s effort to controlcontent of Beanie Babies
guides under its copyrightlicenses). See CDT Com plaint, supra note 53, at
1011;EFF GUIDE, supra note75;Read, supra note46, at406.
387 17 U.S.C. §107 (
2014):
Lim itationson exclusiverights:Fairuse
Notwithstanding the provisionsofsections106 and 106A [17
USCS §§106 and 106A], thefairuseofa copyrighted work, including such useby reproduction in copiesorphonorecordsor
byanyotherm eansspecified bythatsection, forpurposessuch
as criticism , com m ent, news reporting, teaching (including
m ultiplecopiesforclassroom use), scholarship, orresearch, is
380
381
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perm its the use of copyrighted m aterial for criticism or com m ent.388 The Register of Copyrights also previously indicated
thatquotation ofexcerpts in a review or criticism for purposes
ofillustration or com m ent is protected fair use.389 In such instances, one
suse ofthe copyrighted postingsorreviewswithout
a license orconsentfrom a copyrightholderis notan infringem entofcopyright.390 In addition, a person m ay m ake a fairuse
ofanother
s tradem ark in com m entaries orcritiques withoutinfringingordilutingthatm ark.391
As a com panion to fair use, som e federalcircuits have also
recognized the equitable principle ofcopyright m isuse to curb
the excesses ofthe term s and conditionsofcontem porary copyrightlicenses.392 While fairuse addressesa purported infringer
s
notan infringem entofcopyright. In determ ining whetherthe
use m ade ofa work in any particular case is a fair use the
factorsto be considered shallinclude
(1)the purpose and character ofthe use, including whether
such use is ofa com m ercialnature oris fornonprofiteducationalpurposes;
(2)thenatureofthecopyrighted work;
(3)the am ountand substantiality ofthe portion used in relation tothecopyrighted work asawhole;and
(4)theeffectoftheuseupon thepotentialm arketfororvalue
ofthecopyrighted work.
Thefactthata work isunpublished shallnotitselfbara findingoffairuseifsuch findingism adeupon consideration ofall
theabovefactors.
Id. See Pam ela Sam uelson, Copyright, Commodification, and Censorship:
Past As PrologueBut To What Future?, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO. 6, 9,
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/
~pam /
papers/haifa_priv_cens.pdf[http:/
/perm a
.cc/J8L2-XGZN](raising concernsaboutfuturedem iseoffairuseduetotreaty
obligationsand privatecontractingschem es).
388 See Sam uel
son, supra note387;CDT Com plaint, supra note53, at1011.
389 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FAIR USE (
Nov. 2015), http://www.copyright.gov
/fls/
fl102.htm l[http://perm a.cc/KDN9-ZVC8 (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 24(
Com m . Print1961).
390 Read, supra not
e46, at40610.
391 See supra not
e115 and accom panyingtext.
392 Read, supra not
e 46, at 40206; Jennifer R. Knight, Com m ent,
Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: and the Winner Is..., 73 TENN. L.
REV. 237, 23738, 246 (2006);BrettFrischm ann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving
Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application
to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 893941 (2000). See Sam uelson, supra
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conduct, copyrightm isuse, which isim ported from patentlaw,393
focuseson overreachingbyacopyrightholderthatresultsin a dim inishm entofpublicaccessto creative expressionsand knowledge.394 Differinginterpretationsofcopyrightm isusehavecreated
severaldistinctdoctrinalstrains. In som einstances, a courtm ay
require a showing ofantitrustviolations before applying copyrightm isuse.395 Othercourtsdonotrequireanexusbetween copyrightm isuseand antitrustviolations.396
In som e ofthese cases, courts address whether a copyright
s
statutory rightsarebeingutilized tosubverttheunderlying publicpolicy ofcopyrightlaw.397 Underthispublicpolicy approach,
the rightsholdersm ay try to extend theirstatutory protections
orcopyrightm onopolybeyond theintended objectivesand param etersofcopyrightlaw.398 A courtm ay refuse to apply copyright
note 387, at9. Contra Dore v. New Sensations, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144701, *9 & n.2 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2013)(stating thatfederallaw does not
recognizedoctrinesofcopyrighttrollingorcopyrightabuse).
393 Mort
on SaltCo. v. G. S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942)(sem inalcaseon
m odern application ofpatentm isusedoctrinein antitrustcontext). See Belm as
& Larson, supra note55, at85;Frischm ann & Moylan, supra note 392, at868
69;Knight, supra note392, at240.
394 Fri
schm ann & Moylan, supra note392, at81920, 89394;Knight, supra
note392, at23940.
395 See, e.g., BroadcastMusi
c, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 6 & n. 9, 24 (1979);
United Statesv. Param ountPictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 (1948);Saturday
Evening PostCo. v. Rum bleseatPress, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987);MitchellBros. Film Grp. v. Cinem a AdultTheater, 604 F.2d 852, 865
& n.27 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980);Syncsort Inc. v.
SequentialSoftware, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318, 33637 (D.N.J. 1999).
396 See, e.g., Pract
ice Mgm t. Info. Corp. v. Am . Med. Ass
n, 121 F.3d 516,
521 (9th Cir. 1997);Ass
n ofAm . Med. Collegesv. Princeton Review, Inc., 332
F. Supp. 2d 11, 22 (D.D.C. 2004);MicrosoftCorp. v. Lutian, 2011 U.S. Dist.
Lexis109918 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2011);see infra note 402 and accom panyingtext.
397 See, e.g., Al
tm ayer-Pizzorno v. L-Soft Int
l, Inc., 302 Fed. App
x 148,
15657 (4th Cir. 2008);Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Hom e Entm 
t,
Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 20306 (3d Cir. 2003);AlcatelUSA, Inc. v. DGI Techs.,
Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 79394 (5th Cir. 1999);In re Napster, Inc. CopyrightLitig.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7236, *39*41 (N.D. Cal. 2004);Lexm ark Int
l, Inc. v.
Static ControlCom ponents, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 966 (E.D. Ky. 2003);
Lasercom b Am erica, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 97576 (4th Cir. 1990). See
Belm as& Larson, supra note55, at85.
398 See supra not
e397 and accom panyingtext.
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m isuse when a party with unclean hands seeks to invoke this
equitableprinciple.399
Courtshaveadoptedthecopyrightm isusedoctrinein instances
whereplaintiffstried todeterthe legitim ateexercise offairuse
rightsthrough overlyrestrictivelicensingagreem ents.400 Forexam ple, in WIREdata, copyrightm isusewasinvoked toinvalidate
licensing agreem ents in which copyrightholders were seen as
abusingprocesswith unsupportablethreatsofcopyrightinfringem ent.401 Applying thedoctrineofcopyrightm isuse, JudgePosner
adm onished copyrightholders who m ightseek to overreach on
theirstatutory grant. Hestated thathoping toforcea settlem ent
oreven achieve an outrightvictory overan opponentthatm ay
lack theresourcesorthelegalsophistication toresisteffectively,
isan abuse ofprocess.402
The Third Circuit
s copyrightm isuse analysis in Video Pipe403
line islikely the m ostinstructive case on the validity ofnondisparagem entclauseswhen applyingcopyrightm isusewithin the
publicpolicy context. Thecaseinvolved a websitethatstream ed
film trailersform oviesin orderto m arketvideo rentals.404 The
websitebecam eem broiled in alicensingdisputewith Disneyover
itslegalrighttostream Disneytrailersonlineand tocopym aterialsfrom Disney m oviestocreate itsown online m ovie trailers
forstream ing.405 Thewebsiteclaim ed fairuseoftheDisney m aterialsand asserted copyrightm isuseregarding restrictiveterm s
in Disneylicensingagreem entsthatsoughttosuppressnegative
critiquesofDisney film sorthe entertainm entindustry,406 sim ilartoadhesiveconsum ernondisparagem entclauses.
Initially, the court determ ined that Video Pipeline
s use of
the m ovie and trailer, both copyrighted m aterials, did notm eet
See, e.g., Int
lMotorContestAss
n v. Staley, 434 F. Supp. 2d 650, 66869
(N.D. Iowa 2006);AtariGam esCorp. v. Nintendo ofAm erica, Inc., 975 F.2d
832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
400 Assessm entTech. ofWi
s., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 645
47 (7th Cir. 2003);Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at203;see Knight, supra note392,
at24344.
401 WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d at647.
402 Id.
403 See generally Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d. 640.
404 Id. at19495.
405 Id. at19496.
406 Id. at197, 203.
399
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threeoutofthefourrequirem entsforfairuse.407 Thecourtthen
addressed Video Pipeline
s claim that Disney
s nondisparagem entclause triggered a copyrightm isuse defense because ofits
harm fulim pacton fair use critiques and com m entaries.408 The
Third Circuitupheld theDisney licensing term s, reasoning that
these term s were notanticom petitive409 and did notnegatively
affecta party
srightto criticize Disney on othersites.410 Thecourt
alsodeterm ined thatDisneym ightfurtherlim itaccesstoitscreative trailersifthe com pany wasnotperm itted to protectitself
from derogatorylicensees.411 In thiscase, thenondisparagem ent
Id. at198203.
Id. at20306.
409 Id. at20406.
410 Id. at206. Unl
ike other blanketnondisparagem entclauses, licensees
were able to criticize Disney on the Internet, butnoton theirsitesshowing
Disneytrailers:
Thelicensing agreem entsin thiscasedoseek torestrictexpression by licensing the Disney trailers for use on the internet
only solong astheweb siteson which thetrailerswillappear
do notderogate Disney, the entertainm entindustry, etc. But
wenonethelesscannotconcludeon thisrecord thattheagreem entsare likely to interfere with creative expression to such
a degree that they affect in any significant way the policy
interestin increasing thepublicstoreofcreativeactivity. The
licensing agreem ents do not, for instance, interfere with the
licensee
s opportunity to express such criticism on other web
sites or elsewhere. There is no evidence thatthe public will
find itany m ore difficultto obtain criticism ofDisney and its
interests, oreven thatthepublicisconsiderably lesslikely to
com e across this criticism , ifitis notdisplayed on the sam e
siteasthetrailers. Moreover, ifa criticwishestocom m enton
Disney
s works, the fair use doctrine m ay be im plicated regardlessoftheexistenceofthelicensingagreem ents.
Id.
411 Id. at206. In t
his instance, the nondisparagem entterm s allowed for
greaterpublicaccesstocopyrighted m aterials:
Finally, copyrightlaw, and them isuse doctrinein particular,
should notbe interpreted to require Disney, ifitlicenses its
trailersfordisplayon any web sitesbutitsown, todosowillynilly regardlessofthe contentdisplayed with itscopyrighted
works. Indeed such an application of the m isuse doctrine
would likely decrease the public
saccessto Disney
sworksbecauseitm ightasa resultrefusetolicenseatallonlinedisplay
ofitsworks.
Id.
407
408
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clausehelped toensuregreaterdistribution ofcopyrighted creativeworksand im provepublicaccesstothesecopyrighted m aterials, socopyrightm isusewasnoteffectivelyproven.412
Conversely, the Third Circuit
s em phasis on increasing creativeproduction and im proving publicaccesstocopyrighted works
favorsconsum ers, notbusinesses, in typicaladhesive nondisparagem entclauses. Underthe Third Circuit
spublicpolicy approach
to copyrightm isuse, copyrightlaw seeksto expand the num ber
and diversityofcreativeworks, whilenondisparagem entclauses
using copyrightassignm entschem es strive for the opposite outcom e. Theseclausesseek toreducetheoverallam ountand variety ofauthored reviews and ratings. Unlike the Disney trailer
licenses, these clauses do not try to m axim ize public access to
copyrighted works, butseek topreventpublicdistribution ofand
accessto copyrighted reviewsand ratings. These consum erprovisionspervertcopyrightprinciplesin ordertocensorkeyproduct
and services inform ation and provide unfair com m ercialadvantagesoverboth consum ersand com petitors, outside the reasonableboundsofcopyrightprotections. Furtherm ore, theseclauses
underm inecongressionalpublicpolicy favoring and prom oting the
free flow ofideas in the online world, illustrated by the broad
im m unity afforded to websites hosting user-generated content
undertheCDA.
Despitethisanalysis, othercourtshaveupheld partywaivers
oftheir fair use rights by contract withoutapplying copyright
m isuse orothercontractexcusesordefenses.413 These decisions
point toward an em phasis on freedom ofcontract and private
ordering ofintellectualproperty rights.414 Therefore, thetension
between copyrightm isuseand freedom ofcontractand respectfor
theintegrityofcontractscontinueson astate-by-statebasis.
D. Excessive Penalty Clauses and Privity Issues
A num ber ofthese nondisparagem entclauses include liquidated dam agesprovisions, them eaningand im pactofwhich few
Id.
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d. 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005);Bowers
v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See Knight,
supra note392, at25960.
414 See Kni
ght, supra note392, at26061.
412
413
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consum ers understand.415 At the tim e of contract form ation,
liquidated dam agesm ustbereasonablebased upon thelikely or
actuallossessuffered from a breach and the challengesofproving dam ages.416 Publicpolicy isviolated ifa liquidated dam ages
clause is viewed as a penalty, or ifexcessive am ounts are involved, ratherthan an efforttoreasonablycom pensateforlosses
resulting from a breach.417 In Palmer, the consum erspurchased
Christm asgiftsthatwerenotdelivered, andwerepenalized m ore
than $3,500 forposting a negativereview.418 Ultim ately, a Utah
courtinvalidated theliquidated dam agesprovision and asserted
thattheplaintiffsneverowed anym oneytoKlearGear.com under
thatclause.419
415 See St
ark et al., supra note 265, at 809, 845. In their Consum er
Rem ediesExperim ent, theauthorssuggestthatthelegislatureshould outlaw
unfairterm s, such asharsh rem ediesprovisions, thatfew consum erscom prehend. Id. In showing both fairand unfairrem ediesclausestonon-lawyers, the
studyshowed that
[b]ased on otherresultsfrom the Consum erRem ediesExperim ent, itappearsthatthe clearly worded fair rem ediesclause
wassom ewhatdifficultforthem to understand because they
did notprecisely know whatlegalrem edieswere available to
them atlaw or in equity,legalterm inology thatany lawyer
orjudgewhohastaken a contractscoursein law schoolshould
readily understand butapparently notunderstandabletolaypersons. Sim ilarly, the clearly worded unfair rem edy clause
was also som ewhatdifficultforthem to understand, perhaps
because m any were not precisely sure what words like sole
rem edym eant. Theiradm itted difficultiesin understanding the
clauses m ostlikely accounts for their difficulties identifying
the portionsofthe rem ediesclause thatwould preventthem
from recoveringdam ages.
Id. at809.
416 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 356(1)(1981). The provision
statesthat
[d]am agesforbreach by eitherparty m ay beliquidated in the
agreem entbutonly atan am ountthatis reasonable in the
lightoftheanticipated oractuallosscaused by thebreach and
the difficulties ofproofof loss. A term fixing unreasonably
largeliquidated dam agesisunenforceableon groundsofpublicpolicyasapenalty.
Id. See MURRAY, supra note249, at81219.
417 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §356, Ill. 1.
418 Com pl
aintat13, Palm er v. Kleargear, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (N.D. Utah
2014).
419 OrderEnt
ering DefaultJudgm entat1, Palm erv. Kleargear, No. 1:13cv-00175 (N.D. Utah 2014).
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Sim ilarly, couples planning weddings at the Union Street
GuestHousein theCatskillswererequired tosign an agreem ent
thatprevented them orany person in theirwedding party from
postinga negativereview online.420 Theagreem entstated thata
five hundred dollar fine would be deducted from the couple
s
depositforeverynegativereview posted bythem oranym em ber
oftheir party staying atthe inn.421 The couple would only receive a refund of their deposit once the reviews were taken
down.422 Thisdam agesclause m ay also be viewed asa penalty,
as in Palmer. These types ofclauses willlikely failifthey are
viewed asunreasonable penaltiesin lightofthe breach and are
being m isused to deter true or protected opinion speech about
thecustom erexperience.
Penalty clauses m ay also raise issues ofprivity ofcontract.
Privity ofcontractexistsbetween partieswho have bargained for
and agreed upon the term sofa contract.423 Traditionally, parties
wererequired tobein privityofcontractin ordertobringalegal
action forbreach ofthatagreem ent.424 Certain nondisparagem ent
clausestry to reach beyond the contracting partiesto curtailthe
speech ofthird parties, includingotherfam ilyorhousehold m em bersand friendswho are notpartiesto the initialagreem ent.425
These contracts penalize a contracting party for the actions of
third parties who are notin privity ofcontract.426 In addition,
thesethird partiesarenotagentsofthecontracting parties, nor
aretheythird party beneficiariesoftheunderlyingagreem ent.427
TheUnion StreetGuestHouseagreem entm akesitclearthatthe
420 Gol
dm an, supra note 85;Mara Siegler, Hotel Fines $500 for every bad
review posted online, N.Y. POST (Aug. 4, 2014, 1:03 a.m .), http://pagesix.com
/2014/08/04/hotel-charges-500-for-every-bad-review-posted-online [http://perm a
.cc/Q7LS-UKFU]. See Roger R. Quiles, Esq., Why Fines for Negative Online
Reviews Are Not Legally Sound, RRQ LAW BLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.rrq
law.com /blog/
why-fines-for-negative-online-reviews-are-not-legally-sound [http:
//
perm a.cc/7NJC-LGG2].
421 Si
egler, supra note420.
422 Id.
423 MURRAY, supra not
e249, at870.
424 Id.
425 See, e.g., Com pl
aintat23, Palm erv. Kleargear, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (N.D.
Utah 2014).
426 Id.
427 Id.
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signing couplebecom esliablefortheconductofthird partieswho
havenotentered intothecontract.428 Itisdoubtfulthatapartyto
a contractcan forbid orwaivethe speech rightsofnonsignatories
duetothelack ofprivityofcontractbetween theparties.
Although notexpresslystated in theKlearGear.com contract,
John Palm er ordered the goods from KlearGear.com , but his
spouse, Jen Kulas, subsequently posted a negative review on
RipoffReport.429 KlearGearsoughttocollecton itsclauseforher
postingeven though shehadnotagreed toKlearGear.com 
sterm s
430
ofservice.
KlearGear.com 
s interpretation ofits nondisparagem entclausetried tobind notonlythepartieswhoentered intothe
contract, butalso third parties, such asfam ily, household m em bers, and friends who were notcontracting parties.431 One m ay
arguethatKlearGear.com ortheUnion StreetGuestHousehasa
contractualrighttoenforceitsnondisparagem entclauseagainst
thespecificparty in privity ofcontractwhoagreed nottoposta
negativereview. Yetitisunlikelythatthesem erchantscan suppressthespeech ofindividualswhoarenotpartiestotheagreem ent, nor can they penalize a signatory for a noncontracting
party
sexercise oflegalrightsdue toalack ofprivityofcontract.
IV. FEDERAL OPTIONS ON NONDISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES
Traditionally, contractlaw isstate-based, and effortsto deal
with nondisparagem entclauses face an extended state-by-state
evaluation. Thispiecem ealapproach createsuncertainty forboth
consum ers and businesses aboutthe validity ofthese adhesive
nondisparagem entclauses. In ordertoprovideauniform approach
tothisissue, itm aybem oreappropriateforfederalregulation to
protectconsum ersaswellascom petitorsfrom theseunfairbusinesspractices. Severaloptionshavebeen putforward toaddress
theseprovisions, including a proposed federalstatuteoutlawing
consum er nondisparagem ent clauses, further revisions to the
FTC
s Endorsem entGuides, and am endm ents to website im m unityundertheCDA.432
Siegler, supra note420.
Com plaintat23, Palmer, No. 1:13-cv-00175.
430 Id.
431 Id.
432 Consum erRevi
ew Freedom Act(CRFA)of2014, H.R. 5499, 113th Cong.
(Sept. 15, 2014).
428
429
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A. Enact Proposed Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2014
A federallaw addressing adhesive consum er nondisparagem entclausesisalready underconsideration, and would avoid a
m ore piecem ealor state-by-state approach to these issues. In
Septem ber of2014, California Congressm an Eric Swalwellintroduced the proposed Consum er Review Freedom Actof2014
(CRFA).433 Much like California
sstate law, the proposed federal
law voidsany adhesive contractthata businessoffersorenters
into thatrestricts orforbids a contracting party from posting a
covered com m unication.434 Covered com m unications include
written, oral, orpictorialassessm entsofbusinessproducts, services, or interactions provided by electronic m eans.435 Penalty
clauses forcovered com m unicationsin these nondisparagem ent
clauseswouldalsobevoidunderthisproposedstatute.436 Aswritten, thelaw doesnotaddresscontractsthattrytolim itorprevent
such com m unicationsin theofflineworld.437 Thelanguagecould
be broadened to include both offline and online com m unications
underitsterm s.
Furtherm ore, thislegislation indicatesthatany violationsof
its provisions should be viewed as unfairordeceptive practices
undertheFTC Act, which focuseson consum erprotection.438 Its
term scould befurtherbroadened toprotectcom petitorsfrom the
harm ofsuch clausesundertheLanham Act. Both theFTC and
state attorneysgeneralare perm itted to enforce the law,439 but
privateactionsarenotallowed underthefederallaw.440 Yetthe
CRFA would notpreem ptanyexistingstatelawson thesetypesof
contractclauses.441 Therefore, statescouldalsodeterm inewhether
toperm itprivateactionsundertheirstatestatutes, asisallowed
underCalifornia
sstatute.
433 Id.;see Eri
c Goldm an, Congress May Crack Down On Businesses Efforts To Ban Consumer Reviews, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://
www.forbes.com /sites/ericgoldm an/2014/09/24/congress-m ay-crack-down-on
-businesses-efforts-to-ban-consum er-reviews/.
434 H.R. 5499, §§ 12(
a).
435 Id. §2(
g)(4).
436 Id. §2(
a)(2).
437 Id.
438 Id. §2(
e)(2).
439 Id. §§ 2(
e)(2)2(f).
440 Id. §§ 2(
e)2(f).
441 Id. §3.
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Unlike California
s Yelp law, the federallaw deals with the
questionable use ofcopyrightortradem ark rightsin nondisparagem ent clauses. The proposed law invalidates any adhesive
clausethatassignsorcreatesan exclusivelicensetoanothercontracting party
s intellectualproperty rights in one
s own online
442
com m unications.
Although fair use rights are not explicitly
stated, onecan inferthatthenew law would protectthoserights
aspartofa party
sexisting intellectualproperty rights. However,
thelaw doesnotinvalidatecontractsthatprohibitthedisclosure
oftradesecrets, proprietary com m ercialorfinancialinform ation,
hum an resourcesandm edicalfiles, orlaw enforcem entrecords.443
Theproposed CRFA alsoexcludesfrom itsprotectionsanycontractthatcreatesan em ployer-em ployeeorindependentcontractorrelationship.444 Thisexception would notpreventbusinesses
from continuing to include broad nondisparagem entclauses in
theirworkplacepoliciesand contractswith em ployeesand independentcontractors. Therefore, theNLRB, SEC, and otherregulatory agencieswould stillneed to carve outrules to safeguard
whistleblowing and otherform sofprotected com m unications.445
TheCRFA could beim proved bydefiningcovered com m unications
toincludeform soflegalspeech, such astrueoropinion speech, as
wellasspeech otherwiseprotected underlaw, such asconcerted
action undertheNLRB orwhistleblowerstatutes.446
In addition, the CRFA language seem s to protectconsum er
speech thatisnotlegal, such asfalseordefam atory statem ents,
sim ilar to the California law.447 This law would also im peril
websitesthatofferadhesiveterm sofservicethatlim itorforbid
speech thatisillegal, such asfalseordefam atoryspeech, aswell
aslegalspeech, such asoffensive speech undercom m unity contentstandards. Ata m inim um , thewording should berevised to
expressly exclude illegal speech, such as false or defam atory
statem ents, from thedefinition ofcovered com m unications.448
Atthisearly stage, itisdifficulttodeterm inehow likely itis
that this proposed legislation willbe enacted. In today
s highly
Id. §§2(a)(1), 2(a)(3).
Id. §§2(b)2(c).
444 Id. §2(
g)(3).
445 See supra not
es6971 and accom panying text.
446 See CRFA, supra not
e432.
447 See generally H.R. 5499.
448 See supra not
es34043 and accom panying text.
442
443
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politicized environm ent, itm aybedifficulttopassany new laws
thatm ightbeviewed asburdensom etobusinesses, orm oreproperly handled on a state level. With the currentintransigence on
so m any issues facing Congress, a regulatory approach m ay be
fasterandm oreeffectivein addressingnondisparagem entclauses.
B. Revise the Existing FTC Endorsement Guides
Underthe term s ofthe 2009 Endorsem entGuides, the FTC
soughtto clarify the line between consum erdialogue and sponsored advertisingin socialm edia. TheGuidesdefined an endorsem ent as any advertising m essage that a reasonable consum er
would think reflected the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences ofthe online reviewer.449 The Endorsem entGuides m andate that an endorser
s statem ents m ustillustrate one
s honest
beliefs or opinions about one
s actual use or experience with
products orservices.450 To avoid pay-to-postm anipulations, the
2009 revisions required disclosure ofany m aterialconnections
between the online reviewer and the sponsoring business.451 A
m aterialconnection orrelationshipencom passesanyform ofcom pensation notoffered to the publicatlarge, such asspecialdiscounts, free sam ples, m oney, and sales com m issions.452 These
typesofrewardsm ay affecta reviewer
s assessm ent, skewing it
towards positive in order to continue to receive further benefits.453 Disclosures are required to be clear and conspicuous to
Revised Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 255(b)(2009). Endorsem entis defined as
follows:
[A]ny advertising m essage (including verbal statem ents,
dem onstrations, ordepictionsofthenam e, signature, likeness
or other identifying personalcharacteristics ofan individual
or the nam e or sealofan organization)thatconsum ers are
likely to believe reflectsthe opinions, beliefs, findings, orexperiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser,
even if the views expressed by that party are identical to
thoseofthesponsoring advertiser. Theparty whoseopinions,
beliefs, findings, orexperience them essage appearsto reflect
willbe called the endorserand m ay be an individual, group,
orinstitution.
Id.
450 Id. §255.1.
451 Id. §255.5.
452 Id.
453 Id.
449
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prom ote transparency between ordinary consum er reviews and
sponsored speech.454 By revealing these connections when posting a review, consum ersarem adeawareoftherelationship and
can determ inewhatim pact, ifany, ithasupon thecredibility of
theranking orevaluation.455 Thebusinessthatsponsored thereview, aswellasitsagents, such asadvertisingagenciesand reputation m anagem entfirm s, m ay be liable forfailing to educate
and m onitor com pensated reviewers for com pliance with these
regulatoryinterpretations.456
Although m any legalexperts were criticalofthese interpretiverules, the2009 Endorsem entGuidesprovideafederalvehicle
foraddressing nondisparagem entclausesthatencroach upon or
forbid protected true oropinion speech. Sim ilarto the proposed
federallegislation, these guides could be revised to assertthat
adhesiveconsum ernondisparagem entclausesareunfairand deceptivetradepractices. In prohibitingtheiruse, theguidescould
furtherexplain why such provisionsnegatively im pactboth consum ersand com petitorsin them arketplace. In addition, theFTC
could expresslystatethatsponsoringnegativereviewsisalsoan
unfairand deceptive trade practice to furtherassuage business
concernsaboutfake, negativereviews. Asa result, theFTC could
m ore quickly respond to this em erging issue withoutthe possible lengthy delays in awaiting congressionalaction on the proposed CRFA.
C. Amend Section 230 Immunity
UnderSection 230 oftheCDA,457 Congresssoughttoprom ote
the robust developm ent of online discussions and to support
454 Id.

455 FTC Pol
icy Statem enton Deception, Letterto The Honorable John D.
Dingell, Chairm an, Com m ittee on Com m erce and Energy (Oct. 14, 1983),
appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 17475 (1984), http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystm t/ad-decept.htm [http://perm a.cc/M432-7B7W]; see
Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, UserGenerated Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 750
51, 757 (2010).
456 See supra not
es36973 and accom panying text.
457 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(
f)(2)(LexisNexis 2013). Section 230 states that no
cause ofaction m ay be broughtand no liability m ay be im posed under any
State or locallaw that is inconsistent with this section. See generally Jeff
Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15 J.
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self-regulation by online spaceswithoutthe risk oflegalliability
foruser-generated content.458 Underthisprovision, Congressprovided broad im m unity forwebsitesthathostuser-generated content.459 Potentialliabilityforonlinepostingshingesupon whether
TECH. L. & POL
Y 123, 151 (
2010)(discussing how CDA im m unity effectively
balancesfreeexpression underFirstAm endm entand abilityofuser-generated
websitestocreatecontentstandardsreflectingcom m unitystandards).
458 47 U.S.C.S. §230. In i
tsfindingsoffact, Congressstated itsreasonsfor
perm ittingbroad im m unityforICPs.
(a) Findings. TheCongressfindsthefollowing:
(1)TherapidlydevelopingarrayofInternetand otherinteractivecom puterservicesavailabletoindividualAm ericans
representan extraordinary advance in the availability of
educationaland inform ationalresourcestoourcitizens.
(2)Theseservicesofferusersa greatdegreeofcontrolover
theinform ation thattheyreceive, aswellasthepotentialfor
even greatercontrolin thefutureastechnologydevelops.
(3)The Internetand other interactive com puter services
offer a forum for a true diversity ofpoliticaldiscourse,
uniqueopportunitiesforculturaldevelopm ent, and m yriad
avenuesforintellectualactivity.
(4)The Internetand other interactive com puter services
haveflourished, tothebenefitofallAm ericans, with am inim um ofgovernm entregulation.
(5)Increasingly Am ericansarerelying on interactivem edia
fora variety ofpolitical, educational, cultural, and entertainm entservices.
(b)Policy. Itisthepolicy oftheUnited States
(1)to prom ote the continued developm entofthe Internet
and other interactive com puter services and other interactivem edia;
(2)to preserve the vibrant and com petitive free m arket
thatpresentlyexistsfortheInternetand otherinteractive
com puterservices, unfetteredbyFederalorStateregulation;
(3)to encourage the developm ent oftechnologies which
m axim ize user controlover whatinform ation is received
by individuals, fam ilies, and schoolswhousetheInternet
and otherinteractivecom puterservices;
(4)to rem ove disincentivesforthe developm entand utilization ofblockingand filteringtechnologiesthatem power
parentsto restricttheirchildren
s access to objectionable
orinappropriateonlinem aterial;and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcem ent of Federal crim inal
lawstodeterand punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
and harassm entbym eansofcom puter.
47 U.S.C.S. §230 (ab).
459 See 47 U.S.C.S. §230(
f)(2).
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the website is classified as an interactive com puter service
(ICS)460 or an inform ation content provider (ICP).461 As ICPs,
userswho create and upload online content, such asconsum ers
posting reviews or ratings, m ay be held liable for their own
speech.462 Courtshavebroadly interpreted CDA im m unity, even
ifICSsdonotundertakecontentfilteringorm onitoring.463 Usergenerated contentsites, like crowdsourced review websites, are
typically categorized asICSsand havebeen found im m unefrom
liabilityforthird partypostings.464
For exam ple, in Reit, a dentistchallenged negative reviews
on Yelp that he alleged defam ed and harm ed his business.465
Reitobjectedtoan allegedlydefam atoryreview thatassertedthat
Reit
soffice wassm all,old,and sm elly,and thatthe equipm entisold and dirty.466 Reitcontendedthatseveralpatientscanceled theirappointm entsand hisdaily schedule often to fifteen
appointm entsperday felltofourtofiveperday afterthisnegativereview.467 Reittried tohaveYelp rem ovethenegativepost,
butitrefused todoso.468 Thecourtdeterm ined thatYelp wasan
interactive com puterservice, and im m une from defam ation liabilityforthesethird partyposts.469
47 U.S.C.S. § 230(f)(3). An interactive com puter serviceis defined as
any inform ation service, system , oraccesssoftware providerthatprovidesor
enables com puter access by m ultiple users to a com puter server, including
specifically a service orsystem thatprovidesaccessto the Internetand such
system soperated orservicesoffered by librariesoreducationalinstitutions.
461 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(
f)(3). Under the CDA, an 
inform ation content
providerm eans any person or entity thatis responsible, in whole orin part,
forthecreation ordevelopm entofinform ation provided through theInternet
orany otherinteractivecom puterservice.
462 See 47 U.S.C.S. § 230 (
ab);see supra textaccom panyingnote457.
463 See, e.g., Chi
. LawyersCom m . For CivilRights Under Law, Inc., v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 67172 (7th Cir. 2008);Carafano v. Metrosplash.com , Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 112324 (9th Cir. 2003);Zeran v. Am erica
Online, 129 F.3d 327, 33031 (4th Cir. 1997);Blum enthalv. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 5051 (D.D.C. 1998).
464 See Rei
tv. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d at 41214;see infra textaccom panying notes47781;see, e.g., casescited supra note463.
465 Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2d at412.
466 Id.
467 Id.
468 Id.
469 Id. at41314.
460
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However, som ecourtshavedeterm ined thata websitecan be
both an ICP andan ICS and can beheldliableform aterialsdeveloped and posted as an ICP.470 For exam ple, in Roommate.com,
theNinth Circuitdeterm ined thatthedefendantwebsiteoperated
a subscription service website designed to m atch people renting
outspareroom swith people looking fora place tolive.471 Using
drop-down m enus, subscriberswere required to develop profiles
including basiccontactinform ation, and to disclose preferences
ofgender, sexualorientation, and interest in allowing children
into a household.472 The site also allowed subscribersto subm it
additionalcom m entsaboutthem selvesand desired characteristicsofpotentialroom m atesin an open-ended essay.473 Further,
Room m ate.com established an e-m ailalertand search enginethat
facilitated alertsand searchesbasedon discrim inatorycriteria.474
TheFairHousing CouncilsoftheSan FernandoValley and San
Diego (Councils)sued Room m ate.com in federalcourt, alleging
thatRoom m ate.com 
sbusinessviolated federaland statefairhousingrequirem ents.475 ApplyingSection 230 im m unity, thedistrict
courtdism issed the case againstRoom m ate.com as an ICP becausethesubscriberscreated theirown profilecontent.476
On appeal, theNinth Circuitdecided thata websiteoperator
can be both an ICS and an ICP.477 The courtdeterm ined thatif
an ICS passivelydisplayscontentcreated entirelybyothers, then
itm aintains ICS im m unity with respectto thatcontent.478 For
exam ple, Room m ate.com was notliable forusercontentposted
in thefree-form essay section ofthatsite.479 However, iftheICS
created the challenged contentor is found to be responsible, in
See, e.g., FairHous. CouncilofSan FernandoValley v. Room m ate.com ,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008);Doctor
s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP
Holders LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14687, *66, *6869 (D. Conn. Feb. 19,
2010);MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com , LLC, No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at*2836 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004).
471 Room m at
e.com , 521 F.3d at116162.
472 Id. at116566.
473 Id. at117374.
474 Id. at1162, 1167.
475 Id. at116465.
476 Id. at1162.
477 Id. at116263.
478 Id. at116263.
479 Id. at1174.
470
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whole orin partforthe content, then the site isacting asan ICP
andm aybeheldlegallyliableforthatcontent.480 In thisinstance,
Room m ate.com could beheld liableforitsdiscrim inatory profile
questions, drop down m enus, and search and alertvehiclesthat
aided in thecreation ofwebsitecontent.481
Applyingthisapproach could spelltroubleforsites, likeYelp,
thatrely upon broad im m unity. Som ecrowdsourced review sites
m aydirectem ployeestocreatereviews482 andm ayencourageand
com pensate specific users who are popular influencers to post
theirassessm ents, creating a m ixed picture ofliability and im m unityforsuch sites.483 Asidefrom certain judicialdecisionsthat
lim itICS im m unity, Section 230 is underpressure due to legitim ateconcernsaboutcyberbullying, hatespeech, defam atorygossip sites, and revenge porn on web sites thatencourage and/or
financiallyprofitfrom thesetypesofonlinespeech.484 Som elegal
com m entators have criticized courts for applying im m unity too
broadly and fornotrequiring websitestoundertakesubstantive
m onitoring effortsin ordertom eritthe retention ofSection 230
im m unity.485
Id. at116263.
Id. at116567.
482 See supra not
es21619 and accom panying text.
483 See supra not
e198 and accom panyingtext.
484 Schorr, supra not
e 163, at73738;see Jonesv. Dirty World Entm 
tRecordings, LLC, 2013 WL 4068780 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2013)(findingwebsiteliableforthird partycontentasitencouraged thesubm ission ofsalaciousgossip
and m ade rude rem arks aboutcontent);but see Eric Goldm an, Should the
Dirty Website Be Liable for Encouraging Users to Gossip?, FORBES (Nov. 25,
2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com /sites/ericgoldm an/2013/11/25/should-the
dirty-website-be-liable-for-encouraging-users-to-gossip/.
485 SOLOVE, supra not
e 163, at15254;Schorr, supra note 163, at75657;
Short, supra note3, at46667, 470. On the issue ofself-m onitoring, Ms. Schorr
addresses instances of cam pus gossip websites actively soliciting m aterial
thatislikelydefam atoryofordinaryindividuals. Shestates:
When websites engage in intentional solicitation, they are
underm ining one ofthe two reasons for enacting § 230:encouraging self-policing. In fact, providing im m unity to those
whosolicitsalaciouscontentdoestheexactopposite. Thecurrentpolicy suggeststhatthere isnodifference between those
whom akea good faith efforttoself-police, thereby workingto
m aintain a high quality standard as to the inform ation they
disperse, and those who refuse to rem ove objectionable contentbecausetheylikestirringup controversy. Asa result, the
480
481

140 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:059
Proposalsarebeingdiscussed toreviseSection 230 tofurther
lim itICS im m unity, and tohold websiteslegallyliableforencouragingpostingsthataredefam atory, offensive, orillegalspeech486
or for failing to rem ove such illegalthird party m aterialafter
notice.487 Otherexpertsare pushing back againstproposed Section 230 changes, arguingthatexpansiveim m unitybestcom ports
with FirstAm endm entvaluesand thedem ocratization ofspeech
through online platform s.488 Som e com m entators are looking to
self-regulation asthebestway todealwith concernsaboutwebsitecontent, and toencourageservicestoadopttheirown content
standardsin responsetocom m unityconcerns.489
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELF-REGULATORY OPTIONS
While the debate rageson aboutthe value and scope ofSection 230 im m unity, an em phasis on self-regulation m ay be the
bestway to dealwith online contentissues.490 Furtherm ore, it
would bevery difficultforregulators, individuals, and businesses
to balance the concernsofallstakeholderswith regard to adhesive consum er nondisparagem entclauses, and to police the expansiveconsum erblogosphere. Considering theexplosivegrowth
ofsocialm edia, a betterapproach toadhesiveconsum ernondisparagem ent clauses m ay be to focus on website and business
self-regulation, ratherthan am ending Section 230 im m unity and
relyingtooheavilyon regulatoryauthorities.491
Internethasbecom e a safe-harborforthose who wish to prom otecontentthatwould beunacceptableifbroadcastthrough
a differentm edium . Atthispointin tim e, unlike when § 230
was enacted, the Internetis an expansive and thriving network. Therefore, itism oreim portanttoreestablish thepolicy
encouraging self-policing and to establish a policy discouragingdevelopm entofm aliciouswebsites.
Schorr, supra note163, at75657.
486 See supra not
e 483;Bluebond, supra note 4, at68485;Schorr, supra
note163, at74849, 75558.
487 SOLOVE, supra not
e 163, at 15254;Bluebond, supra note 4, at689;
Schorr, supra note163, at75657.
488 See Kossef
f, supra note457, at12728, 13435.
489 Mal
bon, supra note9, at15051;see Ponte, supra note23, at495508.
490 See Godel
l, supra note362, at217.
491 Mal
bon, supra note9, at15051;Ponte, supra note23, at495508.
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Therearea num berofself-regulatoryoptionsfordealingwith
adhesivenondisparagem entclauses. Som eoptionsm ay focusprim arilyon crowdsourcedreview sites, whileothersm ayem phasize
changingbusinessconduct.492 A num beroftherecom m endations
requirecooperation between thesesitesand im pacted businesses
to help reduce unnecessary tensions and festering m istrustbetween businessesand thesewebsites.493 In turn, theseideascan
help decrease lawsuitsoverratingsand reviews, saving wasted
tim e, effort, and expensesforallparties. Theseself-regulatoryproposalsm ayalsohelp toim provethecustom erexperience.
A. Revise Content Guidelines on Nondisparagement Issues
Crowdsourced review sitesm ayhelpbluntthenegativeeffects
ofnondisparagem entclausesbyaddressingthem directlyin their
sitepoliciesandratingscontent. Assom ealreadydo, crowdsourced
websitescan clearlyflagoridentifybusinessesand professionals
whoutilizeadhesivenondisparagem entclauses.494 Thisnotification could occurin a num berofways, including color-coding, specialnotation, orsym bols. In thisway, consum erswillbeeducated
abouta m erchant
spolicy and determ ine how they m ightview or
even devalue consum er assessm ents in lightofthis policy. The
sitecould adoptand im plem enta form alpolicyofuniform reduction in an overallrating ofa businessorprofessionalthatuses
such clauses.
In addition, sitescan m akeitcleartobusinessesand professionalsthatthey willrefusetohonortakedown noticesand cease
and desistlettersgrounded in adhesiveconsum erclauses. These
provisionscouldbeplacedin theterm sofuseforallwebsiteusers,
aswellasin advertisingagreem entswith theirown sponsors, who
are often businessesbeing rated on theirsites. Sim ilarly, credit
rating bureausm ay alsorefusetopostdebtentriesin consum er
credithistorybased on clausespenalizingconsum erspeech.
Tocom plem entthesebusiness-centricpolicies, itisim portant
forcontentguidelinestoaddressconsum erand com petitorabuses,
as well.495 Many crowdsourced review sites forbid users from
Ponte, supra note23, at50307.
Malbon, supra note9, at151.
494 Dohse, supra not
e3, at364, 39091.
495 Id. at38990.
492
493
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posting fake, false, ordefam atory reviews.496 Despite these provisions, itis unclearhow m any ofthese sites m ake m eaningful,
consistenteffortstoenforcetheseprovisions.497 Som esites, such
as Yelp and Edm unds.com , have begun to bring legalactions
against com panies that post fake reviews.498 Other sites m ay
wish todothesam etotam p down on fakereview cam paigns.
Outside oflitigation, review sitesshould enforce theirterm s
ofuseastofalseordefam atory reviewsagainstindividualusers
who m eetsom e threshold am ountofim properreviews.499 Sim ilartosafeharborpoliciesforcopyrighted m aterials, review sites
m aydeterm inethata usercan nolongerpostduetorepeated violations oftheir content guidelines. Alternatively, som e crowdsourced review sites only allow users who actually purchased a
productorservicetoposttheirreviewson thesite.500 Othersites
m ay allow any userto post, buthighlightreviewsfrom verified
purchasersto letconsum ersdecide whatweightto give to nonverified reviews.501 A verification process helps to reduce faked
reviews, both positiveand negative, which benefitsboth consum ers and businesses.502 To lim itsuspicious or repetitive ratings,
websiteterm sofusecan lim itthenum berofreviewsa custom er
m ay create regarding a given business503 and establish waiting
periodsbetween reviewsand updatesofpostings.504
Id. at389.
Short, supra note3, at45253.
498 Dave, supra not
e17.
499 Dohse, supra not
e3, at37778;Short, supra note3, at467.
500 Dohse, supra not
e3, at389;Short, supra note 3, at467, 47071. Som e
retailers m ay link purchases to an individual
s ability to post on their websitesorcould link one
spurchase history to one
sonline accounts. Short, supra
note3, at470. See, e.g., Verified Purchase Reviews, AMAZON.COM [http://perm a
.cc/87WQ-PVU3](onlineretailerwith verified purchaserreviewsnoted);Press
Release, Expedia.com , ExpediaOverhaulsHotelReviews, Consum ersCan Now
Sort Verified Reviews by Shared Interest (Mar. 8, 2012), http://viewfinder
.expedia.com /
news/
expedia-overhauls-hotel-reviews-consum ers-can-now-sort-veri
fied-reviews-by-shared-interest[http:/
/perm a.cc/E7CZ-BP3R];REEVOO.COM (UKbased aggregator ofconsum er reviews from verified purchasers ofproducts
and/orserviceswhich areneitherm anipulated noredited), http://www.reevoo
.com /our-difference/[http://perm a.cc/7SPU-2BRR].
501 See Pont
e, supra note 23, at50405;Tushnet, supra note 455, at722,
75456, 760.
502 Short
, supra note3, at467.
503 Dohse, supra not
e3, at38990.
504 Id. at379.
496
497
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Thesecrowdsourced sitesshould alsoeducateconsum ersabout
theircontentguidelines. Many usersdo notread a site
sterm sof
505
use, sofew m ayabidebyitscontentrules. Itisup tothesiteto
provide sim ple FAQsand video tutorialswhen a userissetting
up a profile to give them a basicunderstanding ofthatsite
scontentguidelinesand notionsoftruthfuland/orprotected opinion
speech.506 Thetutorialsshould alsoadviseconsum ersabouttheir
potentiallegalliability forfalse or defam atory statem ents. Ifa
sitedecidestorem oveapostingorshiftittoasecondarypage, the
consum ershould beadvised and given an opportunitytodispute
thischange, sim ilarto whatisdone forposted copyrighted m aterialson otheruser-generated sites. Sitesm ay alsowantto establish a policy to deny accessto the site forrepeatoffendersof
theircontentguidelines.
With such policies in place, m any businesses m ay be m ore
willing toabandon such clausesascounterproductivein im proving their ratings and harm ful to their business reputations.
Som e businesses m ay also com e to recognize thatthe negative
viralim pactofheavy-handed nondisparagem entclausesiscausingextensivedam agetotheirbrand im ageand hurtingtheircustom errelationships. Further, firm s m ay wantto avoid services
prom ising to rem ove negative postings507 or write positive ones
thatm ay violatetheFTC
sEndorsem entGuidelines. Besides, m ost
consum erreviews are positive, and users tend to be distrustful
ofbusiness ratings with too m any positive business reviews.508
Allowing a m ore balanced picture to em erge and engaging in
post-transaction dialoguewith consum ersm ay increasecustom er
loyaltyand brand valuein thelongerterm .509
Id. at390.
See id. at38990.
507 Id. at387. Dohse not
ed thatbusinesses should be wary aboutonline
reputation m anagers who prom ise to m ake allnegative reviews disappear.
These firm sm ightsilence the voicesofgenuine consum ers who can provide
helpfulfeedback orvaluablewarningsaboutproductproblem s. Id.
508 Mal
bon, supra note 9, at14445. Although som e consum ersbelieve they
can easilydetectfakereviews, ithasbecom everychallengingtodecipherreal
from fakereviews. Id. at145.
509 Dohse, supra not
e 3, at 387. Dohse indicates the im portance ofcontinuingconsum erdialogue:
Beyond technology tricksto displace negative reviews, reputation m anagerscan help businessesplaydefensebym onitoring
505
506
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B. Improve Website Filtering and Communication Programs
Businesses have often challenged filtering system s for dism issing truthfulpositivereviewsand highlighting negativepostings.510 Im provedtechnologicalfiltersand statisticalanalysescan
help sitestorecognizean influx ofsuspiciouspositiveornegative
reviews.511 Sitescan alsoprovideadequatestaffingtohelp quickly
review and rem ove evaluations thatthey discoverorthatbusinessesshow arefalse, defam atory, orinaccurate.512 In addition,
businessesshouldnothavetopayexcessivefeestohavesuch m aterialsprom ptlytaken down.513
Concernsaboutprioritized assessm entshavealsobeen raised
with regard to the influence ofso-called elitereviewerswho have
established a com m unityfollowing, aswellasthepracticeofhighlightingreviewswritten bysiteem ployees.514 Itm aym akesense
forsites to allow postings to flow naturally, perhapsby date of
review, rather than m anipulating the review rankings through
otherartificialm ethods. Thisnew m ethodology allowscustom ers
consum er-generated contentaboutthem and counseling them
on how to respond. Knowing how to com m unicate with custom ersonlinecan help lessen theblow ofnegativereviewsand
develop sustainable social m edia policies for the business.
This m ethod m ay also prove sm arter in the long run as opposed toflooding the Web with positivereviewsorconcealing
negative reviews, which are usually quick fixesrather than
perm anentsolutions. ReputationRanger.com encouragesbusinesses to respond to both positive and negative criticism .
ReviewPush also suggests m aking the review requesta perm anentfeature ofthe business
swebsite ora link included in
thebusiness
sem ails.
Id.
Malbon, supra note9, at144;Dohse, supra note3, at387.
Dohse, supra note 3, at38889;Marciarille, supra note 15, at38990;
Ponte, supra note 23, at 50304. One study determ ined that filtering
algorithm s could be successful90 percent ofthe tim e in weeding out fake
reviews. Ottetal., supra note13, at309, 316. See CDT Com plaint, supra note
53, at8 (discussing discovery ofrepeated use ofIP addressesasway to sort
outfakereviews).
512 Russel
letal., supra note11.
513 See Dohse, supra not
e3, at37475;Short, supra note3, at470.
514 See, e.g., Mi
chaelLuca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of
Yelp.com (Harvard BusinessSchoolWorking PaperNo. 12-016, 2011), http://
www.hbs.edu/
faculty/Pages/
item .aspx?num =41233 [http:
/
/
perm a.cc/
76HM-NSLW].
510
511
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toconsiderthem ostrecentassessm ents, allowinguserstofeelthat
theirviewsaretreated equally, ratherthan being subjugated to
whatisessentiallyapopularitycontest.
Itm ay also be helpfulto allstakeholders for sites to allow
businesses to highlightrecentim provem ents m ade in response
to custom er reviews. Mostm erchants and professionals do not
wish torem ain static515 and should havea noorlow-costway of
advisingcustom ersthattheirfeedback hasbeen heard and effectivelyresponded tothrough businessim provem entsorsitepolicy
changes. Manysitesalreadyallow businessestoresponddirectlyto
consum ers, and othersshould offersim ilaroptions.516 Businesses
should take advantage ofopportunities to create dialogue and
buildrelationshipswith theircustom erbaseon ratingssites.517
Crowdsourced review sites m ay also wish to partner with
m obileapplication developerswhoarecreating new avenuesfor
directcustom er-to-businesscontactpriortoaposted review. With
thisapproach, businessesm ayhaveachancetohandlecustom er
problem s before they resultin a deluge ofnegative postings.518
Forexam ple, Chattback isan app thatfacilitatesm obilecom m unicationsbetween businessesand consum ersbefore reviewsare
posted.519 Theapp allowsuserstoventtheirconcernsthrough an
anonym oustextingprocesswith m erchantsand professionals.520
Thesebusinessescan learn aboutand trytoresolvecustom erexperienceissuesbeforeangrypostsappearonline.521
Lastly, sites need to be m indfulthatthey address internal
conflicts ofinterestby linking advertising to preferentialtreatm entofreviewsand ratings. Forexam ple, a num berofbusinesses
accused Yelp ofhighlighting negative ratings and subordinating
positiveonesin an efforttoextortadvertisingdollarsoutofsm all
businesses.522 Business owners furtheralleged thatadvertising
staff m ade prom ises about rem oving negative reviews, som e
written by Yelp em ployees and elitereviewers, in exchange for
Marciarille, supra note15, at394.
See, e.g., Chang, supra note148;Dohse, supra note3, at391.
517 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, supra not
e26.
518 Id.
519 Dave, supra not
e17.
520 Id.
521 Id.
522 Chang, supra not
e148.
515
516
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purchasing advertising from the site.523 Yelp denies these allegations, buttheperception persistsam ong som em erchantsand
professionals.524 Anycrowdsourced review siteneedstobem indfulthatitsconsum erreviewsshould notbeutilized asleverageto
prom ote site advertising sales.525 Crowdsourced sites need to
adoptclearconflictofinterestpoliciesand provideappropriateem ployee training and supervision to avoid the kinds ofdam aging
perceptionsthatonlyincreasebusinessm istrustofreview sites.
C. Expressly Address Nondisparagement Clauses in Ethics Codes
and Best Practices
Much like the enactm ent oflaws, ethics codes for licensed
professionalsm ay often seem slow to reactto changing circum stances. Professionalorganizationshavebeen som ewhathesitant
torecognizetheim pactofsocialm ediaon theirethicaldutiesand
standards.526 Attorneys,527 doctors, dentists, and other licensed
professionals528 m ustoften awaitcase-by-casedeterm inationsby
licensing bodies abouttheirethicalobligations to newly em ergingissues.529 Som eorganizationsm aytrytostretch existingrules
on conflictsofinteresttosocialm edia issues.530 However, itm ay
523

Id.

524 Id.

Banks, supra note195;Richards, supra note175.
Marciarille, supra note15, at36667, 37172.
527 Tushnet
, supra note 455, at 74042;Stephanie Francis Ward, Grade
Anxiety, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2010, 5:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com /m aga
zine/article/grade_anxiety/[http://perm a.cc/R73M-B97U];Reginald F. Davis
& Joe Dysart, Brag Busters: Discipline is on the way for social media malefactors, panel says, 97 A.B.A. J. 28 (2011).
528 Mi
chelle Andrews, Consumer Reports Extends Its Ratings to Doctors,
NPR:SHOTS (July 3, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012
/
07/02/156136361/consum er-reports-expands-its-ratings-to-doctors [http:/
/perm a
.cc/PH6L-BUE5].
529 See Tushnet
, supra note 455, at 741 (South Carolina bar requires
attorneyswhouseonlinedirectoriestom onitorpostingstoensurecom pliance
with ethics rules on lawyer advertising and FTC disclosure rules);Joan C.
Rogers, Truthfully Bashing Other Lawyers in Blogs Doesnt Count as Conduct
Harmful to Justice, 80 U.S.L.W. 1532 (2012)(New York barassociation determ ined thatlawyer
struthful, publiccriticism sin blog ofopposing counselnot
violation ofethics).
530 Marci
arille, supra note15, at402.
525
526
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bem oreappropriatetoofferexplicitguidancetolicensed professionalsby am ending existing ethicscodestoaddressnondisparagem entclauses, in addition tootherspeech suppression efforts,
likeproblem aticlawsuitsagainstratingsweb sitesorunfounded
defam ation claim s againstconsum ers.531 While lawyers are already ethically obligated to foregofrivolouslawsuits,532 otherlicensed professionalcodesneed tom akeclearthatsuch conductis
unethicaland m ayresultin form alsanctions. Industryorganizationsm ayalsoofferbestpracticestotheirm em bersthataddress
theseconcernsin businesseswithoutaform allicensingschem e.
Professionals and industry m em bers m ay also wish to considerwaystocollaboratewith ratingsandreview sitestodiscover
em erging issuesin consum erexperiences, and tom oreeffectively
m onitorissues with theirm em bership. Forexam ple, Consumer
Reports participated with prim ary careand pediatriccareprovidersin a jointprogram in which patientsreviewed theirm edical
experiences on a scale ofone (low)to four (high).533 These surveysexam ined a varietyoffactors, includingeffectiveand useful
inform ation, respectfuland courteous interactions, and tim ely
appointm ents.534 The reportwasm ade publicly available online
toinform patientsand doctors.535 Som em edicalprofessionalsused
this survey data to assess the quality oftheir practices and to
m akeappropriateim provem entsbased on theseratings.536 Businessesand professionalsm ay wantto considerwaysto im prove
theirconsum erexperiencesby working with, ratherthan fightingagainst, crowdsourced review sites.
See Ponte, supra note23, at50203.
Id. Under the ABA ModelCode ofProfessionalResponsibility, attorneysaretoavoid undertaking frivolousactionsunderboth theethicalcanons
and thedisciplinaryrules. See MODEL CODE OF PROF
L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4,
DR 7-102(A)(1)(1980).
533 See MASS. HEALTH Q UALITY PARTNERS, HOW DOES YOUR DOCTOR
COMPARE?, CONSUMER REPORTS/MHQP HEALTH INSERT 2 (July 2012), http://
consum erhealthchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MHQP2012.pdf[http://
perm a.cc/8EWS-YR9B][hereinafterMASS. HEALTH].
534 Andrews, supra not
e528;Ponte, supra note23, at503;MASS. HEALTH,
supra note533, at2.
535 MASS. HEALTH, supra not
e533, at2.
536 See id. at5 (
discussinga doctorwhodisputed negativesurveyoutcom es,
but im proved his practice after his own survey showed sim ilar results);
Marciarille, supra note 15, at 38082 (discussing doctor concerns about
negativereviews, som eofwhich m aylead topracticeim provem ents).
531
532
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CONCLUSION
In the free-wheeling world ofcrowdsourced reviewsand ratings, every consum er m ay express theircandid perspectives on
business interactions, service offerings, or productexperiences.
Custom erreviewshavebecom ean essentialinform ation resource
for consum ers seeking advice on selecting goods and services.
Businesseshave recognized thatpositive reviewstranslate into
increased revenues, while poorratingscan hurtthe bottom line
and potentially doom new orsm allbusinesses. Som ebusinesses
haveresorted tocensoring consum erspeech with nondisparagem ent or gag clauses that squelch bad or negative reviews by
relying on dubiousintellectualproperty claim s, threatening liquidated dam agesclauses, and otheronerousfinancialpenalties.
Certain m erchantsand professionals, especially start-upsand
sm allbusinesses, justify these gag clausesaslegitim ateactions
needed toprotecttheirbrand and goodwillin a socialm edia environm entperm eated with bogusreviewsfrom unfaircom petitors
and deviousconsum ers. Often battlingforbrand im ageand businesssurvival, thesecom paniesm aylack theresourcesand expertise ofsophisticated m arketing strategies to dealwith negative
consum er reviews. In addition, som e sm allbusinesses contend
thatreview sites em ploy faulty system s and are shaking them
down forexpensiveadvertising to bury negative and som etim es
fraudulent reviews. In this contentious environm ent, it is no
wonderthatsilencinganynegativem essagesseem slikethem ost
cost-effectiveand expedientapproach tosom ebusinesses.
Yet nondisparagem ent clauses m ay be challenged under a
hostofcontractprinciples, including lack ofconsideration, the
doctrineofunconscionability, violation ofpublicpolicy, overreach
on privityofcontract, orexceedingtheboundsofreasonableness
in theirrem edies. Judicialsupervision oftheseclauseswillgenerate a slow case-by-case and state-by-state process that m ay
yield furtheruncertainty aboutthe legality ofthese provisions.
Proposed federaloptionsunderexistingornew federallawsm ay
providea m oreuniform waytohandlenondisparagem entclauses
in consum ercontractsofadhesion. Itisunclearwhetherand how
quickly federalauthoritieswould bewilling toaddressthisissue.
In addition, consideringtheexpansivegrowth ofcrowdsourced review sitesand otherform sofsocialm edia, itm ay bedifficultfor
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regulatorsto effectively safeguard both robustconsum erspeech
onlineand thelegitim ateconcernsofbrand owners.
A num ber ofself-regulatory options m ay provide faster and
m oreeffectivealternativesforthefuture. Contentguidelinescan
berevised toincreaseawarenessaboutonlineobligationsand to
dealwith theabuseofboth businessesand consum erson crowdsourced review sites. Technologicalfiltersand expanded custom erbusinesscom m unication optionscan help siftoutfakereviewsand
prom otegreaterfairnessin onlineinteractions. In addition, ethics
codes can directly address concerns aboutthe propriety ofnondisparagem entclauses in orderto help guide professionals and
im provetheirconfidentialrelationships. Although itm aybevirtually im possible to preventallfake reviews or unfair evaluations, efforts to develop and apply self-regulatory options m ay
im provetheoverallquality, fairness, and inform ationalvalueof
crowdsourcedreviewsforconsum ersand businessesalike.

